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ABSTRACT 
THE FOURTH EARL GREY AND IMPERIAL FEDERATION 
B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s and the Empire, 1880-1917 
by Neil B. Lyon 
The 4th E a r l Grey (1851-1917) was one of the most ardent 
i m p e r i a l i s t s of h i s generation. As a close f r i e n d of C e c i l Rhodes, as 
Governor-General of Canada, and as President of the Royal Colonial 
I n s t i t u t e , Grey devoted h i s l i f e to preaching the gospel of closer 
co-operation between B r i t a i n and each of i t s Dominions. 
This t h e s i s examines Grey's ideas f o r stronger p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and m i l i t a r y t i e s w i t h i n the Empire. These ideas are 
analysed by reference to the wider contemporary debate about Imp e r i a l 
Federation i n the years 1880-1917. What d i s t i n g u i s h e s Grey i s that he 
believed formal t i e s were inadequate by themselves unless an 
enthusiasm f o r the Empire was evoked i n the hearts of a l l Dominion 
subjects. Grey's personal endeavours to promote t h i s necessary 
i m p e r i a l sentiment were remarkable, and as Governor-General he did 
more than any other senior i m p e r i a l i s t to promote I m p e r i a l Federation. 
A t t e n t i o n i s given to the question of why Grey became an 
i m p e r i a l i s t , and the extent to which personal f i n a n c i a l gain may have 
been an i n c e n t i v e . Grey believed that I m p e r i a l Federation might bring 
numerous b e n e f i t s both to the United Kingdom i t s e l f , and to the world 
as a whole. Grey came to share Rhodes's c o n v i c t i o n that the B r i t i s h 
Empire was p o t e n t i a l l y the greatest means of promoting c i v i l i s a t i o n 
t h a t the world had ever known. For Grey, as f o r Rhodes, Imperial 
Federation was but a forerunner to the even greater goal of a 
f e d e r a t i o n of English-speaking peoples throughout the world, i n c l u d i n g 
the United States. 
An understanding of Grey's ideas w i l l provide the reader w i t h a 
u s e f u l case-study f o r assessing both the established and the current 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of imperialism i n the period 1880 to 1917. 
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INTRODUCTION 
H i s t o r y u s u a l l y spares l i t t l e time f o r f a i l e d schemes or ideas. 
The r e l e v a n t source m a t e r i a l i s soon consigned to the waste b i n , with 
perhaps j u s t a vague sense of speculation about what might have 
happened i f that p a r t i c u l a r idea had come to f r u i t i o n . I t i s 
ge n e r a l l y accepted that ' f a i l u r e ' i s a s u i t a b l e l a b e l f o r the notion 
of I m p e r i a l Federation - because a l l the c a l l s f o r closer union among 
the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies of the B r i t i s h Empire were u l t i m a t e l y to 
no a v a i l . Yet any study of B r i t i s h h i s t o r y between 1880 and the end 
of the F i r s t World War i s c e r t a i n l y incomplete without some 
understanding of what I m p e r i a l Federation amounted t o , since i t was a 
key f a c t o r i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l , i m p e r i a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h i n k i n g 
at that time. 
I m p e r i a l Federation was a loosely-defined phrase i n popular use 
among i m p e r i a l i s t s throughout the l a t e V i c t o r i a n and Edwardian 
periods. I t was used as a c o l l e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of the various ideas 
f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g l i n k s between B r i t a i n and i t s self-governing 
colonies i n A u s t r a l i a , Canada, New Zealand and South A f r i c a . To some 
i t meant a s t r i c t form of p o l i t i c a l r e o r g a n i s a t i o n on fe d e r a l l i n e s , 
w h i l e to others i t i m p l i e d a vague form of closer i m p e r i a l u n i t y or 
sentiment. C a l l s were also made f o r closer co-operation i n economic 
and m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s . I m p e r i a l Federation i s regarded i n t h i s thesis 
as a synonym f o r the i m p e r i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n of what i s termed the 
'White Empire', those colonies where there was s u b s t a n t i a l B r i t i s h 
s ettlement: i t does not r e l a t e to I n d i a , or to most colonies i n A f r i c a 
or elsewhere. These were considered by f e d e r a t i o n i s t s to be bound to 
B r i t a i n only by t i e s of conquest, not k i n s h i p . 
I m p e r i a l Federation undoubtedly f a i l e d as an idea. The B r i t i s h 
Commonwealth of Nations which evolved from the 1926 Imperial 
Conference es t a b l i s h e d the Dominions as autonomous governments having 
equal s t a t u s alongside B r i t a i n . This was the a n t i t h e s i s of the closer 
co-operation and organic union many e a r l i e r i m p e r i a l i s t s had 
sought.(1) Nevertheless, the p o s i t i o n which the Im p e r i a l Federation 
idea had i n the t h i n k i n g and motivations of so many of B r i t a i n ' s 
foremost p o l i t i c i a n s and other leading statesmen, as w e l l as i t s 
prominence i n p o l i t i c a l thought between 1880 and 1917, was remarkable. 
I t was I m p e r i a l Federation which prompted one of the shrewdest 
p o l i t i c i a n s of h i s generation, Joseph Chamberlain, to c a l l f o r 
i m p e r i a l t a r i f f reform i n 1903, even at the cost of the fortunes of 
the Unionist party i n the 1906 e l e c t i o n . The very existence of the 
Empire was i n t i m a t e l y t i e d up w i t h the a f f a i r s of B r i t a i n i t s e l f - i t s 
r e l a t i v e economic and m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , the s o c i a l welfare of i t s 
c i t i z e n s , the r o l e and ef f e c t i v e n e s s of parliamentary government, and 
the whole question of I r e l a n d . I n considering t h e i r country's 
c o n d i t i o n , as w e l l as i t s f u t u r e , B r i t i s h statesmen could also not 
avoid debating the f u t u r e of the Empire i t s e l f , i n which Imperial 
Federation played a major p a r t . 
Because of i t s importance, o r i g i n a l source m a t e r i a l r e l a t i n g to 
I m p e r i a l Federation has g e n e r a l l y escaped the waste b i n . Collections 
of major statesmen abound w i t h u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n , and h i s t o r i a n s have 
dwelt f u l l y on the a t t i t u d e s towards i t of major i m p e r i a l i s t s such as 
Chamberlain and Lord Milner. Indeed, i n most books about the Empire 
there w i l l be some mention made of I m p e r i a l Federation, a l b e i t u sually 
b r i e f l y and d i s m i s s i v e l y . Amongst the s u r v i v i n g archive m a t e r i a l , a 
considerable amount of relevant i n f o r m a t i o n may also be found. The 
Papers of the 4th E a r l Grey are an e x c e l l e n t example. E a r l Grey 
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(1851-1917), the grandson of the 1832 Reform Act Prime M i n i s t e r , was 
among the foremost d i s c i p l e s of the gospel of I m p e r i a l Federation. 
Grey's i n f l u e n c e stemmed l a r g e l y from h i s p o s i t i o n as 
Governor-General of Canada from 1904 to 1911. The f a c t that he was 
a c t u a l l y out i n the Dominions f o r seven years meant that he was one of 
the most senior advocates of I m p e r i a l Federation who could claim to 
have an i n t i m a t e knowledge of Dominion s e n s i b i l i t i e s . Indeed, the 
f a c t t h a t as Governor-General he intervened to an unusual degree i n 
Canadian i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s arguably serves to rank Grey alongside 
Milner (High Commissioner of the Cape, 1897-1905) i n having an 
exceptional understanding of both B r i t i s h and Dominion f e e l i n g about 
I m p e r i a l Federation. The extent of Grey's involvement i n Canadian 
p o l i t i c s - never missing an o p p o r t u n i t y to promote the i m p e r i a l cause 
- i s i n i t s e l f of considerable importance. 
Grey himself made various proposals f o r p o l i t i c a l f ederation 
w i t h i n the 'White Empire', as w e l l as closer economic and m i l i t a r y 
co-operation. These are analysed i n chapters three and four of t h i s 
t h e s i s . His proposals were not u s u a l l y s p e c i f i c , but are nevertheless 
worthy of comparison w i t h those advocated by the more widely known 
f e d e r a t i o n i s t s . His perspective, coloured as i t was by h i s being on 
the f r i n g e s of the Empire, o f t e n added a valuable contrast to the 
suggestions of those t h e o r i s t s who are o f t e n c r i t i c i s e d by h i s t o r i a n s 
f o r r a r e l y having s t i r r e d from t h e i r armchairs i n B r i t a i n , and whose 
conception of Dominion f e e l i n g was shaped l a r g e l y by the reports i n 
The Times. Grey knew b e t t e r than most that co-operation i s a two-way 
process, and t h a t nothing of value would ever be achieved i n the 
Empire i f the Dominions themselves were u n w i l l i n g to o f f e r the 
necessary support. 
I n order to overcome any scepticism or antipathy i n the 
Dominions about closer i m p e r i a l co-operation. Grey believed that a 
general f e e l i n g o f sentiment and emotional attachment to the Empire 
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must f i r s t be s t i r r e d up among the c o l o n i a l peoples themselves. 
I m p e r i a l Federation could not be imposed on them from above, whether 
by the B r i t i s h government or even t h e i r own l e g i s l a t o r s : l o y a l t y must 
s p r i n g from the heart. I n e f f o r t s to boost t h i s f e e l i n g of imper i a l 
sentiment. Grey was unsurpassed, both as Governor-General and l a t e r as 
President of the Royal C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e (1912-17). No B r i t i s h 
i m p e r i a l i s t d i d more than he i n seeking to promote an i n t e r e s t i n the 
idea of closer union w i t h i n the Empire, which he c o r r e c t l y saw as a 
fundamental p r e - c o n d i t i o n to I m p e r i a l Federation. His e f f o r t s are 
considered i n chapter f i v e . 
I n e x p l a i n i n g why i t i s that I m p e r i a l Federation f a i l e d , 
h i s t o r i a n s r i g h t l y s t r e s s that i t was never properly promoted, because 
i t s advocates preached only to the converted and r a r e l y won new 
supporters to t h e i r f l o c k . At one extreme there were avowedly 
p o p u l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n s , such as the I m p e r i a l Federation League, 
founded i n 1884 to win over the populace both i n B r i t a i n and the 
Dominions, while at the other extreme there were e l i t e pressure groups 
such as Milner's Round Table, established i n 1909, which sought only 
to win over the p o l i t i c i a n s and leaders of p u b l i c opinion. Again, 
Grey i s i n t e r e s t i n g , because he does not f i t e a s i l y i n t o e i t h e r 
category of s t y l e . As Governor-General he personally led the crusade 
to preach the gospel of I m p e r i a l Federation to a l l Canadians, but i n 
p r i v a t e he also made f u l l use of h i s o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n , as w e l l as h is 
considerable network of s o c i a l contacts, to b r i n g influence to bear on 
Westminster p o l i t i c i a n s and Fleet Street j o u r n a l i s t s a l i k e . 
Grey was not a n a t u r a l leader of men, nor a contemplative 
t h e o r i s e r . Nor d i d he f i t e a s i l y i n t o any of the p a r t i c u l a r schools 
of i m p e r i a l i s t thought which abounded at t h i s time. He was, however, 
as an i n d i v i d u a l i s t , an ardent preacher of what he believed. As w i l l 
be shown. Grey was very much an i d e a l i s t , w i t h remarkably v i s i o n a r y 
n o t i o n s , and h i s i n t e r e s t i n I m p e r i a l Federation was based on the 
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highest p r i n c i p l e s . For him the Empire was not about the number of 
square miles painted red on a map, or a mere consequence of the need 
to secure a safe passage to I n d i a . I t was a r e l i g i o n which 
transcended l o y a l t y to party and even h i s country, and which he 
p r a c t i s e d and preached w i t h the utmost d e d i c a t i o n . He saw the Empire 
as a means whereby peace, progress and m o r a l i t y could be spread 
throughout the world under the mantle of the Anglo-Saxon concept of 
' c i v i l i s a t i o n ' . To the modern reader such r h e t o r i c may sound somewhat 
crude and pompous. Perhaps i t i s . Perhaps, though, the problem l i e s 
p a r t l y w i t h the reader himself, i n being too c y n i c a l and unprepared to 
accept that some people genuinely held such views. 
Many i m p e r i a l i s t s besides Grey used s i m i l a r l y evocative 
language. Some have since been exposed as h y p o c r i t i c a l even i n t h e i r 
own time, concealing s e l f i s h e x p l o i t s behind a veneer of fatuous, 
pseudo-philanthropic w a f f l e . Such accusations are r e a d i l y f i r e d 
against men l i k e Chamberlain and C e c i l Rhodes. Here i t i s contended 
t h a t Grey should not be s i m i l a r l y condemned. Recently David Cannadine 
has repeated an accusation that Grey acted improperly i n h is 
involvement w i t h the 1895 Jameson Raid, and has h i g h l i g h t e d him as a 
c l a s s i c example of what the economist and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t , J.A. 
Hobson, l a b e l l e d a prime agent of c a p i t a l i s t i c imperialism.(2) To 
argue t h i s i s to ignore what Grey was r e a l l y l i k e . Grey was a genuine 
i d e a l i s t , and h i s imperialism was u t t e r l y untainted by s e l f i s h , 
c o r r u p t , or even m a t e r i a l i s t i c t h i n k i n g . I n f a c t , Grey was at times 
remarkably naive i n the extent to which he could be c a r r i e d away by 
h i s enthusiasm f o r the cause of I m p e r i a l Federation - an ingenuous 
i d e a l i s m which probably barred him from achieving success i n high 
p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e , but which none the less prompted i n him a sple n d i d l y 
impassioned v i s i o n of what might be achieved by closer i m p e r i a l union. 
The extent of Grey's idealism i s worthy of study i t s e l f . He 
came to see I m p e r i a l Federation as a panacea f o r every conceivable 
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problem - domestic, i m p e r i a l , and even i n t e r n a t i o n a l - as w i l l be 
shown i n chapter one. The p o t e n t i a l of the B r i t i s h Empire could be 
harnessed, he believed, to improve the welfare of the working classes 
i n B r i t a i n , and even to prevent the outbreak of war between nations. 
For Grey, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s were countless. I n 1885 he declared: 
The establishment of a great English-speaking f e d e r a t i o n drawing 
i t s s t r e n g t h from the four quarters of the globe, ready to r i s k 
something i n the cause of humanity, freedom, j u s t i c e and of peace, 
w i l l prove the most potent instrument that the world has ever seen 
f o r b r i n g i n g about the permanent and l a s t i n g regeneration of 
mankind.(3) 
Perhaps only one man had a greater v i s i o n : C e c i l Rhodes. As 
w i l l be explained l a t e r , the kind of I m p e r i a l Federation which Rhodes 
contemplated exceeded the w i l d e s t dreams of even the most committed 
f e d e r a t i o n i s t s . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to r e f l e c t , t h e r e f o r e , upon the 
very close r e l a t i o n s h i p that e x i s t e d between Grey and Rhodes. Grey 
served under Rhodes i n h e l p i n g to e s t a b l i s h the country that became 
known as Rhodesia, acted as i t s Administrator from 1896 to 1897, and 
l a t e r was appointed an o r i g i n a l t r u s t e e of Rhodes's w i l l upon the 
l a t t e r ' s death i n 1902. I t i s reasonable to suggest that Grey, more 
than anyone els e , was the successor to Rhodes's dreams, which he 
henceforth dedicated h i s l i f e to f u l f i l l i n g . 
Such t a l k about v i s i o n s and dreams might seem a l l rather 
r i d i c u l o u s : but an a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h i s remarkably s p i r i t u a l 
conception i s v i t a l i f one i s properly to understand the nature of 
Grey's d i s t i n c t i v e approach to the whole issue of I m p e r i a l Federation. 
Much current h i s t o r i c a l research about the Empire continues to revolve 
around much more mundane but equally speculative matters, such as the 
impact of Great-Power r i v a l r i e s or the importance of f i n a n c i a l 
i n t e r e s t s , i n seeking to i d e n t i f y the motivations f o r imperialism.(4) 
Since the time of Hobson, questions have been raised about the extent 
to which the prospect of o b t a i n i n g a personal p r o f i t has r e a l l y 
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determined the enthusiasm f o r the Empire. Cain and Hopkins, and more 
r e c e n t l y Davis and Huttenback, are among the present leading 
researchers i n t h i s f i e l d . ( 5 ) I n chapter two, i t w i l l be argued that 
Grey stands out as an exception to these general th e o r i e s . 
As an impassioned i m p e r i a l i s t . Grey placed the i n t e r e s t s of the 
Empire at the f o r e f r o n t even when approaching most B r i t i s h domestic 
issues. One of h i s f a v o u r i t e phrases was i n d i c a t i v e of t h i s : 'What i s 
my country? The Empire i s my country. England i s my home'.(6) One 
p a r t i c u l a r consequence was t h a t , f o r a while at l e a s t . Grey's approach 
to the I r i s h problem was unique among a l l h i s leading contemporaries. 
Although b i t t e r l y opposed to Gladstone's two Home Rule B i l l s , i n 1886 
and 1893, Grey came to believe that some form of f e d e r a l system of 
government f o r the e n t i r e United Kingdom was an i d e a l s o l u t i o n . More 
i m p o r t a n t l y s t i l l , he became convinced that United Kingdom federation 
was an e s s e n t i a l stage to be passed before I m p e r i a l Federation could 
be achieved. Grey thus added a d i s t i n c t l y i m p e r i a l perspective to the 
domestic arguments about I r e l a n d ' s f u t u r e , e s p e c i a l l y i n the period 
a f t e r 1909. This had a s i n g u l a r impact on the debate about I r e l a n d 
which l a r g e l y dominated B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s i n the period up to 1914. 
This i s discussed i n chapter s i x . 
Grey's c o n t r i b u t i o n to the subject of I m p e r i a l Federation i s 
th e r e f o r e of considerable importance. I f the impression has been 
given t h a t Grey was one of the p r i n c i p a l i m p e r i a l i s t s , then that must 
be d i s p e l l e d . He was only a second rank member, while the main team 
was u s u a l l y selected from the foremost mainstream p o l i t i c i a n s at 
Westminster. Nevertheless, Grey's c o n t r i b u t i o n i s so unique that i t 
i s worthy of f a r more n o t i c e than h i t h e r t o has been given by students 
of i m p e r i a l i s m . As Lord Milner wrote: 
[Grey] may not f i l l a great space i n the pages of h i s t o r y , but he 
w i l l nevertheless have exercised a more far-reaching and enduring 
i n f l u e n c e upon the f u t u r e of our country and the Empire, than many 
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men whose names w i l l be very conspicuous i n those pages.(7) 
This t h e s i s attempts to assess that i n f l u e n c e . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
IMPERIAL FEDERATION: THE BACKGROUND 
The essence of federalism i s the c r e a t i o n of u n i t s of equal 
s t a t u s , subordinate and responsible to one governing body. As a model 
f o r the B r i t i s h Empire, t h i s proposal was considered s e r i o u s l y by very 
few i m p e r i a l i s t s i n the period 1880-1917. The phrase Imp e r i a l 
Federation was f o r most of i t s advocates simply a l a b e l f o r any ideas 
which aimed towards strengthening t i e s among the various parts of the 
W h i t e Empire'. Before considering the exact proposals o f f e r e d by 
Grey and others as to what shape any moves towards c o n s o l i d a t i o n might 
take, i t i s necessary to e x p l a i n why the c a l l s f o r consolidation 
arose, and to analyse the atmosphere i n which the I m p e r i a l Federation 
movement developed. 
I t i s impossible to define what made someone an i m p e r i a l i s t , or 
even to de f i n e simply what imperialism r e a l l y means.(1) One can 
surmise, though, t h a t as the r a t e of expansion of B r i t a i n ' s formal 
overseas commitments increased from the 1870s onwards, and yet as 
fears of t h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y also grew, anyone of i n t e l l i g e n c e could 
not f a i l to take a clo s e r i n t e r e s t i n the Empire, w i t h which the f a t e 
of B r i t a i n i t s e l f was ever more c l o s e l y entwined. Among the most 
i n f l u e n t i a l statesmen i n the country who were i m p e r i a l i s t s , there were 
some who were also ardent supporters of I m p e r i a l Federation, such as 
Lord Rosebery (Prime M i n i s t e r , 1894-5) and Chamberlain at the top 
l e v e l , and Lords Curzon, Milner and Grey on the second rung. The 
consequence of t h i s was tha t the advocates of I m p e r i a l Federation had 
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an impact on the guidance of the Empire's a f f a i r s i n the period 
1880-1917 out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n to the r e a l p o p u l a r i t y of t h e i r cause. 
The f i r s t c a l l f o r I m p e r i a l Federation was made i n the decade 
a f t e r 1765, i n the wake of the f u r o r e i n the American Colonies about 
the i m p o s i t i o n there of a Stamp Tax. The idea was revived i n 1837, 
when t r o u b l e arose among the Canadian c o l o n i s t s , and once more from 
about 1867, when Canada was granted responsible self-government.(2) 
Contrary to J.E. Tyler's a s s e r t i o n that I m p e r i a l Federation emerged as 
an idea alongside the c r e a t i o n of the Royal C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e i n 
1868, t h i s body was j u s t evidence of renewed i n t e r e s t i n a long-
e s t a b l i s h e d concept.(3) I t may l e g i t i m a t e l y be argued that Imperial 
Federation was p r i m a r i l y a defensive response among i m p e r i a l i s t s to 
the fear that the Empire was i n danger of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , and that 
such d i s i n t e g r a t i o n would threaten B r i t a i n ' s p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s j u s t 
as much as those of the Empire i t s e l f . 
I n t h i s chapter two arguments are advanced to explain the 
development of I m p e r i a l Federation. The 'Consolidate or D i s i n t e g r a t e ' 
c l a i m w i l l be considered f i r s t , since t h i s was what a t t r a c t e d most 
a t t e n t i o n . There was, however, a second claim, that i m p e r i a l u n i t y 
was d e s i r a b l e as a goal i n i t s e l f - an i d e a l i s t i c strand of thought 
which, although not held by many, c e r t a i n l y does much to explain the 
enthusiasm f o r I m p e r i a l Federation of men l i k e Grey. 
I n 1918 the B r i t i s h Empire embraced 12,000,000 square miles of 
land and perhaps a quarter of the world population. Not since the 
height of the Roman Empire had there been such a dominant world power. 
Moreover, B r i t a i n had maintained t o t a l supremacy of the seas since the 
B a t t l e of T r a f a l g a r , and enjoyed u n p a r a l l e l e d wealth due to i t s status 
as the f i r s t , and most advanced, of the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d nations. Yet 
i t was vul n e r a b l e . A country at the height of i t s power has l i t t l e to 
ga i n , and ever y t h i n g to lose. Anything which seemed to challenge 
B r i t i s h s u p e r i o r i t y , such as the troubles i n Egypt (1882) and South 
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A f r i c a (1880-1 and 1899-1902), sent a shiver down the spine of every 
i m p e r i a l i s t . As Bernard Porter says: ^Fear probably made more people 
i m p e r i a l i s t s than anything else d i d ' . ( 4 ) 
I t seemed i n e v i t a b l e that soon B r i t a i n ' s naval power, and 
u l t i m a t e l y i t s c o n t r o l of so much of the globe, would also be 
challenged. This f i t t e d i n w i t h the general notions among 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s , p o l i t i c i a n s and j o u r n a l i s t s a l i k e at that time, of a 
^D a r w i n i s t i c world of s t r u g g l e , of success and f a i l u r e , of growth and 
d e c l i n e ' . ( 5 ) Chamberlain, f o r example, declared that B r i t a i n had now 
become ^the weary T i t a n , [ s t a g g e r i n g ] under the too vast orb of i t s 
f a t e ' . ( 6 ) Under Bismarck the new German s t a t e was making rapid 
advances both economically and m i l i t a r i l y , and was c l e a r l y looking to 
develop an empire f o r i t s e l f . The United States continued to grow as 
a n a t i o n , as i t expanded westwards across to the P a c i f i c Ocean - and 
i t s sense of n a t i o n a l self-importance also grew, r e f l e c t e d i n a 
growing American involvement i n the Caribbean and South America, which 
seemed to threaten B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s there. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
clash between B r i t a i n and the United States over Canada was r a r e l y 
f o r g o t t e n , e i t h e r . Russia, meanwhile, s t i l l seemed to be a severe 
t h r e a t to I n d i a , and proved a constant challenge to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
i n the Persian Gulf. 
Once one s t a r t e d to search f o r evidence of de c l i n e , one found 
i t everywhere - and the B r i t i s h have long had a f a s c i n a t i o n f o r t h i s 
s u b j e c t . As the f i r s t i n d u s t r i a l i s e d n a t i o n , B r i t a i n had much to fear 
from competition as other nations developed. I n 1860, the r e l a t i v e 
share of world manufacturing output was: B r i t a i n (19.9%), United 
States ( 7 . 2 % ) , Germany ( 4 . 9 % ) . I n 1900 the f i g u r e s were: United 
States (23.6%), B r i t a i n (18.5%), Germany (13.2%).(7) By 1913 B r i t a i n 
was i n t h i r d place, ^not because i t wasn't growing, but because others 
were growing f a s t e r ' . ( 8 ) O v e r a l l , B r i t i s h i n d u s t r i a l production grew 
at an annual r a t e of 3%, 1840-70, but only at 1.5%, 1875-94. While 
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Germany (1879), Russia (1881), France (1882) and the United States 
each protected t h e i r own burgeoning i n d u s t r i e s behind t a r i f f b a r r i e r s , 
B r i t a i n found i t s e l f less able to compete i n European markets. A 
s o l u t i o n , i n c r e a s i n g l y advocated by p o l i t i c i a n s and businessmen a l i k e , 
was f o r B r i t a i n to trade more w i t h i t s colonies than w i t h Europe, 
since the colonies o f f e r e d guaranteed markets f o r i t s manufactured 
goods and were p o t e n t i a l sources of cheap raw materials and food.(9) 
The challenge to B r i t a i n ' s m i l i t a r y power was another source of 
fe a r . The t h r e a t of invasion was recurrent i n the nineteenth century. 
The r i s e of German m i l i t a r y power posed a new t h r e a t , e s p e c i a l l y i f a 
Franco-German a l l i a n c e were to emerge. Whereas i n 1860 B r i t a i n 
boasted 347,000 m i l i t a r y personnel, and Germany 201,000, by 1880 the 
f i g u r e s were 248,000 and 430,000 r e s p e c t i v e l y . ( 1 0 ) As Germany's 
i n d u s t r i a l growth continued, the thr e a t to B r i t a i n ' s supremacy of the 
seas also seemed challenged: whereas i n 1896 B r i t a i n could boast 45 
b a t t l e s h i p s , Germany 21, Japan none and the United States 5, j u s t ten 
years l a t e r the f i g u r e s were 61, 31, 11 and 15 respectively.(11) 
B r i t a i n no longer Iru l e d the waves.(12) 
I m p e r i a l i s t s believed that B r i t a i n must expand i n t o A f r i c a , i n 
order to maintain i t s p o s i t i o n as a ^ l i v i n g ' n a t i o n , and must 
consolidate i t s e x i s t i n g Empire. A large empire could help sustain 
the B r i t i s h economy, which was v i t a l i f B r i t a i n were to be able to 
withstand any m i l i t a r y assault i n the f u t u r e . So, suggests Porter, 
i m p e r i a l expansion i n the 1880s, and the c a l l s f o r Imperial 
Federation, were p r i m a r i l y ^a r e f l e c t i o n not so much of B r i t a i n ' s 
growing power i n the world as of her slow d e c l i n e , or at least the 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of i t ' . ( 1 3 ) 
A f u r t h e r h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t point f o r advocates of Impe r i a l 
Federation was that B r i t a i n ' s main r i v a l s - Germany and the United 
States - were both nations comprised of various smaller states merged 
together. I t seemed i r o n i c that while they grew stronger by 
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c o n s o l i d a t i n g , u s u a l l y through a f e d e r a l system of government, B r i t a i n 
was i n danger of a l l o w i n g i t s colonies to d r i f t away. I n t e r n a l s e l f -
government had been granted to Canada i n 1867, Cape Colony i n 1872, 
and A u s t r a l i a i n 1901, although B r i t a i n had r etained c o n t r o l of a l l 
e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . 
These fears about B r i t a i n ' s f u t u r e were b r i l l i a n t l y portrayed 
by John Seeley, Professor of Modern H i s t o r y at Cambridge from 1869 to 
1895. I n The Expansion of England, published i n 1883, Seeley sketched 
out two scenarios f o r the f u t u r e of the Empire. Ei t h e r the s e l f -
governing colonies would become independent, l e a v i n g B r i t a i n 
considerably weaker than the other major powers, or else England 
may prove able to do what the United States does so e a s i l y , that 
i s hold together i n a f e d e r a l union countries very remote from 
each other. I n that case England w i l l rank w i t h Russia and the 
United States i n the f i r s t rank of s t a t e s , measured by population 
and area, and i n the higher rank than the states on the 
c o n t i n e n t . ( 1 4 ) 
Seeley was saying l i t t l e that was new, but he gave an 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e seal to these ideas by p o r t r a y i n g the f u t u r e of the 
Empire i n the context of h i s t o r y , and o f f e r i n g an e n t i c i n g mixture of 
i m p e r i a l i s t and p a t r i o t i c r h e t o r i c . His book was widely read, s e l l i n g 
80,000 copies i n the f i r s t two years, and received favourable r e a c t i o n 
from i m p e r i a l i s t s such as Rhodes, Chamberlain and Rosebery.(15) 
Another reader was Grey - who, as a H i s t o r y and Law undergraduate at 
Cambridge i n the e a r l y 1870s would have come i n t o contact w i t h Seeley 
on a formal basis. Expansion was recommended to him by his f r i e n d 
A l f r e d L y t t e l t o n ( C o l o n i a l Secretary, 1903-5) as 'one of the most 
b r i l l i a n t and suggestive l i t t l e books w r i t t e n f o r some time'.(16) 
Wormell says that Seeley was c r e d i t e d by many w i t h having transformed 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c opinion about the Empire from a s t a t e of i n d i f f e r e n c e 
to one of attachment, and that he achieved t h i s l a r g e l y because he 
stressed how much the Empire could a f f e c t the fortunes of B r i t a i n 
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i t s e l f : he thus appealed to basic p a t r i o t i s m . H i s t o r i a n s such as 
H.A.L. Fisher and R.K. Ensor have l i k e w i s e acknowledged the profound 
impact which Expansion had on the p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g of the nation, by 
r e j e c t i n g an i n s u l a r approach to B r i t i s h h i s t o r y . ( 1 7 ) 
Seeley's book established him as 'the figurehead of the 
I m p e r i a l Federation movement'.(18) I t was a great source of 
i n s p i r a t i o n to the I m p e r i a l Federation League ( o f which Seeley was a 
founder member), established i n J u l y 1884 to advance the aim of 
co n s o l i d a t i o n . ( 1 9 ) I t was launched w i t h a meeting of p u b l i c f i g u r e s 
'favourable to the permanent u n i t y of England and the Colonies, to 
discuss the means of securing such union by some form of p o l i t i c a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n and also the expediency of b r i n g i n g the question more 
prominently before the p u b l i c ' . ( 2 0 ) W.E. Forster chaired the meeting, 
which was attended by more than f o r t y prominent p o l i t i c i a n s , i n c l u d i n g 
Rosebery and Chamberlain, as w e l l as some c o l o n i a l s and lesser 
p o l i t i c i a n s l i k e Grey, then L i b e r a l M.P. f o r South Northumberland. 
From the outs e t , the League saw i t s e l f as a propagandist 
movement r a t h e r than a policy-making body, and l i k e Seeley i t opted 
not to advocate p a r t i c u l a r schemes of con s o l i d a t i o n . This 
conveniently meant that i t could t a l k i n general terms about the 
merits of such a proposal, without embroiling i t s e l f i n the 
controversy of d e t a i l . Forster suggested that the word 'federalism' 
was i t s e l f i n a p p r o p r i a t e , since no f e d e r a l system l i k e that i n the 
United States was intended f o r the Empire, while Rosebery warned the 
League not to be too hasty i n i t s proposals, since most ordinary 
B r i t i s h and c o l o n i a l people were s t i l l l a r g e l y i n d i f f e r e n t to the 
Empire except where p a t r i o t i s m or s e l f - i n t e r e s t were s t i r r e d up -
perhaps by a c o l o n i a l war. I t should be the f i r s t task of the League, 
as Seeley had advocated, to teach these people of the b e n e f i t s that 
I m p e r i a l Federation might b r i n g . 
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I f I m p e r i a l Federation were u l t i m a t e l y to succeed, the 
i n i t i a t i v e would have to be taken equally by B r i t a i n and the 
Dominions. A c t i v i t y j u s t by B r i t a i n might appear to the c o l o n i a l s to 
be l i t t l e more than an attempt towards B r i t i s h c e n t r a l i s a t i o n , and to 
threaten the l o c a l autonomy which they were e s t a b l i s h i n g f o r 
themselves. I t could not j u s t be a B r i t i s h idea. Branches of the 
League were set up i n the Dominions themselves, t h e r e f o r e , and i n 
Canada they achieved a reasonable momentum under George Parkin, a 
Canadian enthusiast who had been at Oxford w i t h Milner. 
The League soon a t t r a c t e d a l a r ge membership throughout the 
Empire, aided by i t s j o u r n a l , I m p e r i a l Federation. Yet as a movement 
i t was weaker than i t appeared. Arguing that the Empire was a j o l l y 
good t h i n g was easy, but the ideas of i t s membership about how to 
maintain and strengthen i m p e r i a l u n i t y were so diverse that the League 
could remain u n i t e d only while i t avoided suggesting anything 
s p e c i f i c . 
The most extreme type of I m p e r i a l Federation proposed was a 
complete f e d e r a l system of government, such as had been established i n 
the United States i n 1787, and copied i n Canada (1867) and Germany 
(1871). Most members of the League considered t h i s proposal to be 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the B r i t i s h Empire, which was avowedly leading i t s 
senior colonies - i n Canada, A u s t r a l i a , South A f r i c a and New Zealand -
to l o c a l autonomy. Moreover, the n o t i o n of other u n i t s i n the Empire 
having equal s t a t u s to B r i t a i n i n deciding i m p e r i a l a f f a i r s i n the 
c e n t r a l body was too r a d i c a l f o r most B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s , who might 
t o l e r a t e the idea of c o l o n i a l s having some say i n i m p e r i a l economic 
p o l i c y , perhaps, but c e r t a i n l y not an equal power i n determining 
fundamental issues of f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Herein lay a key c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
about I m p e r i a l Federation: the B r i t i s h c a l l e d f o r closer co-operation 
between the colonies, and yet they s t i l l expected i t to be the B r i t i s h 
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who had the f i n a l say. They urged the Dominions to j o i n the team, but 
expected the captaincy to remain undisputed. 
The major achievement of the I m p e r i a l Federation League came i n 
1886, when i t persuaded Lord Salisbury to host a c o l o n i a l conference 
i n the f o l l o w i n g year, to discuss ways of b r i n g i n g the Colonies 
together.(21) A la r g e reason f o r the government agreeing was 
doubtless t h a t , of the M.P.s. a c t i v e i n the League, the vast m a j o r i t y 
were Conservative or Unionist.(22) Rosebery, who had succeeded 
Forster as chairman upon the l a t t e r ' s death i n 1885, suggested that 
such conferences were the best way to advance t h e i r cause, and hoped 
tha t the idea might be repeated.(23) 
I n 1887 t h i s f i r s t C o l o n i a l Conference was held, conveniently 
at the same time as the Queen's Golden Jubilee celebrations were being 
held and senior c o l o n i a l representatives were i n London. Similar 
conferences were l a t e r held i n 1897, 1902, 1907 and 1911. The meeting 
was addressed by Salisbury, who suggested that any scheme of Imper i a l 
Federation was 'a matter f o r the f u t u r e rather than f o r the 
present'.(24) The conference achieved l i t t l e . I t should not be seen 
as the s t a r t of the succession of p e r i o d i c c o l o n i a l conferences, as i t 
was never intended that i t be repeated. Nevertheless, i t d i d provide 
a unique experiment i n i m p e r i a l co-operation.(25) 
I n 1891, under pressure from the government as w e l l as i t s 
membership, the League sought to produce a d e f i n i t e plan f o r promoting 
i m p e r i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n . I t s response was a proposal f o r a c e n t r a l 
c o u n c i l i n London, w i t h one repres e n t a t i v e from each self-governing 
colony, which would help advise the Cabinet on i m p e r i a l p o l i c y . I t 
omitted to de f i n e the council's powers, but d i d suggest that i t should 
i n v o l v e i t s e l f i n common defence p o l i c y and an i m p e r i a l t a r i f f system. 
Such a proposal was hardly r e v o l u t i o n a r y , and was c e r t a i n l y not 
designed to launch a f e d e r a l system of i m p e r i a l government, but i t was 
nevertheless s u f f i c i e n t to upset the League's membership, some of 
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which considered i t too r a d i c a l , others that i t was woefully 
inadequate. The idea was f o r m a l l y presented to the government i n 
1893, but by then the L i b e r a l s had resumed power - and Gladstone, who 
had long dismissed as spurious the claim that the only a l t e r n a t i v e to 
d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the Empire was c o n s o l i d a t i o n , was f a r too involved 
i n the question of I r i s h Home Rule to consider the scheme, despite the 
f a c t t h a t Rosebery, h i s Foreign Secretary, had been Chairman of the 
League u n t i l 1892. 
The I m p e r i a l Federation League collapsed i n t u r m o i l , and 
dissolved i t s e l f i n November 1893, b a s i c a l l y f o r three reasons. 
F i r s t l y , and most i m p o r t a n t l y , the membership s p l i t on the question of 
d e f i n i n g what f e d e r a t i o n should mean - whether there should be 
c e n t r i p e t a l f e d e r a l union, whereby most power was retained i n the 
centre (as Seeley recommended), or a l t e r n a t i v e l y devolution of power 
to the federated s t a t e s (as Rosebery recommended). This was a key 
p o i n t , about which f e d e r a t i o n i s t s were to disagree f o r the next t h i r t y 
years. To a considerable extent i t also explained why the League 
membership, and indeed a l l i m p e r i a l i s t s , d i v i d e d over a second issue -
the d e s i r a b i l i t y and nature of Home Rule f o r Ire l a n d . ( 2 6 ) Whereas 
Seeley, f o r example, was s t r o n g l y opposed to any Home Rule, a 
s u b s t a n t i a l m i n o r i t y of League members welcomed i t . Rhodes too was a 
keen supporter and Rosebery was a r e l u c t a n t supporter, while 
Chamberlain, Mi l n e r and Grey were h o s t i l e . The t h i r d , and equally 
contentious p o i n t , that l a t e r s p l i t the Unionist party, was whether a 
system of i m p e r i a l trade preference should be introduced, even at the 
expense of the hallowed d o c t r i n e of Free Trade.(27) 
So f a r i n t h i s chapter, much mention has been made of the 
enthusiasm of i m p e r i a l i s t s f o r I m p e r i a l Federation, without 
acknowledging the f a c t t h a t they were not the only group w i t h opinions 
about the Empire. Most people, i f asked, were probably p e r f e c t l y 
s a t i s f i e d w i t h the e x i s t i n g , l a i s s e z - f a i r e , approach to imp e r i a l 
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a f f a i r s , o f peaceful co-operation between B r i t a i n and i t s s e l f -
governing c o l o n i e s . There were also several very vocal opponents who, 
although not demanding the immediate dismemberment of the Empire, were 
c e r t a i n l y opposed to I m p e r i a l Federation. 
A l e a d i n g c r i t i c was Goldwin Smith.(28) I n reviewing Seeley's 
Expansion i n 1884, he pointed out that i t was not i n the i n t e r e s t s of 
the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies to j o i n i n t o closer association w i t h 
B r i t a i n , l e s t they found themselves drawn i n t o European wars w i t h 
which they had no concern. Smith also showed that f e d e r a t i o n i s t s 
t r e a t e d a l l the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies as i f they were a l i k e , whereas 
i n f a c t they a l l had d i f f e r e n t i n t e r n a l problems and d i f f e r e n t 
perspectives: a f e d e r a l system i n Canada had f a i l e d to reconcile the 
c o n f l i c t between the English and French s e t t l e r s , f o r example, and 
there was no reason to suppose that the l a t t e r would any more welcome 
a grand scheme of f e d e r a t i o n throughout the Empire.(29) 
I n 1863 Smith had urged i n h i s book. The Empire, that the 
e x i s t i n g c o l o n i a l system e n t a i l e d l i t t l e s t r a t e g i c or m a t e r i a l 
advantage f o r B r i t a i n , and t h a t any b e n e f i t s were e a s i l y outweighed by 
the costs and r i s k of r i v a l r y w i t h other powers. He declared himself 
i n favour of ' c o l o n i a l emancipation', and urged instead an informal 
p a r t n e r s h i p - a union of s p i r i t , not formal consolidation.(30) 
Smith's scepticism was shared i n part even by James Froude, a 
prominent i m p e r i a l i s t , who recognised that no matter how admirable a 
scheme of I m p e r i a l Federation might be, most c o l o n i s t s d i d not want to 
be f o r m a l l y bound to B r i t a i n , as they considered the e x i s t i n g semi-
formal l i n k s to be more than adequate. 
The vast m a j o r i t y of B r i t i s h people were never p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the Empire, and fewer s t i l l i n I m p e r i a l Federation. 
I m p e r i a l i s m was fundamentally an upper and middle class phenomenon, 
and even then i t only mattered because i t was submerged i n a greater 
form of p a t r i o t i s m . Public opinion was most e x c i t a b l e about the 
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Empire when an a t r o c i t y occurred which happened to be a c o l o n i a l 
escapade - such as General Gordon's death i n Khartoum i n 1885. I n 
p a r t i c u l a r , p u b l i c opinion was f a r less i m p e r i a l i s t i c than the press, 
which r e v e l l e d i n discussing the perceived threats f a c i n g B r i t a i n and 
i t s overseas possessions. Nevertheless, i m p e r i a l i s t s were l a r g e l y 
unaware of what most people thought. 
One such i m p e r i a l i s t was Joseph Chamberlain, who was determined 
t h a t the cause of I m p e r i a l Federation should not be abandoned j u s t 
because the League had collapsed. I n i t i a l l y , i n the e a r l y 1890s, the 
prospects were not encouraging. The domestic depression had receded, 
there were no c o l o n i a l wars i n progress anywhere, and so general 
confidence was high. I m p e r i a l i s t s , moreover, were concentrating not 
on the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n but rath e r on the expansion of the Empire i n 
A f r i c a - i n which people l i k e Grey were involved through the B r i t i s h 
South A f r i c a Company and the I m p e r i a l B r i t i s h East A f r i c a Company. 
Not u n t i l i t became obvious i n the l a t t e r part of the decade that 
A f r i c a would not render f o r t h an immediate abundance of raw materials 
or e a s i l y accessible markets d i d the gloom r e t u r n , exacerbated by the 
f a i l u r e of the Jameson Raid i n 1895, the tr o u b l e i n the Sudan, and ^ 
then the c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h France at Fashoda i n 189^ 9*^ . Once more ^ 
I m p e r i a l Federation was revived as the remedy f o r a l l i l l s . 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g B r i t a i n i n s p i r e d i n Chamberlain an 
awareness of the growing magnitude and complexity of im p e r i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , as w e l l as of the development and great p o t e n t i a l of 
the e s t a b l i s h e d colonies. He conceived two p r i n c i p a l aims: to b r i n g 
the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies closer together w i t h B r i t a i n ; and to 
develop the resources of the Empire. He sought to r e a l i s e these aims 
by means of I m p e r i a l Federation and t a r i f f reform. Chamberlain - who 
could have taken any senior p o s i t i o n i n the Cabinet i n 1895 but 
instead chose the h i t h e r t o lowly C o l o n i a l O f f i c e - now made Imperi a l 
Federation h i s main t a r g e t i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
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His f i r s t o p p o r t u n i t y came at the 1897 C o l o n i a l Conference, 
which he chaired, and which was designed to coincide w i t h the v i s i t of 
c o l o n i a l premiers f o r the Queen's Diamond J u b i l e e . Chamberlain 
envisaged one supreme, i m p e r i a l parliament, i n which the s e l f -
governing colonies would share equal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w i t h B r i t a i n f o r 
i m p e r i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y and defence. As a step towards t h i s he 
proposed an i m p e r i a l c o u n c i l w i t h l i m i t e d executive powers, designed 
to co-ordinate laws and communications and to move towards r e c i p r o c a l 
t a r i f f s . Once a body could be created to regulate trade, i t would 
consider the p r o t e c t i o n of trade. Once i t assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
defence, moreover, i t 'would be l i t t l e , i f at a l l , d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
a r e a l f e d e r a t i o n of the Empire'.(31) 
Chamberlain's proposals f o r an i m p e r i a l c o u n c i l f a i l e d to 
a t t r a c t support from any c o l o n i a l premier except Seddon of New 
Zealand, and even he would not accept the idea of a c o l o n i a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n England being delegated the r i g h t to make decisions 
on behalf of h i s own government.(32) The r e s t were not prepared to 
accept a body i n which t h e i r number of delegates was chosen i n 
accordance w i t h the s i z e of t h e i r population, since B r i t a i n would 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y be able to outvote them a l l . Moreover, Laurier of 
Canada declared himself p e r f e c t l y happy w i t h the i m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
as i t stood.(33) Chamberlain was thus thwarted f o r the moment, but 
was to r e v i v e h i s plans at the next conference f i v e years l a t e r . He 
refused t o accept t h a t I m p e r i a l Federation was impossible; yet he was 
to be e q u a l l y disappointed by the r e s u l t i n 1902. I t i s also worth 
n o t i n g t h a t Chamberlain's proposals probably met w i t h l i t t l e support 
even among h i s own Cabinet colleagues, who doubtless f e l t that the 
schemes were too ambitious. 
Chamberlain was not the only senior p o l i t i c i a n to be committed 
to I m p e r i a l Federation, however. I n the L i b e r a l p a r t y Rosebery had 
been a leading f e d e r a t i o n i s t since the time of h i s v i s i t to A u s t r a l i a 
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i n 1883-4, which convinced him of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of much closer 
l i n k s w i t h i n the Empire. I n a speech i n Adelaide he argued t h a t , j u s t 
because A u s t r a l i a was a country i n i t s own r i g h t , t h i s d i d not make 
i n e v i t a b l e i t s separation from the Empire. 'There i s no need f o r any 
n a t i o n , however gre a t , l e a v i n g the Empire, because the Empire i s a 
Commonwealth of Nations', he proclaimed.(34) However, despite serving 
as chairman of the I m p e r i a l Federation League f o r s i x years, and 
h a i l i n g i t s mission as 'the dominant passion of [ h i s ] l i f e ' , ( 3 5 ) 
u n l i k e Chamberlain, he never troubled himself to o f f e r any d e t a i l e d 
suggestions as to what t h i s concept might e n t a i l . Nor d i d he 
encourage I m p e r i a l Federation during h i s b r i e f premiership i n 1894-5. 
While the Unionist party under Salisbury and then Balfour was 
always s t r o n g l y supportive of imperialism, i f not a c t u a l l y I m p e r i a l 
Federation, the L i b e r a l s under Gladstone and Campbell-Bannerman were 
somewhat less ardent enthusiasts. Those who were keen formed 
themselves i n t o a group c a l l e d the L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s , headed 
nominally by Rosebery, but c e n t r i n g mainly around Asquith, Haldane and 
Edward Grey (a cousin of the 4th E a r l ) . They were p a r t i c u l a r l y a c t i v e 
from about 1895 onwards, and took a keen i n t e r e s t i n the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of closer co-operation i n m i l i t a r y matters e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the Boer 
War. A l l t h i s was i n s t r i k i n g contrast to Campbell-Bannerman himself, 
who openly opposed the Boer War.(36) 
Despite t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Rosebery, none of these young, 
up-and-coming L i b e r a l s aspired to any s p e c i f i c form of Impe r i a l 
Federation. As the e r u p t i o n i n the Unionist party was to show i n 
1903, making an issue of r a d i c a l reform was not u s u a l l y the best way 
f o r any ambitious p o l i t i c i a n to advance h i s career, e s p e c i a l l y when 
the e l e c t o r a t e was i n d i f f e r e n t or even h o s t i l e to the idea. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , none of the L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s except Rosebery 
supported Chamberlain's c a l l f o r an i m p e r i a l preference i n trade, and 
i n f a c t i t was Asquith who emerged as i t s most e f f e c t i v e c r i t i c . Thus 
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even the L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s had doubts about some notions of Empire, 
and put f r e e trade before the cause of imperialism. 
I n t h i s period a f t e r 1900, i m p e r i a l i s t s of both p a r t i e s were 
being swayed by a d i f f e r e n t , but e q u a l l y ominous, symbol of n a t i o n a l 
d e c l i n e : the c o n d i t i o n of the B r i t i s h people. The a p p a l l i n g physical 
s t a t e of many of those who had volunteered to f i g h t i n the Boer War 
sent Shockwaves throughout the country. L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s , Fabian 
S o c i a l i s t s , and even c o l l e c t i v i s t Unionists embraced a new n o t i o n , 
'National E f f i c i e n c y ' , which Rosebery defined as 'the c o n d i t i o n of 
n a t i o n a l f i t n e s s equal to the demands of our Empire - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , 
parliamentary, commercial, educational, p h y s i c a l , moral, naval, and 
m i l i t a r y f i t n e s s ' . ( 3 7 ) 
I n i t s crudest form, i t s leading advocates urged compulsory 
m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g , temperance, and even that a l l school c h i l d r e n 
throughout the Empire should s a l u t e the Union f l a g each morning.(38) 
Baden-Powell's scouting movement, established i n 1908, was another 
consequence of t h i s , as was the mass of s o c i a l welfare l e g i s l a t i o n 
introduced by the L i b e r a l government a f t e r 1905.(39) On a d i f f e r e n t 
l e v e l , L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s c a l l e d f o r the establishment of more 
Standing Committees i n Parliament, to a l l e v i a t e what was seen as the 
inadequacy of the B r i t i s h system of government to cope w i t h the burden 
of running a great Empire.(40) I n every aspect of l i f e , i t seemed, 
great e f f o r t needed to be made to improve standards i f B r i t a i n were to 
r e t a i n i t s s t a t u s as a great power. 
While the l i n k between domestic s o c i a l conditions and I m p e r i a l 
Federation was not immediately apparent even to most i m p e r i a l i s t s , 
those who were already f e d e r a t i o n i s t s were adamant that the empire 
could provide a v i t a l cure. One s o l u t i o n was to encourage the mass 
mi g r a t i o n of people from the overcrowded c i t i e s to the empty plains of 
Canada, A u s t r a l i a and Southern A f r i c a , which would have the b e n e f i c i a l 
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e f f e c t of strengthening s t i l l f u r t h e r the f e e l i n g of u n i t y w i t h i n the 
Empire. 
Against t h i s , Goldwin Smith pointed out that the colonies could 
not absorb u n l i m i t e d numbers of emigrants, and were f a r from keen to 
receive the dregs of B r i t i s h s o c i e t y . Even A u s t r a l i a was no longer 
prepared to be a human rubbish dump. Moreover, as he observed, most 
emigrating B r i t o n s opted not f o r the Empire but the United States -
which would do nothing f o r I m p e r i a l Federation.(41) Yet the c a l l s f o r 
mi g r a t i o n continued, e s p e c i a l l y while newly-established colonies such 
as Rhodesia c r i e d out f o r B r i t i s h s e t t l e r s to help r e a l i s e the// ? 
p o t e n t i a l . Grey too was convinced that emigration from B r i t a i n to the 
colonies could both a l l e v i a t e B r i t a i n ' s domestic decline and also 
boost I m p e r i a l Federation. Indeed, as President of the Royal Colonial 
I n s t i t u t e he was to become one of the leading exponents of emigration 
schemes.(42) 
A f u r t h e r reason why I m p e r i a l Federation was favoured was that 
many saw the Empire as a good t h i n g i n i t s own r i g h t , and deserving of 
pre s e r v a t i o n . Such j u s t i f i c a t i o n s are i n t e r e s t i n g i n themselves, 
since they provide a f a s c i n a t i n g i n s i g h t i n t o the minds of some of the 
key advocates of I m p e r i a l Federation, and not l e a s t E a r l Grey. 
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, imperialism was 
j u s t i f i e d because i t enabled the B r i t i s h to b r i n g to ignorant people 
across the world the b e n e f i t s of the C h r i s t i a n gospel, peace and 
p r o s p e r i t y , s t a b l e government, and what the B r i t i s h chose to define as 
c i v i l i s a t i o n . I n I n d i a i n the f i r s t part of the century i t became a 
widely recognised goal to europeanise the subcontinent i n every way 
pos s i b l e , a mission h a i l e d by Wi l l i a m Wilberforce as the 'greatest of 
a l l causes'.(43) The B r i t i s h had a supreme and unabashed confidence 
i n the v i r t u e and righteousness of t h e i r ' c i v i l i s i n g mission' i n the 
world. Grey's uncle, the 3rd E a r l , who was Co l o n i a l Secretary from 
1846 to 1852, declared t h a t no one could doubt t h a t , i f the West 
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I n d i e s were l e f t to themselves, ' c i v i l i s a t i o n would be thrown back f o r 
ce n t u r i e s ' . ( 4 4 ) This sense of the moral worth of the B r i t i s h Empire 
was r a r e l y questioned i n the nineteenth century. 
While t h i s does much to ex p l a i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r imperialism, 
the connection w i t h I m p e r i a l Federation i s not so obvious. A few 
i m p e r i a l i s t s , however, and e s p e c i a l l y Rhodes and Grey, held a profound 
b e l i e f t h a t the Anglo-Saxon race, as the most successful and therefore 
apparently superior race i n the world at that time, had a p o s i t i v e 
duty to spread i t s values o f c i v i l i s a t i o n throughout the world - to 
a l l n a t i o n s , and not j u s t i t s own colonies. Rhodes said of the 
B r i t i s h : 
We happen to be the best people i n the world, w i t h the highest 
i d e a l s of decency and j u s t i c e and l i b e r t y and peace, and the more 
of the world we i n h a b i t , the b e t t e r f o r humanity.(45) 
While many i m p e r i a l i s t s - such as Chamberlain - l i k e d to point 
out t h a t the B r i t i s h were b e t t e r at governing than other people, few 
went so f a r as Rhodes d i d i n cl a i m i n g that they were superior i n every 
respect.(46) Indeed, some l i k e Seeley disparaged a l l t a l k of an 
Anglo-Saxon 'race' or d e s t i n y , and even r e j e c t e d the moral worth of 
Empire.(47) For those l i k e Rhodes, Grey and Milner, who d i d believe 
i n the innate s u p e r i o r i t y of the B r i t i s h , t h i s was considered to be a ^ 
deeply c u l t u r a l , but not a b i o l o g i c a l t r a i t . So the subject of 
eugenics i s not at issue here. I t was simply that t r a d i t i o n made the 
B r i t i s h the best race i n the world. As Grey l a t e r declared: 
England should be proud to lead the world's march of progress. At 
the centre of a vast Empire i t i s her duty to lead the van of 
c i v i l i s a t i o n . She must always be ahead of other nations....To 
her, more than any other country, i t seems to me that the fortunes 
of God are committed.(48) 
From t h i s f i r m l y - h e l d viewpoint, i t i s easy to understand why 
Grey saw i t as e s s e n t i a l t h a t the Anglo-Saxon race should maintain a 
sense of c o l l e c t i v e u n i t y , i n order to withstand c o r r u p t i o n and defeat 
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by 'lesser' races such as the Southern Europeans - whose own 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c i v i l i s e d values appeared v i s i b l y lower i n the ways 
they t r e a t e d A f r i c a n natives i n t h e i r colonies. 
For Grey, as f o r Rhodes, I m p e r i a l Federation was not the 
u l t i m a t e g o a l , but r a t h e r a stepping-stone to the greater o b j e c t i v e of 
a vast Anglo-Saxon c o n s o l i d a t i o n , embracing both the B r i t i s h Empire 
and the United States. They both went so f a r as to urge that these 
two great power blocs should come back i n t o some form of association. 
Such a vast p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic union, combined w i t h what 
they believed to be the s e l f - e v i d e n t c u l t u r a l and moral s u p e r i o r i t y of 
the Anglo-Saxon race, would make f o r the greatest moral and physical 
f o r c e f o r good th a t the world had known since the time of the Roman 
Empire. This would render obsolete forever the threats of Japanese, 
Russian or German aggrandisement, or the problems of barbarism i n 
A f r i c a and Asia. A higher n o t i o n of c i v i l i s a t i o n , a Heaven on Earth, 
thus seemed pos s i b l e , and I m p e r i a l Federation was a v i t a l step towards 
t h i s . 
Other i m p e r i a l i s t s , l i k e Chamberlain, o f t e n lauded the 
pre-eminence of the Anglo-Saxon race, but none - not even Milner, one 
of the foremost 'race p a t r i o t s ' - took i t to q u i t e such extremes.(49) 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t Grey was i n s p i r e d i n t h i s respect e n t i r e l y by Rhodes, 
who i n 1877 had envisaged: 
the u l t i m a t e recovery of the United States of America as an 
i n t e g r a l part of the B r i t i s h Empire; the co n s o l i d a t i o n of the 
whole Empire...and the foundation of so great a power as to 
h e r e a f t e r render wars impossible and promote the best i n t e r e s t s of 
humanity.(50) 
As Grey himself claimed, since English-speaking people 
everywhere shared a common ancestry and a common c u l t u r e , and hence 
were p r a c t i c a l l y one people, some s o r t of organic union between them 
a l l was not only h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e but p e r f e c t l y l o g i c a l . ( 5 1 ) 
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With t h i s object i n mind, Rhodes devoted the bulk of his legacy 
towards the establishment of a scholarship fund, a v a i l a b l e to scholars 
from both the Empire and the United States, as w e l l as Germany (whom, 
as Teutons, he considered s u f f i c i e n t l y c u l t u r a l l y s i m i l a r to Anglo-
Saxons to be acceptable). The o r i g i n a l t r u s t e e s , nominated i n 1899, 
included Rosebery and Grey: and i t was Grey, more than anyone else, 
who understood the i n t e n s i t y of Rhodes's desire to strengthen l i n k s 
w i t h the United States.(52) Upon h i s mentor's death i n 1902 Grey 
expressed the hope that United States representatives might be present 
at the f u n e r a l i n Rhodesia, and that w h i l s t there they and t h e i r 
counterparts from the B r i t i s h Empire might resolve 'to undo the f o l l y 
of George I I I , and by so doing pave the way towards the f e d e r a t i o n of 
mankind'.(53) The Rhodes scholarships would, he believed, prove an 
e f f e c t i v e stepping-stone towards the eventual attainment of that 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n which both Rhodes and Grey saw as the c h i e f hope f o r the 
f u t u r e of mankind. 
I t was Grey who stood alongside Rhodes when he f i r s t v i s i t e d 
the Matoppos H i l l s near Bulawayo, where the l a t t e r was l a t e r 
buried;(54) and i t was Grey who unveiled the Rhodes memorial i n 
Capetown i n 1912, proclaiming: 
Those who were admitted to h i s hopes are aware that h i s soaring 
s p i r i t looked forward w i t h f e e l i n g s of glowing enthusiasm to the 
time when people of the United Kingdom and of the self-governing 
dominions should act together as j o i n t trustees w i t h the people of 
the United States, f o r the p r o t e c t i o n and expansion of the Anglo-
Saxon and C e l t i c c i v i l i s a t i o n , i n which i s involved the hope of 
f u t u r e peace, and the r e a l i s a t i o n of the highest a t t a i n a b l e 
i d e a l s . ( 5 5 ) 
Grey spoke of Anglo-Saxon c o n s o l i d a t i o n as i f i t were 
d i v i n e l y - i n s p i r e d . Imperialism was f o r him a r e l i g i o n , to which he 
devoted much of h i s l i f e . I t must be stressed that no senior f i g u r e 
a f t e r Rhodes's death held q u i t e such strong views as Grey; but that i s 
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no reason to dismiss them as f o l l y . Grey was, a f t e r a l l , s h o r t l y to 
become the Governor-General of the most senior colony i n the ^White 
Empire', bordering the United States, and therefore h i s own personal 
motives were i n e v i t a b l y to be of c r u c i a l importance i n the way he ^ 
chose to d e f i n e h i s r o l e as proconsul there. I t was t h i s h i g h l y moral 
and v i s i o n a r y z e a l , moreover, which explains why Grey was surely more 
dedicated t o , and c e r t a i n l y more passionate about, the cause of 
I m p e r i a l Federation, than any except C e c i l Rhodes. 
32 
CHAPTER TWO 
INFLUENCES ON EARL GREY 
Background 
'To understand imperialism, i t i s necessary to understand the 
i m p e r i a l i s t s ' , wrote Kirk-Greene.(1) Why d i d men l i k e Grey devote so 
much energy to the service of the Empire? The standard reasons 
o f f e r e d are tha t i t became a fashionable t h i n g to do among members of 
the same s o c i a l c i r c l e ; or that they believed i n the cause of 
B r i t a i n ' s ' c i v i l i s i n g mission'; or that they simply wished to make a 
f i n a n c i a l p r o f i t e i t h e r f o r B r i t a i n or themselves, or both. Perhaps 
i m p e r i a l i s t s were motivated by a v a r i e t y of these reasons - the 
'philanthropy plus f i v e per cent' maxim a t t r i b u t e d to Rhodes being an 
example. 
This chapter assesses why Grey became i n t e r e s t e d i n the Empire. 
I t considers the importance of h i s background and upbringing, h i s 
i n t e r e s t s when a Member of Parliament, and h i s e a r l y involvement w i t h 
the I m p e r i a l Federation League. I t then proceeds to demonstrate how, 
once he f e l l under the i n f l u e n c e of Rhodes, Grey became one of the 
most ardent champions of the i m p e r i a l cause, t r u l y 'a Paladin of 
Empire'.(2) I t seeks also to provide a d e s c r i p t i o n of Grey's 
p e r s o n a l i t y and to e x p l a i n why he was so v i s i o n a r y i n h i s appraisal of 
the Empire, since i t i s only by a p p r e c i a t i n g h i s i d e a l i s t i c , somewhat 
unworldly, character that one can properly understand what motivated 
Grey i n h i s love of the B r i t i s h Empire and the cause of Imper i a l 
Federation. He was speaking from h i s heart when he declared i n 1880: 
England could w e l l a f f o r d to use her powerful i n t e r e s t abroad on 
behalf of freedom, of j u s t i c e , and of r i g h t - ambitious not to 
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conquer nations or extend her t e r r i t o r y , but ambitious only to 
spread c i v i l i s a t i o n , and to put down barbarism i n every quarter of 
the globe.(3) 
Some t h i r t y years l a t e r . Grey's opinion was stronger s t i l l , when he 
sta t e d t h a t Uhe b e l i e f t h a t the B r i t i s h Empire stands f o r the highest 
a t t a i n a b l e i d e a l s makes the maintenance of the B r i t i s h Empire a 
r e l i g i o n ' . ( 4 ) 
For anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s , concern about the 
f u t u r e of the Empire loomed i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e i n the p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u 
of the 1870s and 1880s. The Grey fa m i l y was t y p i c a l i n t h i s respect. 
A l b e r t Grey i n h e r i t e d a f a m i l y t r a d i t i o n of service to the Empire and 
also grew up i n both s o c i a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s where concern f o r 
the Empire was strong. As a young man, he learned of h is family's 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d s e r v i c e , and became mindful of those duties which lay 
before him too. The 1st E a r l Grey had served i n the Army during the 
American War of Independence, and achieved g r e a t , i f s h o r t - l i v e d , 
success as Commander-in-Chief i n the West Indies i n 1794. His 
grandfather, the 2nd E a r l , had been Prime M i n i s t e r of the Whig 
m i n i s t r y from 1830 to 1834, securing the passage of the Reform Act of 
1832. His f a t h e r . General Charles Grey, was a L i b e r a l M.P. f o r s i x 
years, 1831-7, and l a t e r became p r i v a t e secretary to the Prince 
Consort (1849 to 1861) and then Queen V i c t o r i a (1861 to 1870). 
A major i n f l u e n c e on Grey as a young man was h i s uncle, the 3rd 
E a r l (1802-94), who had been C o l o n i a l Secretary from 1846 to 1852, and 
who became h i s guardian upon General Grey's death i n 1870. I n e a r l i e r 
years, the 3rd E a r l had spoken of B r i t a i n having a moral duty to 
maintain and develop the Empire as a permanent e n t i t y : ^By the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of i t s C o l o n i a l dominions, the nat i o n has incurred a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the highest k i n d , which i t i s not at l i b e r t y to 
throw o f f , he wrote. (5) As Colon i a l Secretary, he promoted the 
growth of responsible government i n Canada, although not elsewhere -
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since he considered none of the other colonies to be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
mature. This p o l i c y r e f l e c t e d h i s desire to lessen the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and expenses of the mother country, not a disdain f o r 
i m p e r i a l l o y a l t y ; on the contrary, he regarded the possible severance 
of c o l o n i a l t i e s as a 'grievous calamity, lowering by many steps the 
rank of t h i s country among the nations of the world'.(6) Clearly the 
3rd E a r l d i d not regard c o l o n i a l self-government as amounting to 
autonomy from B r i t a i n . 
Even when he r e t i r e d from o f f i c e i n 1852, the 3rd Earl's keen 
i n t e r e s t i n the f u t u r e of i m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s p e r s i s t e d , despite the 
f a c t t h a t he never returned to a c t i v e p o l i t i c s f o r h i s remaining 
f o r t y - t w o years, nor maintained any r e a l i n f l u e n c e i n p o l i t i c a l 
c i r c l e s . He remained a keen p u b l i c i s t of closer i m p e r i a l union, and 
wrote several pamphlets, as w e l l as a ceaseless flow of l e t t e r s to The 
Times, i n an attempt to win over p u b l i c opinion. His mature 
r e f l e c t i o n s on the Empire were expressed i n an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n i n 1879 
f o r the Nineteenth Century, e n t i t l e d 'How s h a l l we r e t a i n the 
Colonies?' I n t h i s he argued t h a t , as the colonies progressed towards 
self-government, the need was a r i s i n g f o r some paramount 
a u t h o r i t y i n London, vested w i t h s u f f i c i e n t powers to ensure that i n 
matters of common i n t e r e s t each colony would co-operate w i t h one 
another, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h regard to defence and commercial p o l i c y . The 
colonies must recognise that alongside the p r i v i l e g e of responsible 
self-government l a y the duty of c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e i r own 
p r o t e c t i o n : but i f they were to pay, they deserved some say i n p o l i c y -
making. 
I n suggesting what shape any such paramount a u t h o r i t y might 
take, the 3rd E a r l c a l l e d f o r a Committee of the Pr i v y Council, 
composed of the senior London representatives of each self-governing 
colony alongside various chosen p o l i t i c i a n s , which would have the 
r i g h t t o discuss a l l c o l o n i a l issues and help advise the Colonial 
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O f f i c e . Although t h i s committee would have no executive power - and 
u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would s t i l l r e s t w i t h the B r i t i s h Cabinet - i t 
would be able to play a v i t a l r o l e i n f u r t h e r i n g the influence of the 
colonies i n i m p e r i a l p o l i c y , as w e l l as helping to explain these 
p o l i c i e s to a l l c o l o n i a l s across the seas.(7) 
Even as a young man, A l b e r t Grey shared h i s uncle's i n t e r e s t i n 
the Empire. I t i s known t h a t , when an undergraduate at Cambridge from 
1870 to 1873, he was a member of the T r i n i t y College group which 
^received from time to time a general e p i s t l e from Chinese Gordon, and 
each member of which pledged himself to take a l i f e l o n g i n t e r e s t i n 
the moral and p o l i t i c a l w elfare' of the Empire.(8) This must have 
done much to broaden h i s horizons, as doubtless d i d h i s t r i p to I n d i a 
i n 1875. 
A l b e r t Grey shared many of the i n t e r e s t s of the 3rd E a r l , 
besides the B r i t i s h Empire, such as an enthusiasm f o r temperance and 
p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . As a young man, he also devoted 
considerable a t t e n t i o n to reform of the Churches of England and Wales, 
and to the Co-operative movement - which strove f o r the promotion of 
mutual assistance i n the workplace. These issues a l l r e f l e c t a common 
theme i n h i s p e r s o n a l i t y - a desire to overcome t r i v i a l and 
counter-productive d i v i s i o n s , and to promote u n i t y and cohesion, 
whether i n domestic p o l i t i c s , the Empire, the Church or i n i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . Thus Grey's i n t e r e s t i n I m p e r i a l Federation was 
symptomatic of an o v e r a l l d e s i r e to promote co-operation i n a l l human 
a f f a i r s , and cannot properly be understood apart from h i s other 
i n t e r e s t s at t h i s time. 
I n t h i s sense Grey was c l e a r l y i d e a l i s t i c . He was seeking to 
create Heaven on Earth, promoting righteousness and j u s t i c e i n every 
aspect of human l i f e . This o f t e n l e d him to adopt unpopular causes, 
or to approach conventional issues from a p a r t i c u l a r l y unconventional 
standpoint. Grey's approach to domestic p o l i t i c s i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of 
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t h i s , i n th a t he was never able to accept the c o n s t r a i n t s of party 
p o l i t i c a l dogma. I n t h i s respect he i n h e r i t e d a strong family 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . His f a m i l y were Whigs by t r a d i t i o n : but h i s uncle had 
abandoned p o l i t i c s at the age of f i f t y p a r t l y because he could no 
longer t o l e r a t e being part of a p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n , and General Charles 
Grey had soon l e f t p o l i t i c s f o r service i n the Royal Household. Grey 
himself remained a L i b e r a l M.P. f o r j u s t s i x years, u n t i l 1886, and 
t h e r e a f t e r never again found himself able to a f f i l i a t e w i t h e i t h e r 
main p o l i t i c a l p a r t y (although he d i d l a b e l himself a L i b e r a l 
U n i o n i s t ) . 
Grey was not j u s t a b e l i e v e r i n , but a passionate advocate of, 
co-operation i n human a f f a i r s . Perhaps because he i n h e r i t e d something 
of the p e r s o n a l i t y of h i s mother, who has been described as 
e v a n g e l i c a l , ( 9 ) Grey applied to a l l h i s endeavours a q u a s i - r e l i g i o u s 
devotion, sometimes bordering on fa n a t i c i s m , even i f to most men the 
ideas he supported seemed impracticable. Grey considered h i s gospel 
of human co-operation to be so important, i n f a c t , that he 
commissioned Harold Begbie to record h i s views on h is deathbed, so 
that h i s testament might be preserved f o r p o s t e r i t y and thus extend 
beyond the grave. This does much to e x p l a i n why some of his a t t i t u d e s 
may appear nowadays to be s i m p l i s t i c or even naive, and why he was so 
open to manipulation by someone l i k e C e c i l Rhodes - who preached much 
the same s o r t of v i s i o n a r y gospel as Grey, but perhaps f o r less noble 
reasons. I n a l l matters Grey's idealism was f i r m l y based on a 
d e f i n i t e C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y , and he possessed a 'moral earnestness' 
beneath h i s warm and charming e x t e r i o r . ( 1 0 ) 
Grey's i n t e r e s t i n the Co-operative movement brought him i n t o 
contact w i t h Arnold Toynbee, a s o c i a l r a d i c a l , who introduced him to 
the w r i t i n g s of the I t a l i a n n a t i o n a l i s t , Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72) -
and e s p e c i a l l y h i s book the Duties of Man, which Toynbee described as 
'the most simple and passionate statement published i n t h i s century of 
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man's d u t i e s to God and h i s fe l l o w s ' . ( 1 1 ) kt f i r s t glance t h i s seems 
s u r p r i s i n g . Mazzini devoted h i s l i f e to challenging the established 
a u t h o r i t y of monarchy and a r i s t o c r a c y i n the I t a l i a n States and 
elsewhere: he was a keen supporter of nationalism (but a nationalism 
which transcended n a t i o n a l l i m i t s ) , and no eulogiser of imperialism. 
Yet Grey became attached to Mazzini's strong advocacy of peace and 
co-operation i n the workplace, arguing as he d i d t h a t , u n t i l employers 
and labourers worked as associates r a t h e r than enemies, progress was 
an impossible goal. 
I n t e r e s t i n Mazzini was common i n the 1850s and 1860s, 
e s p e c i a l l y among B r i t i s h e v a n g e l i c a l protestants and l i b e r a l academics 
(such as Benjamin Jowett, A.V. Dicey and T.H. Green), as w e l l as 
p o l i t i c i a n s such as James Bryce and John Morley. Mazzini's advocacy 
of l o y a l t y to 'the n a t i o n ' was based on the b e l i e f that the nation 
could g i v e a moral basis f o r an ideology of co-operation r a t h e r than 
narrow s e l f - i n t e r e s t . This m o r a l i t y appealed s t r o n g l y to evangelicals 
at t h i s time, who saw r i c h and poor as equal before God, a l l part of a 
common humanity.(12) I t f i t t e d i n w e l l w i t h Grey's own t h i n k i n g , and 
hi s m o r a l i s t i c , e v a n g e l i c a l view of mankind. One p a r t i c u l a r passage 
i n Mazzini's Duties of Man had a great s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r Grey 
throughout h i s l i f e , and which he c a l l e d 'The Object of L i f e ' : 
We must convince men t h a t . . . t o s t r u g g l e against i n j u s t i c e and 
e r r o r , wherever they e x i s t , i n the name and f o r the be n e f i t of 
t h e i r b r o t h e r s , i s not only a r i g h t but a duty; a duty which may 
not be neglected without s i n , the duty of t h e i r whole l i f e . ( 1 3 ) 
I n i t i a l l y , Mazzini's philosophy was applied by Grey only to 
domestic concerns, s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the task of improving the 
co n d i t i o n s of the working classes. Throughout h i s l i f e he remained a 
vocal supporter of the Co-operative movement, and became involved i n 
the Garden C i t y movement f o r the same reason, digging the f i r s t sod i n 
Letchworth i n 1903. Once he became a c t i v e l y involved i n the Empire, 
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however, he strove to apply those same Mazzinian p r i n c i p l e s to the 
whole cosmos of h i s i m p e r i a l t h i n k i n g , and there was an obvious 
p a r a l l e l between Mazzini's conception of nati o n a l i s m and Grey's views 
about a l l English-speaking people throughout the world being one 
race - e f f e c t i v e l y one n a t i o n , 'Greater B r i t a i n ' . Likewise, he came 
to see the B r i t i s h Empire as a panacea f o r many of B r i t a i n ' s s o c i a l 
domestic i l l s , a splendid example of how a l l h i s i n t e r e s t s were 
interdependent. I n conversation w i t h Begbie, Grey explained the 
connection: 
I have had two great passions i n my l i f e , the Empire and the 
welfare of the working classes. The Empire has been my r e l i g i o n . 
I b e l i e v e that i t contains the world's greatest promise of peace. 
I t h i n k i t can s e t t l e a l l our domestic problems. Rescue t h i s vast 
Empire from being at the disposal of the party system, give our 
working classes an i n t e l l i g e n t conception of what i t means, and 
you w i l l transform the working conditions here at home.(14) 
Of course t h i s i n t e r e s t i n the working classes was mirrored by 
the whole 'National E f f i c i e n c y ' movement i n the period a f t e r the Boer 
War. Moreover, s i m i l a r l y c o l o u r f u l , m o r a l i s t i c phraseology was used 
by many i m p e r i a l i s t s , not l e a s t Chamberlain and Rhodes, men whose r e a l 
i n t e r e s t i n Empire has been a t t r i b u t e d by c r i t i c s such as Hobson and 
Hobsbawm to personal avarice or i n t e r e s t i n B r i t a i n ' s economic 
we l f a r e . I n the case of Grey, however, the m o r a l i t y which underlaid 
h i s i m p e r i a l i s m was not mere r h e t o r i c . He was aware of the f i n a n c i a l 
b e n e f i t s a v a i l a b l e but, as w i l l be argued l a t e r , t h i s was not an 
o v e r r i d i n g f a c t o r . He shared the same b e l i e f as many of h i s 
contemporaries, t h a t the B r i t i s h had a c l e a r duty to spread the gospel 
of c i v i l i s a t i o n . This was vaguely i n l i n e w i t h Mazzini's espousal of 
na t i o n a l i s m - as not a geographical but an h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon. As 
Mazzini wrote: 
N a t i o n a l i t y i s the share that God has assigned to the given people 
i n the progress of humanity. I t i s the mission which each people 
must f u l f i l , the task i t must do, on e a r t h , that the d i v i n e idea 
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may a t t a i n i t s f u l l expression; i t i s the work which gives a 
people a r i g h t to c i t i z e n s h i p i n the world.(15) 
Grey i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s view to understand and j u s t i f y the a c t i v i t i e s of 
h i s f e l l o w countrymen across the world; and i t seemed l o g i c a l that the 
c o n t i n u a t i o n of the B r i t i s h Empire should be the i d e a l means to 
achieve t h i s dream of Heaven on Earth. 
Grey as a Member of Parlicunent 
When Grey was L i b e r a l M.P. f o r South Northumberland from 1880 
to 1885, and then f o r the Tyneside D i v i s i o n u n t i l 1886, h i s 
impe r i a l i s m was s t i l l j u s t one of many i n t e r e s t s , t h e varying nature of 
which aroused some s u r p r i s e among h i s contemporaries. Hugh Egerton 
wrote of him l a t e r : 
No one was more c a t h o l i c i n h i s i n t e r e s t s . A g r i c u l t u r a l i s t , 
t r a v e l l e r , and sportsman, he was also a s o c i a l reformer and a 
champion of unpopular causes; so that there seemed some r i s k l e s t 
h i s energies, d i v e r t e d i n t o such v a r i e d channels, might run to 
waste.(16) 
Grey's considerable enthusiasm was matched by his p o l i t i c a l 
ambition at t h i s time, which s t a r t e d w e l l when Gladstone asked him to 
move the Address i n the House of Commons i n May 1880. The Prime 
M i n i s t e r remarked that i t would be appropriate that t h i s be done by 'a 
grandson of Lord Grey who has given such promise both of walking i n 
h i s steps and of s u s t a i n i n g the fame of h i s family'.(17) 
Almost from the outset, however. Grey found himself 
uncomfortable i n p o l i t i c s , d i s l i k i n g as he d i d the r e s t r a i n t s of party 
d i s c i p l i n e . He was always an i n d i v i d u a l i s t , who d i d not f i t 
comfortably i n t o groups or associations much more e a s i l y than h i s 
uncle, and who almost i n v a r i a b l y put p r i n c i p l e before expediency. 
Once Grey began t a k i n g an independent l i n e i n the 1880s, references to 
the f a m i l y r e p u t a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l unorthodoxy were not i n f r e q u e n t l y 
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made. Edward Hamilton, Gladstone's p r i v a t e secretary, recorded i n his 
d i a r y : 
I t i s deplorable that A l b e r t Grey should so constantly be a 
d e f a u l t e r . He has, I f e a r , got a l l the Grey 'crankiness' i n him. 
Mr. G. was r e g r e t t i n g that a young f e l l o w l i k e A l b e r t Grey should 
be throwing away h i s p o l i t i c a l career i n the way he does. I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t to have patience w i t h a f e l l o w who does not r i d e o f f on 
small issues and t r i f l i n g hobbies but i s always e l e c t i n g c r u c i a l 
questions f o r the occasion on which to desert h i s party.(18) 
Grey's main desire was to stem the t i d e of Radicalism i n the 
L i b e r a l p a r t y , and as e a r l y as 1881 he hoped that the Whig Committee 
might s p l i t away to form a new p a r t y , as a counterbalance.(19) I n 
much the same v e i n , the 3rd E a r l had p u b l i c l y supported the 
Conservative, not the Radical, candidate f o r North Northumberland i n 
the 1880 e l e c t i o n . Likewise, i n October 1885 Grey expressed his hope 
tha t Gladstone would soon r e t i r e i n favour of Goschen, a moderate who 
would be able to a t t r a c t Conservative support and thus promote i n t e r -
p a r t y harmony.(20) 
Grey was both a n t i - p a r t y and a n t i - R a d i c a l , both at t h i s time 
and f o r the remainder of h i s l i f e . The f i r s t t r a i t was not uncommon -
both Rhodes and Milner f e l t much the same. I n part i t stemmed from a 
contempt of a d v e r s a r i a l p o l i t i c s , where n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s were 
subordinated to p a r t y p o l i t i c s , which were themselves determined 
i n c r e a s i n g l y by the whims of an i l l - e d u c a t e d and i l l - i n f o r m e d 
e l e c t o r a t e . Those who held t h i s view considered that such a system of 
government was t o t a l l y unworthy to run a great Empire. I n the 1880s, 
and again when Governor-General of Canada, Grey deplored the f a c t that 
governments, dependent on the support of the I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s f o r a 
Commons m a j o r i t y , seemed q u i t e ready to ignore the i n t e r e s t s of the 
Empire, since the I r i s h lobby i n h i s view displayed only apathy 
towards any n o n - I r i s h issues. 
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Grey's patience w i t h the p o l i t i c a l system snapped when 
Gladstone introduced h i s I r i s h Home Rule B i l l i n A p r i l 1886. He was 
one of the f i r s t to condemn the measure, arguing that i t was the 
r e s u l t of the Radicals p r e s s u r i s i n g Gladstone, and that the I r i s h were 
not responsible enough t o r u l e themselves. Equally, he equated Home 
Rule w i t h 'dismemberment of the Empire'.(21) There could be no chance 
of i m p e r i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n i f i t were seen that B r i t a i n could not 
c o n t r o l j u s t four m i l l i o n people w i t h i n t h i r t y miles of i t s coast, 
even w i t h one m i l l i o n l o y a l i s t s there. I n a d d i t i o n . Home Rule would 
probably soon be followed by a u n i l a t e r a l d e c l a r a t i o n of independence, 
and the I r i s h would then be fr e e to express f r e e l y t h e i r longstanding 
h o s t i l i t y towards the English people. 
I n h i s e l e c t i o n address i n 1880, and again i n 1885, Grey had 
declared t h a t he would f i e r c e l y oppose any Home Rule measure. He 
accepted that some reforms were necessary - such as the r e l i e f of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l d i s t r e s s - but believed that there was an i n s u f f i c i e n t 
number of I r i s h landowners who were competent enough to manage t h e i r 
own p o l i t i c a l or economic a f f a i r s . ( 2 2 ) Now he spoke out st r o n g l y 
against Home Rule, and i n the House of Commons debate on the issue 
exhorted H a r t i n g t o n and Chamberlain to do t h e i r utmost to protect the 
Union against t h i s r a d i c a l measure.(23) 
Grey's p o s i t i o n i n the L i b e r a l party became untenable when 
Hart i n g t o n and Chamberlain were defeated i n the b a t t l e f o r c o n t r o l of 
the L i b e r a l p a r t y . He busied himself w i t h the work of the 
newly-formed L i b e r a l Unionist Committee, of which he, Craig Se l l a r and 
Milner were the most a c t i v e members, under the patronage of 
Goschen.(24) At the ensuiing e l e c t i o n he stood as a L i b e r a l Unionist, 
but was defeated i n the h e a v i l y Gladstonian Tyneside constituency. 
Thus the ' d o c t r i n a i r e p o l i t i c i a n w i t h r i g i d p r i n c i p l e s ' , ( 2 5 ) from a 
f a m i l y which had long been the embodiment of Whiggery, f i n a l l y 
abandoned the L i b e r a l Party. He now j o i n e d h i s uncle, who also had 
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long been opposed to Home Rule of any type, i n the p o l i t i c a l 
wilderness o f Northumberland: f o r he remained always a Whig, and could 
never r e c o n c i l e himself to the Conservatives' lack of compassion on 
s o c i a l issues (as he perceived i t ) . 
Reaction among other L i b e r a l s who were also imperially-minded 
was s i m i l a r , w i t h f o r t y of h i s f e l l o w M.P.s. adopting the L i b e r a l 
Unionist cause - among them Goschen and Chamberlain (the l a t t e r was an 
acquaintance but not yet a close f r i e n d ) . Men l i k e Seeley and Milner 
also l e f t the party i n pr o t e s t . ( 2 6 ) Of a l l the main L i b e r a l 
i m p e r i a l i s t s , only Rosebery remained w i t h i n the L i b e r a l f o l d , arguing 
as he d i d th a t he p r e f e r r e d Home Rule to coercion or separation.(27) 
However, Rosebery was l a t e r to oppose the t h i r d Home Rule B i l l , i n 
1911, once he too concluded that such a scheme damaged any hope of 
I m p e r i a l Federation. 
I t i s f a i r to say tha t Grey's opposition to Home Rule was 
st i m u l a t e d as much by domestic p o l i t i c a l considerations as by concern 
f o r the Empire. Yet i t i s important to understand that once Imper i a l 
Federation became h i s o v e r r i d i n g i n t e r e s t , h i s opposition to Home Rule 
only hardened, not because he was t o t a l l y opposed to change of any 
type - h i s promotion i n l a t e r years of 'Home Rule A l l Round' ( f o r 
England, Scotland, Wales and I r e l a n d ) was proof of h i s f l e x i b i l i t y -
but because he became ever more convinced that I m p e r i a l Federation and 
I r i s h Home Rule were t o t a l l y incompatible. He considered that I r i s h 
Home Rule would i n v a r i a b l y lead to separation and independence. 
Although by temperament a good-natured man, he expressed h i s views 
s t r o n g l y i n a l e t t e r to Chamberlain i n June 1898: 
I f Gladstone had been i n the prime of h i s [ l i f e ] when he died, and 
i n the f u l l g a l l o p of h i s Home Rule p o l i c y I would rather have 
been shot than honour by my presence the side of h i s grave.(28) 
I n 1884 Grey became a founder member of the I m p e r i a l Federation 
League, an i n d i c a t i o n of h i s growing i n t e r e s t i n the Empire even 
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before he f e l l under the i n f l u e n c e of Rhodes. I n July of the 
f o l l o w i n g year he deputised f o r Rosebery at the inaugural meeting of a 
new branch of the League i n L i v e r p o o l . Nevertheless, at t h i s time 
im p e r i a l i s m was not h i s paramount concern, and he continued to 
concentrate more on domestic issues. He was not elected to the 
League's committee i n December 1884, and he made l i t t l e mention of 
i m p e r i a l matters i n h i s e l e c t i o n address of the f o l l o w i n g year.(29) 
I t can be said t h a t the Empire became h i s passion only i n 1889, once 
he was no longer i n Parliament and had accepted Rhodes's i n v i t a t i o n to 
become a d i r e c t o r of the newly-formed B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Company. 
Grey's involvement w i t h the I m p e r i a l Federation League was thus but a 
stage i n the development of h i s i m p e r i a l fervour. 
Grey and the B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Company 
I n 1889 most European countries were s t e a d i l y expanding t h e i r 
spheres of i n t e r e s t i n Southern A f r i c a . Spurred on by the 3rd E a r l , 
who as a strong humanitarian had long expressed concern about the 
w e l l - b e i n g of the n a t i v e population there. Grey now took an i n t e r e s t 
i n the region, and j o i n e d w i t h other humanitarians and Empire-minded 
p o l i t i c i a n s (such as the Rev. John Mackenzie, H.O. Arnold-Forster and 
Chamberlain) to form the South A f r i c a n Committee. This was a pressure 
group, aiming to persuade Salisbury's government to take 'such ac t i o n 
as may be necessary f o r the preservation of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n South 
A f r i c a , and the p r o t e c t i o n of South A f r i c a n n a t i v e populations'.(30) 
I n other words, they sought to achieve two i m p l i c i t l y - l i n k e d aimsyto 
promote B r i t i s h s t r a t e g i c and economic i n t e r e s t s i n the region over 
those of i t s European competitors ( e s p e c i a l l y Germany and P o r t u g a l ) , 
w h i l e simultaneously ensuring t h a t the natives were treated humanely. 
The 3rd E a r l was emphatic that both these aims were compatible, but 
th a t the B r i t i s h government had wantonly f a i l e d to ensure that' the 
region would come w i t h i n the B r i t i s h domain. 
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I t should be noted that Grey appears not to have shared his 
uncle's deep humanitarian i n t e r e s t i n the welfare of the Af r i c a n 
n a t i v e s i n q u i t e the same way. What mattered f a r more to Grey was the 
prospect of e s t a b l i s h i n g Southern A f r i c a as a land f i t f o r B r i t i s h 
s e t t l e r s as soon as possible, and thus c r e a t i n g another 'white' 
colony. He d i d not ignore the welfare of the na t i v e s , because he 
argued th a t B r i t i s h settlement i n the region would have the advantage 
of i n t r o d u c i n g ' c i v i l i s a t i o n ' to the n a t i v e s ; but i t would be true to 
suggest that whenever he spoke about the Empire as an instrument of 
progress he had h i s own countrymen i n mind as the p r i n c i p a l 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s , not the A f r i c a n s . Whereas the 3rd Earl's 
humanitarianism l e d him to urge d i r e c t help f o r the n a t i v e s , the 4th 
Earl's methods were more i n d i r e c t . 
One can c i t e as evidence c e r t a i n remarks made by Grey i n 1899, 
that the nat i v e s i n Rhodesia be 'induced to seek spontaneously 
employment at the mines', and that a hut tax of one pound per native 
should be l e v i e d as an i n c e n t i v e to work - since they could a f f o r d to 
pay t h i s tax only i f they worked i n the mines, which was the only 
moderately adequate source of employment a v a i l a b l e . ( 3 1 ) Grey thus 
aimed both to keep the mines worked and to introduce the natives to 
what he defined as ' c i v i l i s a t i o n ' . Grey's reasoning was that the 
nat i v e s c u r r e n t l y believed paradise meant two wives and a mud hut, and 
so i f they were taught by the B r i t i s h that they ought to be craving 
f o r a higher standard of l i v i n g they would r e a l i s e they could obtain 
the necessary income only i f they sought i n d u s t r i a l employment. Thus 
the Empire would b e n e f i t d i r e c t l y , and the natives i n d i r e c t l y . 
Radical press opinion i n England was not slow to l i k e n t h i s to 
a c a l l f o r i n d u s t r i a l slavery i n Southern A f r i c a . The Co-operative 
News c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n to the strange discrepancy between Grey's 
compassion f o r the welfare of (white) workers i n England and his 
apparent l a c k of concern f o r those i n A f r i c a ( b l a c k ) . ( 3 2 ) Another 
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example of a possible hypocrisy i n h i s l o g i c might be how, i n the 
House of Lords debate four years l a t e r , on the use of Chinese labour 
i n the Transvaal, he urged f u l l support f o r Milner. He argued that 
the best hope, f o r the Empire and natives a l i k e , was i f Southern 
A f r i c a 'turned white'. I n the 1904 debate Grey said that the only 
hope f o r the success of t h i s dream l a y i n a t t r a c t i n g so large an 
i n f l u x of B r i t i s h s e t t l e r s as to make i t impossible f o r South A f r i c a 
again to be the scene of race c o n f l i c t between B r i t o n and Boer. White 
workers were not prepared, however, to s e t t l e i n the region to do the 
poor (but necessary) j o b s , such as mining. Yet since the economic 
we l l - b e i n g of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the country depended on the mining 
i n d u s t r y , and since black natives were u n w i l l i n g to do the work, the 
use of a s i a t i c labour was the only a l t e r n a t i v e . ( 3 3 ) 
A l l t h i s may sound spurious, i f not a c t u a l l y unhumanitarian. 
C e r t a i n l y the 3rd E a r l would not have adopted such an approach. For 
Grey himself, though, the reasoning was p e r f e c t l y l o g i c a l : i m p e r i a l 
i n t e r e s t s demanded that the mineral resources of the area be 
e x p l o i t e d , and he was convinced that the natives (or immigrant labour) 
could be deployed to s a t i s f y t h i s need i n a manner which was morally 
acceptable and even personally advantageous f o r them. This may 
perhaps appear to be a naive view, but nevertheless i t was genuinely 
held by Grey. 
The South A f r i c a n Committee members were mindful that i f 
B r i t a i n were to maintain i t s hold over the Cape of Good Hope, i t must 
be able to p r o t e c t i t s h i n t e r l a n d , whether from other Europeans or the 
Boers. More i m p o r t a n t l y , they believed, as d i d most people, that the 
p o t e n t i a l economic wealth of A f r i c a was considerable. This p o t e n t i a l 
was appreciated c e r t a i n l y by Rhodes, then a mining magnate i n the 
Cape, who hoped to form a company to develop the area of Matabeleland 
and Mashonaland (now Zimbabwe) to the n o r t h of the Transvaal. 
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Before he met Rhodes, Grey had shared a widely-held scepticism 
of h i s i n t e n t i o n s , b e l i e v i n g him to be nothing more than a creature of 
greed and ambition. He feared that i f t h i s company were formed, i t 
would seek only to e x p l o i t the mineral resources and do nothing to 
e s t a b l i s h the area as a B r i t i s h colony.(34) This antipathy towards 
Rhodes, w i t h which the 3rd E a r l and Mackenzie wholeheartedly 
concurred, d i d not l a s t long. Just one week l a t e r . Grey was swayed 
du r i n g a t a l k w i t h S i r W i l l i a m Mackinnon, a keen i m p e r i a l expansionist 
i n Tanganyika, who convinced him that Rhodes could do much f o r the 
i m p e r i a l cause, and should not be hindered.(35) By the end of June, 
as Germany and Portugal continued to make p l a i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n 
expansion n o r t h of the Transvaal - and yet the B r i t i s h government 
s t i l l refused to become involved i t s e l f - Grey concluded that the only 
chance of Matabeleland becoming B r i t i s h was i f i t were handed over to 
a p r i v a t e company. 
Because Rhodes and h i s South A f r i c a n colleagues did not i n s p i r e 
confidence among most p o t e n t i a l B r i t i s h i n v e s t o r s . Lord Salisbury had 
urged Rhodes to f i n d B r i t i s h d i r e c t o r s of ' s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
standing' before applying f o r the Charter.(36) Rhodes therefore 
sought to win over such people, and duly secured the services of the 
Dukes of Abercorn and F i f e . I n J u l y 1889, a c t i n g on the advice of 
W.T. Stead, e d i t o r of the P a l l Mall Gazette and a mutual f r i e n d , he 
also persuaded Grey to j o i n the board of h i s new venture, the B r i t i s h 
South A f r i c a Company, as one of i t s l i f e d i r e c t o r s . ( 3 7 ) 
Reaction to Rhodes's i n t e n t i o n s was v a r i e d . Salisbury, f o r 
example, by s t a t i n g that the government would not involve i t s e l f i n 
the r e g i o n , h a p p i l y l e f t the area open to Rhodes. Chamberlain, 
however, d i s l i k e d the idea of d i r e c t c o n t r o l being exercised by a 
company, and t r i e d to persuade Grey not to accept a d i r e c t o r s h i p . I t 
i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t Rhodes considered i t most important that he gain 
Grey's support: f o r Grey, as a c r i t i c h i t h e r t o of a l l that he was 
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supposed to stand f o r , was a p o t e n t i a l l y troublesome opponent to his 
quest f o r a r o y a l charter f o r the company. Although barely f o r t y , 
Grey's id e a l i s m and s i n c e r i t y was already known and widely respected: 
To have gained Grey...was one of the best b i t s of work Rhodes ever 
d i d f o r himself and h i s great ideas; f o r i n a f t e r days, when 
doubts arose about Rhodes's motives, the staunchness to h i s cause 
of such a t r a n s p a r e n t l y honest man reassured many.(38) 
Once he won Grey over to h i s side, Rhodes gained a l i f e l o n g admirer, 
supporter and f r i e n d . The extent and s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s adulation 
was such t h a t Rhodes's views on Southern A f r i c a and the Empire became 
those also of Grey. I t was not that Grey was a weak or spineless man, 
but r a t h e r t h a t he was captivated by the appeal of Rhodes's i m p e r i a l 
v i s i o n . 
The B r i t i s h government was prepared to accept the claim f o r a 
r o y a l c h a r t e r f o r the B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Company because Rhodes 
would be h e l p i n g to secure t h e i r goals f o r the region without i t flH'jfir/f^ 
having to pay anything.(39) The government saw the charter as a means 
of strengthening B r i t i s h hegemony over the Boers once the various 
colonies i n South A f r i c a were federated: thus B r i t i s h Matabeleland and 
Mashonaland would counter-balance the economic and p o l i t i c a l r i s e of 
the Boer Transvaal. The charter was granted f o r a twenty-five year 
p e r i o d , u n t i l such time as the c o l o n i s t s were ready to govern 
themselves and j o i n a South A f r i c a n federation.(40) 
Rhodes was much i n accordance w i t h t h i s aim of fe d e r a t i o n : and 
so too was Grey, even before 1889. I n l a t e r years he r e c a l l e d 
r e c e i v i n g a l e t t e r from S i r B a r t l e Frere (Governor of the Cape, 
1877-80), prophesying to him that i f only the various states of South 
A f r i c a had a f a i r chance given to them, a unite d South A f r i c a might 
g r a d u a l l y develop i n t o a r i v a l w i t h A u s t r a l i a and the United States as 
a home f o r educated Englishmen. By 1894 Rhodes was advocating a 
system of c o l l e c t i v e f e d e r a t i o n of a l l the states i n Southern A f r i c a , 
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and was r e c e i v i n g advice from Grey of t r e a t i s e s on s i m i l a r f e d e r a l 
schemes i n Canada.(41) South A f r i c a n f e d e r a t i o n would help b r i n g the 
dream of I m p e r i a l Federation one step closer to r e a l i t y . 
I n an 1898 speech Grey proclaimed that the Company had created 
f o r England a s t a t e which would secure her supremacy i n Southern 
A f r i c a , and t h a t a l l the colonies there could u n i t e ^on the basis of 
Mr. Rhodes's p o s i t i o n of equal r i g h t s f o r every white man'.(42) What 
he meant by t h i s was t h a t a l l whites, whether English, Dutch, French, 
German or Scandinavian, were welcome i n a B r i t i s h Southern A f r i c a so 
long as they accepted B r i t i s h r u l e . The resident Boers posed a 
problem, however: Grey, alongside other i m p e r i a l i s t s , recognised war 
was i n e v i t a b l e i n order to vanquish the Boers once and f o r a l l , to end 
t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o the spread of B r i t i s h hegemony. Kruger and his 
colleagues could not be allowed to thwart the spread of progress and 
c i v i l i s a t i o n as represented by the B r i t i s h Empire. As Grey 
proclaimed: 
An i n t u i t i o n t h r i l l s the Anglo-Saxon world that the f e d e r a t i o n of 
South Africa...which w i l l f o l l o w the war, i s only the precursor of 
the f e d e r a t i o n of Canada, A u s t r a l i a and South A f r i c a w i t h the 
B r i t i s h Empire; and, i n fulness of time, of the f e d e r a t i o n of the 
whole English-speaking race.(43) 
Grey's a n t i p a t h y to the Boers was widely shared by many of his 
f e l l o w countrymen - as r e f l e c t e d i n the circumstances surrounding the 
Jameson Raid of 1895. Grey was deeply involved i n the conspiracy: he 
was one of the few d i r e c t o r s i n the Company to be t o l d i n advance of 
the Raid, since he was used by Rhodes as an emissary between himself 
and Chamberlain. On 1 August 1895, i t i s believed that Grey t o l d the 
C o l o n i a l Secretary of Rhodes's i n t e n t i o n to a s s i s t an Uitlander 
u p r i s i n g , but t h a t the l a t t e r then 'declined to receive t h i s 
i n f o r m a t i o n ' o f f i c i a l l y . ( 4 4 ) The c r u c i a l question i s whether Grey 
t o l d him t h a t Rhodes intended to i n i t i a t e , or simply a s s i s t , an 
u p r i s i n g , because i f he had said the former then Chamberlain would 
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have been made aware of a plan which was b l a t a n t l y i l l e g a l and yet 
which he f a i l e d to stop. Chamberlain l a t e r i n s i s t e d that he had not 
been thus informed. Grey confirmed t h i s , probably i n an attempt to 
help Chamberlain escape censure. I n an open l e t t e r , he declared: 
I most c e r t a i n l y can confirm you [Chamberlain] when you say that 
you d i d not know and could not know of any plan or i n t e n t i o n of 
Mr. Rhodes which could possibly lead to such an invasion of the 
Transvaal i n time of peace as was perpetrated by Dr. Jameson f o r I 
d i d not know of any such plan or i n t e n t i o n myself - our whole 
ob j e c t was t o place Jameson i n a p o s i t i o n which could enable him 
to a s s i s t a r e v o l u t i o n at the r i g h t moment. That he should 
attempt to i n i t i a t e a r e v o l u t i o n by an invasion of the Transvaal 
i n time of peace never so much as entered i n t o my 
imagination".(45) [my emphasis] 
Did Grey know of the r e a l i n t e n t i o n s of Rhodes and Jameson? 
H i s t o r i a n s such as Cannadine suggest that he d i d , and Cannadine 
a c t u a l l y uses Grey's involvement i n the Jameson a f f a i r as a c l a s s i c 
example of corrupt behaviour by the a r i s t o c r a c y i n the nineteenth 
century.(46) This i s an u n f a i r accusation, however, since Grey was 
u n i v e r s a l l y acclaimed as a person too honest and u p r i g h t to be able to 
l i e over such a matter. Just so that he d i d not say too much, 
however, i t s u i t e d both Rhodes and Chamberlain that he should be 
appointed the Ad m i n i s t r a t o r of the Company t e r r i t o r y i n succession to 
Jameson, i n March 1896, which meant that he was not a v a i l a b l e f o r the 
parliamentary i n q u i r y on the Raid. This was t h e i r d ecision, i t must 
be stressed, not Grey's. He could have been summoned, l i k e Rhodes 
was, and i t i s s u r p r i s i n g that t h i s d i d not happen: but no one on the 
committee of i n q u i r y suggested t h i s , not even the s c e p t i c a l 
Labouchere. W.V. Harcourt, another member, suspected that Grey had 
been i n the midst of the p l o t ; ( 4 7 ) but not even he asked that Grey be 
summoned, once Rhodes i n h i s evidence had refused to admit that Grey 
knew anything beforehand of the Raid.(48) 
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Perhaps Grey was naive i n being duped by a man whom he 
considered h i s close f r i e n d . Yet even i f Grey would have been shocked 
by the exact d e t a i l s of the Raid, i t s o v e r a l l purpose was f o r him 
p e r f e c t l y j u s t i f i a b l e . Since the Boers would not l i s t e n to reason, 
and continued s u c c e s s f u l l y to oppose a l l that the B r i t i s h Empire stood 
f o r , t h e i r power had to be destroyed. Consequently, the idea of the 
Company a s s i s t i n g a r i s i n g seemed q u i t e reasonable to him, but he 
probably d i d not a n t i c i p a t e that Jameson would be rash enough to make 
a pre-emptive s t r i k e . Stated q u i t e b l u n t l y , the Boers, l i k e the 
N a t i o n a l i s t s i n I r e l a n d , had challenged the a u t h o r i t y of the B r i t i s h 
Empire i n areas regarded by people l i k e Grey as s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l . 
That could not be permitted.(49) 
The l i k e l i h o o d of Rhodes's deep involvement i n the conspiracy 
d i d nothing to lessen the esteem i n which Grey held him. On the 
c o n t r a r y , he regarded the whole a f f a i r as a f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n of 
Rhodes a c t i n g nobly i n the i n t e r e s t s of the Empire while the 
government sat passively on the s i d e l i n e s . His devotion to Rhodes 
continued to grow, and upon h i s death i n 1902 Grey became ^a jealous 
guardian of the r e p u t a t i o n and t r a d i t i o n of Rhodes'.(50) I n 1903 he 
declared: 
[Rhodes] was, i n t r u t h , a most strenuous lover of h i s country, the 
most single-minded and the greatest man I ever met. During his 
l i f e he gave a l l h i s energies and a l l h i s wealth to the services 
of the Empire.(51) 
Grey l a t e r donated h i s e n t i r e p r o f i t from h i s quota of free Company 
shares, about £3,000, towards the e r e c t i o n of a reproduction of G.F. 
Watts's Statue of Physical Energy, as a memorial to Rhodes i n Bulawayo 
(t h e o r i g i n a l i s i n South A f r i c a ) . ( 5 2 ) 
I t was as a personal favour to Rhodes, and at considerable 
inconvenience to himself, that i n 1896 Grey accepted the post of 
A d m i n i s t r a t o r of the Company t e r r i t o r y (then known as Rhodesia) i n 
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succession to the disgraced Jameson. I n h i s f i f t e e n months i n t h i s 
p o s i t i o n he was unable to do much c o n s t r u c t i v e work of any 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , however, since the Shona and Matabele t r i b e s had taken 
advantage of Jameson's absence to r i s e i n r e b e l l i o n ; and the Company 
devoted a l l of i t s energy, under Rhodes's personal leadership, to 
c o n t r o l l i n g the n a t i v e s . Gann makes no mention of Grey i n his History 
of Southern Rhodesia, while Cannadine h a i l s h i s a d m i n i s t r a t o r s h i p as 
' d i s t i n c t l y unimpressive'.(53) Upon h i s r e t u r n home. Grey remained a 
d i r e c t o r of the B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Company, and served as i t s Vice-
President from 1898 to 1904. I n h i s view the Company was involved i n 
transforming a waste i n t o a garden, a garden capable of becoming a 
white man's country - and a major element i n any f u t u r e B r i t i s h 
f e d e r a t i o n i n the region. 
Personal p r o f i t as an explcination of Grey's imperialism ? 
One possible reason f o r Grey's i n t e r e s t i n the Empire which 
must be considered was the f i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e - whether Grey was an 
i m p e r i a l i s t simply because he saw the colonies as a p o t e n t i a l l y 
l u c r a t i v e source of income f o r i n d i v i d u a l s such as himself. According 
to Hobson, i n h i s c l a s s i c work Imperialism, most of the im p e r i a l 
expansion i n A f r i c a before 1895 could be a t t r i b u t e d not to 
humanitarian or v i s i o n a r y impulses, but simply to personal greed. 
Rhodes, and hence Grey too, might be said to f i t p e r f e c t l y i n t o t h i s 
argument, through t h e i r involvement w i t h the B r i t i s h South A f r i c a 
Company. A t h i n veneer of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y was provided f o r the Company 
by the t a l k about i t s work i n b r i n g i n g c i v i l i s a t i o n to i t s t e r r i t o r y , 
w h i l e i t s r e a l aim was j u s t to make a p r o f i t f o r i t s shareholders.(54) 
Hobson's argument has been a recurrent theme among l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s , 
as i t has become customary to explode the contemporary V i c t o r i a n myth 
about humanitarianism being the d r i v i n g force behind the Europeans' 
'Scramble f o r A f r i c a ' . Whereas Robinson and Gallagher asserted i n the 
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1950s th a t the B r i t i s h Empire expanded i n t o A f r i c a because of the need 
to p r o t e c t i t s s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s - such as the sea routes to I n d i a , 
and w h i l e Fieldhouse l a t e r r e s t a t e d the view that i t was non-economic 
motives that were paramount, more recent h i s t o r i a n s have w r i t t e n i n 
support of the argument, s t a r t i n g w i t h P i a t t i n the 1960s.(55) 
This argument was f u r t h e r developed by the p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1986 
of Davis and Huttenback's Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, i n which 
i t i s noted t h a t empire-building was a c o s t l y undertaking f o r the 
B r i t i s h government, whereby a small wealthy e l i t e could make large 
p r i v a t e p r o f i t s at the expense of the taxpayer - since the government 
was s u b s i d i s i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of companies l i k e the B r i t i s h South 
A f r i c a Company.(56) They noted t h a t : 'the B r i t i s h as a whole 
c e r t a i n l y d i d not b e n e f i t economically from the Empire. On the other 
hand, i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t o r s d i d ' , although admittedly from 1890 onwards 
the p r o f i t s a v a i l a b l e from i m p e r i a l investments generally were 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y below those a v a i l a b l e at home.(57) 
Cain and Hopkins, meanwhile, have argued that i t i s not 
possible to d i s t i n g u i s h between p o l i t i c a l / s t r a t e g i c motives and 
economic motives i n e x p l a i n i n g the actions of men l i k e Rhodes and 
Grey.(58) They have described the s i g n i f i c a n c e of gentlemanly 
c a p i t a l i s t s - 'the powerful landed i n t e r e s t which combined...the 
p r e s t i g e of i n h e r i t e d s o c i a l p o s i t i o n w i t h progressive market 
o r i e n t a t e d ambitions', a class which dominated the p o l i t i c s and 
c u l t u r e of the l a t e nineteenth century. They say that these 
i n d i v i d u a l s helped determine B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n t h i s period, i n a 
manner designed to b e n e f i t and boost B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l and 
commercial i n t e r e s t s i n the c o n t i n e n t , as w e l l as i t s s t r a t e g i c 
i n t e r e s t s , and argue th a t the ' c o s t l y decision' to b r i n g the Boer 
Republics under B r i t i s h c o n t r o l i n the 1890s can only be understood i n 
t h i s context.(59) 
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Hobson's argument may w e l l apply i n respect of some 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , such as A l f r e d B e i t , Barney Barnato and Hercules 
Robinson, who were c a p i t a l i s t s f i r s t and foremost. Perhaps i t applies 
also to Rhodes, G a l b r a i t h arguing that he 'professed devotion to the 
advancement of "Anglo-Saxondom", but he demonstrated devotion to the 
advancement of s e l f ' . ( 6 0 ) Another h i s t o r i a n has suggested that i t was 
p r i m a r i l y Rhodes's s u b s t a n t i a l stake i n De Beers which determined h i s 
de s i r e to expand northwards i n search of new p r o f i t s . ( 6 1 ) Yet such 
arguments dismiss too e a s i l y Rhodes's evident devotion to the im p e r i a l 
i d e a l . Rhodes d i d want to make a personal p r o f i t , but he also wanted 
to b e n e f i t the Empire. 
There i s thus a narrow, but v i t a l , d i s t i n c t i o n to be drawn 
between the s c e p t i c a l views of c e r t a i n h i s t o r i a n s and what r e a l l y 
i n s p i r e d i m p e r i a l i s t s l i k e Rhodes and Grey, who saw personal p r o f i t 
and i m p e r i a l gain as two goals which were p e r f e c t l y compatible. This 
i s d e f i n i t e l y not the same t h i n g as arguing that they were 
i m p e r i a l i s t s purely f o r s e l f i s h reasons. I t must be emphasised that 
Grey's prime reason f o r becoming a d i r e c t o r of the B r i t i s h South 
A f r i c a Company was i n seeing Southern A f r i c a developed as a f u l l part 
of the B r i t i s h Empire, w i t h a l l the necessary communications and 
f a c i l i t i e s . For him the aim of the Company making a p r o f i t was but a 
means to tha t end, and any personal p r o f i t was a c o i n c i d e n t a l b e n e f i t . 
I t i s t r u e that Grey d i d b e n e f i t considerably from his 
s u b s t a n t i a l involvement i n the Empire. As a d i r e c t o r he was e n t i t l e d 
to an allotm e n t of 9,000 shares at par; and w i t h p r o f i t s r i s i n g by 
300% between 1889 and 1895, t h i s represented no small sum.(62) He was 
always anxious to invest i n the Empire, however, rat h e r than elsewhere 
abroad, since he saw i m p e r i a l investment as p o s i t i v e l y advantageous 
f o r the Empire as a whole. For example, on the advice of Robin 
Benson, h i s wife's b r o t h e r - i n - l a w and a London merchant banker, Grey 
bought a f r u i t farm of 720 acres i n B r i t i s h Columbia, having been 
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loaned the necessary £10,000 from h i s maternal aunt. Lady Wantage. He 
wrote to her: 
I f you can help me to purchase t h i s farm, you w i l l do these two 
th i n g s : you w i l l be ta k i n g out your dividends i n sound 
imperialism...and you w i l l be helping me and my family.(63) 
Surely Grey had j u s t as much r i g h t as anyone else to make a b i t 
of e x t r a money. He happened to seek h i s fortune by i n v e s t i n g i n the 
Empire, w h i l e others, such as Labouchere, sought i t i n Boston 
Consolidated Mines.(64) Grey also had strong and j u s t i f i a b l e reasons 
f o r wanting to make some money: i n 1894, when he had succeeded to the 
earldom, he had also i n h e r i t e d a mortgage of £200,000, and hence every 
e f f o r t had to be made to rescue the f a m i l y and the estate at Howick 
from the d i r e f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n which i t had been i n since the time 
of the 2nd Ear l . ( 6 5 ) 
Despite these d i f f i c u l t i e s . Grey was s t i l l prepared to accept 
the post of A d m i n i s t r a t o r of Rhodesia, even though t h i s barred him 
from r e c e i v i n g any f u r t h e r income from any form of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e 
i n the Company's t e r r i t o r i e s . Moreover, i n order not to prompt a 
collapse i n Rhodesian shares, he asked h i s f e l l o w d i r e c t o r A l f r e d Beit 
to s e l l various of h i s shares p r i v a t e l y , r a t h e r than on the open 
market, despite the f a c t that t h i s reduced t h e i r value by up to 10%. 
As he commented to B e i t : 'My coming out here i s going to lose me a l o t 
of money which I can i l l a f f o r d to lose'.(66) 
The s t o r y was l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t i n 1904, when he was appointed 
Governor-General - a post he was able to accept only because Lady 
Wantage was w i l l i n g to act as h i s patroness and to subsidise heavily 
h i s o f f i c i a l expenses.(67) Cannadine says that a major a t t r a c t i o n f o r 
poor men l i k e Grey i n being a proconsul was the pay (£10,000 i n 1910), 
which enabled them to enjoy, at someone else's expense, a grander 
s t y l e of l i v i n g than they themselves could enjoy at home.(68) He 
proceeds to r e j e c t the claims of Grey and others that the o f f i c i a l 
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s a l a r y was inadequate f o r a l l the e n t e r t a i n i n g which they were 
expected to undertake, and that hence they returned home poorer than 
ever, by p o i n t i n g out that any loss incurred was not as great as the 
cost i f they had stayed at home and been obliged to maintain t h e i r 
houses i n London and elsewhere without t h e i r o f f i c i a l s a l a r i e s . I n 
par t t h i s i s t r u e , but i n Grey's case i t ignores the f a c t that i f Grey 
had not gone to Canada he would have been able to r e t a i n h i s various 
d i r e c t o r s h i p s - which i n 1915 were to b r i n g i n £3,000 per year.(69) 
So Grey was r i g h t to complain that h i s i m p e r i a l duties cost him 
de a r l y . By the time of the F i r s t World War, moreover, the mortgage on 
the Howick estate s t i l l stood at £137,000, the house there had been 
shut up and most male servants dismissed, and the fa m i l y was obliged 
to l i v e i n the humblest way i n i t s London house.(70) 
Conclusion 
I t i s contended here that the various explanations c u r r e n t l y given 
as to why one g e n e r a l l y might have become an i m p e r i a l i s t i n the 
nineteenth century do not apply to Grey. Porter notes that 
' c a p i t a l i s t s i n general do not mind where they make t h e i r wealth':(71) 
but Grey d i d mind very much, and was anxious to invest only i n schemes 
which might be of b e n e f i t to the Empire, such as those i n Canada and 
Rhodesia. Some of h i s investments turned out to be disastrous, i n 
f a c t , and by 1916 he was obliged to s e l l a l l h i s shares i n Canadian 
f r u i t farms at only h a l f t h e i r o r i g i n a l value: h i s i m p e r i a l enthusiasm 
had overridden any f i n a n c i a l judgment.(72) 
As has been demonstrated i n t h i s chapter. Grey's imperialism 
was based on i d e a l i s t i c and not m a t e r i a l i s t i c , b e n e f i t s - an idealism 
shaped e s p e c i a l l y by the i n f l u e n c e of h i s uncle, the 3rd E a r l , and the 
w r i t i n g s of Mazzini. From then onwards, h i s contacts w i t h Rhodes 
served both to nourish h i s b e l i e f s and to d i r e c t h i s energies towards 
the r e a l i s a t i o n of one p a r t i c u l a r goal - I m p e r i a l Federation. What he 
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understood t h a t concept to mean, and how he intended that i t should be 
r e a l i s e d , forms the basis of the next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
POLITICAL FEDERATION 
I n J u l y 1885, when Grey addressed the inaugural meeting of the 
I m p e r i a l Federation League i n L i v e r p o o l , he made h i s f i r s t p ublic c a l l 
f o r the p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n of the Empire. He spoke generally about 
the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a common defence p o l i c y and f i s c a l p o l i c y , as w e l l 
as adapting the House of Lords i n t o an i m p e r i a l council by the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o l o n i a l l i f e peers. He d i d not, however, o f f e r any 
s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s about what each change might e n t a i l . ( 1 ) 
A f t e r making that speech. Grey's involvement w i t h the Imperial 
Federation League waned. Nevertheless, through h i s involvement w i t h 
the B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Company he remained keenly aware of the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of c o n s o l i d a t i o n . At the 1902 annual dinner of the Royal 
C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e he suggested that the changing r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
B r i t a i n and i t s se l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies demanded the u l t i m a t e adoption 
of some form of I m p e r i a l Federation, even i f t h i s meant a p a r t i a l loss 
of p o l i t i c a l autonomy and freedom of a c t i o n on both sides. The Times 
claimed: 'Most Englishmen now hold w i t h Lord Grey that we are tending 
towards I m p e r i a l Federation by a process of " i r r e s i s t i b l e 
e v o l u t i o n " ' . ( 2 ) I t was not u n t i l h i s appointment as Governor-General 
of Canada, i n 1904, however, that Grey began to make a s i g n i f i c a n t 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the debate about p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n . 
I n much the same s p i r i t as Seeley and the League, Grey never 
concerned himself w i t h the precise d e t a i l s of any scheme. When his 
son c r i t i c i s e d him f o r vagueness, he responded: 
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He would be a bold and f o o l i s h man who would attempt at t h i s time 
of day to define the exact shape and marking and co l o u r i n g of t h i s 
flower now i n the bud.(3) 
The reason f o r Grey's reluctance was p a r t l y because he considered i t 
dangerous to present c o n t r o v e r s i a l plans before one needed to - as 
shown i n the way the League s p l i t i n the 1890s. I t can also be said, 
though, that Grey r a r e l y cared f o r d e t a i l s : h i s mind was o f t e n too 
a c t i v e to s e t t l e to such mundane tasks. This was not due to any lack 
of i n t e l l i g e n c e : h i s t a l e n t s , as he w e l l knew, l a y elsewhere - i n 
seeking to boost the necessary f e e l i n g of i m p e r i a l sentiment as a pre-
c o n d i t i o n to p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n . 
When pressed to be more s p e c i f i c . Grey e i t h e r suggested that 
t h i s task should be l e f t to a Royal Commission,(4) or else talked 
vaguely of an I m p e r i a l Parliament or L e g i s l a t i v e Council. I n 1909-10, 
when he was promoting the idea of a f e d e r a l system of government f o r 
the United Kingdom, he d i d propose that each of the dominions might 
also send t h e i r own representatives to t h i s new assembly.(5) He did 
not pursue the idea, however, once he recognised that the Dominions 
would never consent to send t h e i r representatives to what would be 
l i t t l e more than the parliament of j u s t another f e d e r a t i o n . 
Grey envisaged instead an assembly - which confusingly he 
sometimes described as an I m p e r i a l Council when i n f a c t he meant a 
parliament w i t h l e g i s l a t i v e powers, not the merely advisory I m p e r i a l 
Council advocated by i m p e r i a l i s t s such as Milner. Grey's assembly 
would be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the various f e d e r a t i o n s , and responsible 
f o r determining the e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s and defence p o l i c i e s of the 
Empire. I t would assess also how much each of the Dominions should 
c o n t r i b u t e to the cost of t h e i r j o i n t defence - although, most 
i m p o r t a n t l y , i n order not to i n f r i n g e Dominion self-government, i t 
would not have the r i g h t to d i c t a t e the methods by which that revenue 
should be r a i s e d . Nor would i t even consider the more c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
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question of an i m p e r i a l t a r i f f . ( 6 ) Later he added the suggestion that 
t h i s Council would i n due course take over r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
dependencies of the Empire, i n c l u d i n g even I n d i a . ( 7 ) This l a t t e r 
proposal h i g h l i g h t e d Grey's general lack of i n t e r e s t i n the special 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n and I n d i a , i n s t a r k contrast w i t h many 
other i m p e r i a l i s t s , such as Curzon, who not only viewed I n d i a as the 
r a i s o n d'etre of the Empire but saw i t as being entwined i n a unique 
way w i t h B r i t a i n , q u i t e separate from the 'White Empire'. 
While Grey sat on the periphery of the Empire, t a l k i n g i n 
general terms about the need to boost i m p e r i a l sentiment, a group of 
ardent i m p e r i a l i s t s was forming i n London under the aegis of his 
colleague Milner, committed to the task of working out a d e t a i l e d 
scheme of p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n . The group, established i n September 
1909 as the 'Round Table', was l a r g e l y composed at f i r s t of those 
young men who had worked under Milner when he had been High 
Commissioner of the Cape Colony, where they had been known as 
'Milner's Kindergarten'.(8) I n c l u d i n g O l i v e r , L i o n e l C u r t i s , P h i l i p 
Kerr and ( t o a considerably lesser extent) Grey's own son. Lord 
Howick, these men had c a r r i e d through Milner's plans f o r the 
f e d e r a t i o n of South A f r i c a , s u c c e s s f u l l y established i n 1910. They 
had now returned home to B r i t a i n , seeking to formulate s i m i l a r 
proposals f o r the 'White Empire' as a whole, working under the same 
basic assumption as most i m p e r i a l i s t s , from Seeley to Chamberlain, 
tha t the Empire must e i t h e r consolidate or d i s i n t e g r a t e . 
A major c o n t r i b u t i o n to the t h i n k i n g of a l l i m p e r i a l i s t s . Grey 
and the Kindergarten members a l i k e , had been provided by the 
p u b l i c a t i o n i n 1906 of O l i v e r ' s Alexander Hamilton, a p r o - f e d e r a l i s t 
t r a c t which The Times l a t e r described as having probably more 
i n f l u e n c e than any other p o l i t i c a l work of that decade.(9) I n 
h i g h l i g h t i n g the success of the i n t r o d u c t i o n by Hamilton of federalism 
i n the United States as an e x c e l l e n t means of r e c o n c i l i n g l o c a l i s t 
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l o y a l t i e s w i t h c e n t r a l i s t cohesion, Oli v e r ' s book str u c k an immediate 
chord w i t h many. Hamilton's federalism d i d indeed seem an i d e a l 
system of government - so long as the c e n t r a l focus of u n i t y was given 
s u f f i c i e n t power to prevent a c i v i l war. 
M i l n e r , u n l i k e Grey, was 'dedicated less to ideals than to 
systems',(10) as were h i s two most a c t i v e l i e u t e n a n t s , C u r t i s and 
O l i v e r . What the Round Table sought to achieve, and what i t preached, 
vjas not unique, but the extent of i t s considerable energy and i t s 
i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t y made i t a p r i n c i p a l source of i n s p i r a t i o n f o r 
I m p e r i a l Federation i n the years leading up to the outbreak of war i n 
1914. 
Unlike the I m p e r i a l Federation League, the Round Table d i d not 
attempt to be a p o p u l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n , b e l i e v i n g instead ( i n contrast 
to Grey) that there was no point i n t r y i n g to s t i r up p u b l i c i n t e r e s t 
f o r I m p e r i a l Federation u n t i l there were enough p o l i t i c i a n s i n B r i t a i n 
and the Dominions who were ready to consider the issue. Thus i t aimed 
to d i r e c t i t s proposals at the leaders, not the l e d , while avoiding 
any connection w i t h one p a r t i c u l a r party l e s t i t s message be seen as 
p a r t i s a n r a t h e r than d i s i n t e r e s t e d . I t d i d , however, encourage the 
formation of Round Table groups i n B r i t a i n and the Empire, and 
produced what became an i n f l u e n t i a l j o u r n a l . Round Table, under the 
i n i t i a l e d i t o r s h i p of O l i v e r . 
I n accordance w i t h Milner's opinions, the Round Table argued 
tha t the system of c o l o n i a l conferences was i n s u f f i c i e n t as a means of 
encouraging c o n s o l i d a t i o n since i t d i d not allow f o r a continuous flow 
of communication between B r i t a i n and the Dominions. I n the autumn of 
1909 C u r t i s and Kerr set out on a mission, to discover the extent of 
i m p e r i a l sentiment i n Canada, and to meet Grey.(11) Both were 
depressed that even those Canadians who c a l l e d themselves keen 
i m p e r i a l i s t s seemed to have an inadequate a p p r e c i a t i o n of the urgent 
need f o r i m p e r i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n . This raises an i n t e r e s t i n g contrast 
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to the view of Grey, who was much more convinced of Canadian keenness 
f o r the Empire. I t was not that Grey was deluding himself e n t i r e l y , 
but r a t h e r t h a t he r e a l i s e d b e t t e r than C u r t i s and the other Round 
Tablers that the people of Canada must not be rushed towards Imperial 
Federation u n t i l they were s u f f i c i e n t l y convinced of i t s merits. 
A f t e r r e t u r n i n g home from a subsequent tour to A u s t r a l i a and 
New Zealand i n 1910, C u r t i s produced a 'Green Memorandum' o u t l i n i n g 
the movement's i n i t i a l views on what form I m p e r i a l Federation might 
take. I t r e i t e r a t e d the view that there was no a l t e r n a t i v e between 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , and c a l l e d f o r an I m p e r i a l 
Parliament, to be responsible f o r the Empire's dependencies and 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
Reaction to the Round Table's i n i t i a l proposal, at t h i s stage 
only t e n t a t i v e , was mixed. While i m p e r i a l i s t s such as Lord Selborne 
(High Commissioner f o r South A f r i c a , 1905-10) welcomed the c a l l f o r an 
I m p e r i a l Parliament, others l i k e Richard Jebb advocated a very 
d i f f e r e n t course.(12) Rejecting the claim that there was no 
a l t e r n a t i v e between the Empire c o n s o l i d a t i n g or d i s i n t e g r a t i n g , he 
argued instead f o r a form of i m p e r i a l u n i t y based on association 
r a t h e r than f e d e r a t i o n : he envisaged the 'White Empire' as a family of 
f r e e n a t i o n s , bound together by t i e s of l o y a l t y and sentiment, as w e l l 
as a system of i m p e r i a l economic preference - an issue not addressed 
by the Round Table because i t was contentious and p o t e n t i a l l y 
d i v i s i v e . 
Grey's ideas on p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n were very s i m i l a r to those 
of the Round Table, and he maintained a regular correspondence w i t h 
i t s prominent members ( e s p e c i a l l y Milner and O l i v e r ) , even once his 
son's involvement had waned.(13) However, although 'one of the 
movement's most ardent supporters i n Canada and l a t e r an i n t i m a t e i n 
London', Grey never j o i n e d the Round Table.(14) The possible reasons 
f o r t h i s are t h a t , as an i n d i v i d u a l i s t by nature, Grey f e l t 
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uncomfortable i n any o r g a n i s a t i o n dominated by someone else. He could 
h a r d l y hope to be a leading f i g u r e i n the Round Table, since he was 
across the A t l a n t i c , and because most of i t s members were the 
starry-eyed apostles of Milner. Moreover, Grey was more i n t e r e s t e d i n 
p o p u l a r i s i n g than t h e o r i s i n g , which d i d not accord w i t h the Round 
Table's o b j e c t i v e s . F i n a l l y , although Milner and Grey were f e l l o w 
enthusiasts of I m p e r i a l Federation, Grey feared that Milner was 
sometimes too strong-headed to pay s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n to Dominion 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s , and so r i s k e d o f f e n d i n g those whose support was v i t a l : 
His f a u l t i s a want of sympathy which disables him from seeing the 
s t r e n g t h of other people's objections to a course which commends 
i t s e l f to h i s i n t e l l e c t . ( 1 5 ) 
The prospect of c l a s h i n g w i t h t h i s i n t e l l e c t held no appeal f o r Grey, 
any more than d i d the tedium of t h e o r i s i n g backstage. Grey's 
p r e f e r r e d place was i n the p u l p i t , not the t h e o l o g i c a l college. 
Grey i n Ccinada 
As Governor-General i n Canada, which has been described as ' i n 
some ways the l e a s t e n t h u s i a s t i c of the i m p e r i a l daughters',(16) Grey 
took every o p p o r t u n i t y to promote I m p e r i a l Federation. He faced 
enormous obstacles, though, and not j u s t because there was a 
s u b s t a n t i a l French-speaking m i n o r i t y g e n e r a l l y a n t i p a t h e t i c to closer 
l i n k s w i t h B r i t a i n . Canada had long been keen to assert i t s autonomy, 
and had been the f i r s t colony to be granted responsible s e l f -
government, under the Canada Act of 1840. 
Since 1895 the Prime M i n i s t e r had been W i l f r i d L aurier, a 
French Canadian and Roman Cat h o l i c , who was widely known f o r h i s lack 
of i n t e r e s t i n the c a l l s f o r I m p e r i a l Federation, expressing himself 
p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h the e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between Canada and 
B r i t a i n . I n 1900 he declared: 
I claim f o r Canada t h i s , that i n f u t u r e , Canada s h a l l be at 
l i b e r t y to act or not to a c t , to i n t e r f e r e or not i n t e r f e r e , to do 
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j u s t as she pleases, and that she s h a l l reserve to h e r s e l f the 
r i g h t to judge whether or not there i s cause f o r her to act.(17) 
Two years l a t e r he spoke of the ^White Empire' as ^a galaxy of 
independent nations'.(18) For L a u r i e r , the e f f o r t s of Grey and others 
to regiment the Empire i n t o a federated and c e n t r a l i s e d system ran 
counter to the t i d e of h i s t o r y over the past s i x t y years, which had 
been towards responsible self-government and autonomy f o r Canada. (19) 
Grey was not daunted by the apparent widespread lack of 
i n t e r e s t among Canadians i n I m p e r i a l Federation, and ascribed i t to a 1 
l a c k of understanding about the b e n e f i t s of Empire rather than any 
p o s i t i v e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m . A l l that was needed was f o r the Canadian ^ 
people, and L a u r i e r i n p a r t i c u l a r , to l e a r n of the many bene f i t s of 
c l o s e r i m p e r i a l a s s o c i a t i o n . Grey was q u i t e happy to be the teacher. 
He soon developed a f r i e n d l y and i n t i m a t e working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
L a u r i e r , and i n t h e i r i n f o r m a l meetings at Government House each 
Sunday Grey would ha p p i l y preach the gospel of imperialism. 
Grey considered t h a t p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n might more e a s i l y be 
a t t a i n e d i f a separate department were established w i t h i n the Colonial 
O f f i c e i n W h i t e h a l l , devoted e n t i r e l y to the concerns of the s e l f -
governing colonies. He knew that Canadian p u b l i c opinion was 
i n f u r i a t e d by the way i n which the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e seemed to regard 
Canada i n the same condescending manner as i t d i d the newest-acquired 
colonies i n A f r i c a . He concluded that change was necessary to remove 
t h i s cause of i l l - f e e l i n g , and hoped he could persuade Laurier himself 
to make the necessary proposal at the next Col o n i a l Conference. 
The whole question of i n t e r - i m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i n c l u d i n g 
the r o l e of the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e and the p e r i o d i c C o l o n i a l Conferences, 
was i n the e a r l y 1900s being considered by a self-appointed committee 
of about f i f t y i n t e r e s t e d persons', i n c l u d i n g Haldane, Milner and 
Parkin, under the chairmanship of S i r Frederick Pollock, an Oxford Law 
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professor. This committee, established i n 1903 a f t e r the s e l f -
governing colonies had once again r e j e c t e d Chamberlain's c a l l f o r an 
I m p e r i a l Council at the 1902 C o l o n i a l Conference, now concluded that 
I m p e r i a l Federation was an impossible goal, and sought instead to 
strengthen the Conference system. I n 1905 Pollock, himself went out to 
Canada on a f a c t - f i n d i n g mission. He f a i l e d to impress Grey, however, 
who d i s l i k e d h i s unfortunate manner of antagonising everyone whom he 
met.(20) 
The Pollock Committee reported i t s conclusions i n 1905, 
suggesting the establishment of a s p e c i a l Committee of the Privy 
Council to include the C o l o n i a l Secretary and the Colonial Premiers, 
served by a permanent s e c r e t a r i a t . ( 2 1 ) L y t t e l t o n supported t h i s idea 
as an acceptable way of c o n s o l i d a t i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the Empire, 
and then proposed to the Cabinet that the C o l o n i a l Conference be 
renamed the I m p e r i a l Council, chaired by the Prime M i n i s t e r and served 
by a s e c r e t a r i a t . These proposals met w i t h widespread approval i n 
London and most self - g o v e r n i n g colonies. I n Canada, though, the 
government expressed i t s e l f p e r f e c t l y content w i t h the r e l a t i o n s 
between B r i t a i n and the colonies as they stood. Grey remaiA.ed 
c o n f i d e n t , none the l e s s , that Laurier would not a c t u a l l y oppose 
L y t t e l t o n ' s scheme i f i t were f o r m a l l y approved by the other s e l f -
governing colonies at the next conference ( i n 1907); and he i n s i s t e d 
t h a t L a u r i e r ' s o p p o s i t i o n was not to be i n t e r p r e t e d as an i n d i c a t i o n 
of any u n d e r l y i n g o p p o s i t i o n to I m p e r i a l Federation.(22) 
By the time of the next conference, the Unionists had been 
replaced i n government by the L i b e r a l s . Lord E l g i n , the new Colonial 
Secretary, was moderately sympathetic to the idea of closer i m p e r i a l 
t i e s , but lacked the determination of h i s predecessor to challenge the 
vested i n t e r e s t s of the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e and lessen i t s power by 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a permanent s e c r e t a r i a t alongside. At the 1907 
Conference, t h e r e f o r e , i n the absence of any strong leadership from 
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B r i t a i n , those Premiers i n favour of closer t i e s - Deakin of 
A u s t r a l i a , Ward of New Zealand and Jameson of the Cape - f a i l e d to 
present a coherent plan, w hile Laurier f a i l e d to show any enthusiasm 
f o r change.(23) There were some developments, nevertheless, such as 
the d e c i s i o n to r e - l a b e l the self-governing colonies ^Dominions', and 
to give both them and B r i t a i n one vote equally at f u t u r e conferences. 
Although the c a l l f o r a separate Dominions s e c r e t a r i a t was r e j e c t e d , a 
new department was established w i t h i n the Colon i a l O f f i c e to f u l f i l 
broadly the same purpose. 
By 1907 Grey also had l o s t h i s e a r l i e r enthusiasm f o r the idea 
of an I m p e r i a l Council, perhaps because he appreciated that Laurier's 
r e s i s t a n c e to the idea was more deep-rooted than he had a n t i c i p a t e d . 
According to H a l l e t t , Grey had d u t i f u l l y conveyed the s p i r i t of 
L y t t e l t o n ' s proposals to L a u r i e r , 'but he d i d not pursue t h i s matter 
w i t h h i s usual enthusiasm'.(24) Although Kendle states that Grey 
'aided and abetted L y t t e l t o n i n h i s attempt to win over Laurier', 
Grey's personal correspondence made l i t t l e mention of the subject, 
which may suggest a possible lack of i n t e r e s t i n t h i s proposal.(25) 
Nevertheless, h i s enthusiasm f o r some reform p e r s i s t e d . Could he win 
over Laurier? I n 1907, not y e t : Grey had not been i n Canada long 
enough to be s u f f i c i e n t l y persuasive, but he remained hopeful. 
Grey was pleased w i t h the decision at the 1907 Conference to 
e s t a b l i s h a separate Dominions department. While i m p e r i a l i s t s such as 
Jebb and Amery, as w e l l as The Times, mocked t h i s new body as but an 
extension of bureaucracy. Grey had incurable optimism that t h i s would 
soon lead to a f u l l y - f l e d g e d Dominions O f f i c e per se.(26) Hopwood, 
the new Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colon i a l O f f i c e , thought Grey 
'f a r too sanguine' f o r h o l d i n g such hopes.(27) Barely a month l a t e r , 
a f t e r persuasion from Grey about how a t o t a l l y new Dominions O f f i c e 
might do much to improve i m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s , Laurier intimated that he 
might consider favourably any proposal f o r such an i n s t i t u t i o n . ( 2 8 ) 
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Grey was d e l i g h t e d by t h i s , and resolved to persuade Laurier to 
propose i t himself at the 1911 Conference. Grey then advised h i s 
opposite number i n A u s t r a l i a , Lord Dudley, how they might each advance 
t h i s aim: 
One way i n which you and I can do so i s by g e t t i n g our responsible 
advisers to favour the proposal to separate the Imperial 
Department which has to do w i t h the S.G.Dominions from the 
C o l o n i a l Department....Laurier thinks t h i s should be done. He 
t h i n k s the o f f i c e of the I m p e r i a l Parliament should be under a 
roof of i t s own - q u i t e separate from the CO. 
Once t h i s had been accomplished, i t would be advisable to house a l l 
the Dominion High Commissioners and Agents-General i n London under one 
r o o f : and then, he maintained, Uhe r e s t w i l l s u r e l y f o l l o w ' , w i t h the 
I m p e r i a l M i n i s t e r g i v i n g a lead to the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the common 
i n t e r e s t s of the Empire on uniform l i n e s . ( 2 9 ) Grey l a t e r pursued 
v i g o r o u s l y t h i s idea of a c e n t r a l l o c a t i o n i n London f o r Dominion 
a f f a i r s , proposing the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a Dominion House (discussed i n 
chapter f i v e ) . 
M ilner agreed w i t h Grey on the need f o r a Dominions M i n i s t e r as 
a great advance towards I m p e r i a l Federation.(30) He too believed that 
i t was v i t a l to s t i r up Laurier's i n t e r e s t i n Empire i f t h e i r cause 
were to be advanced, and supported attempts to persuade the Canadian 
Prime M i n i s t e r to make a proposal f o r a Dominions O f f i c e at the next 
Conference. Grey informed Crewe (who succeeded E l g i n i n 1908) that 
L a u r i e r had already expressed some i n t e r e s t i n t h i s idea, while s t i l l 
remaining unconvinced of the b e n e f i t s of an I m p e r i a l S e c r e t a r i a t or 
Council. Crewe, however, was worried l e s t Laurier were being 
pressurised unduly by Grey, and warned the Governor-General that he 
must be c a r e f u l not to commit the B r i t i s h government i n any way since 
even he himself would ^need a good deal of convincing that such a 
step, q u i t e apart from questions of expense or of the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n 
of O f f i c e s , i s anything but premature'.(31) Grey assured him that h i s 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h L a u r i e r was such that he could make these 
suggestions as a f r i e n d , not as an o f f i c i a l , but admitted that he was 
not averse to using L a u r i e r to champion h i s own i m p e r i a l causes: 
I n discussing these [ i m p e r i a l ] questions w i t h S i r W i l f r i d Laurier 
I am c a r e f u l to remember the dictum of the o l d J e s u i t who pointed 
out t h a t there was hardly any l i m i t to what a man might accomplish 
i f he would only allow other people to o b t a i n the c r e d i t . ( 3 2 ) 
Of course Grey was using t h i s advice as a way of persuading Laurier to 
work through others to achieve h i s o b j e c t i v e s : but the dictum applied 
e q u a l l y t o himself. 
Crewe u l t i m a t e l y accepted the p o s s i b i l i t y of a separate 
Dominions O f f i c e , which ought c e r t a i n l y to have pleased Dominion 
sentiment even i f i t d i d not prove to be a step closer to I m p e r i a l 
Federation: but he waited i n vain f o r news that Laurier would commit 
himself i n any way. This was not through lack of e f f o r t on Grey's 
p a r t , who warmly recommended the proposal to Laurier as 'the next step 
i n the slow but sure growth of our I m p e r i a l evolution'.(33) Laurier's 
obstinacy was almost c e r t a i n l y because he had come to have doubts 
about the l i k e l y m e rits f o r Canada of any such scheme. Nevertheless, 
e v e n t u a l l y he succumbed to the exhortations of h i s Governor-General, 
and, i n A p r i l 1910, put the proposal before h i s Cabinet. His Finance 
M i n i s t e r , W i l l i a m F i e l d i n g , objected however, b e l i e v i n g that such a 
r a d i c a l change was unnecessary, and L a u r i e r , d e c l i n i n g to act without 
the f u l l approval of h i s colleagues, decided not to proceed w i t h the 
proposal.(34) 
This f a i l u r e was a personal blow f o r Grey, who, l i k e Milner, 
long believed t h a t reform of the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e would advance the 
cause of I m p e r i a l Federation f a r more than any attempts to improve the 
system of c o l o n i a l conferences, such as Jebb and Amery advocated. 
Grey shared the Round Table's scepticism about the conferences, 
considering them i n e f f e c t i v e because they had f a i l e d to provide any 
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basis f o r permanent and meaningful c o n s u l t a t i o n between the B r i t i s h 
and Dominion governments. Secondly, Grey was disappointed because he 
had f a i l e d i n promoting the type of reform which he thought most 
l i k e l y to be acceptable to L a u r i e r , one which d i d not threaten 
Dominion autonomy. He never sought to promote the proposals f o r an 
I m p e r i a l Council, since he knew Laurier considered these unacceptable, 
and instead t a l k e d only of the b e n e f i t s of equal partnership which 
would accrue from a Dominions O f f i c e . Such an o f f i c e was not 
e s t a b l i s h e d u n t i l 1925 i n f a c t , by which time i t was Amery, 
i r o n i c a l l y , who was the C o l o n i a l Secretary. 
I n the summer of 1910, while C u r t i s was v i s i t i n g A u s t r a l i a and 
New Zealand, the Prime M i n i s t e r of the l a t t e r country, Joseph Ward, 
announced h i s i n t e n t i o n to c a l l f o r I m p e r i a l Federation at the next 
I m p e r i a l Conference. Ward's i n t e r e s t was i n s p i r e d p a r t l y by the 
t h i n k i n g of the Round Table, but l a r g e l y by n a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . 
New Zealand, as a small Dominion, was less prominent i n the minds of 
W h i t e h a l l than, say, Canada, and believed i t s e l f to be regarded as a 
second-class Dominion. I t also f e l t i n c r e a s i n g l y threatened by the 
growing naval s t r e n g t h of Japan i n the P a c i f i c . By means of an 
i m p e r i a l body i n which a l l Dominions had an equal say alongside 
B r i t a i n , New Zealand hoped i t could make i t s voice more c l e a r l y heard 
and exert more i n f l u e n c e over i m p e r i a l decision-making.(35) 
On the f i r s t day of the 1911 Conference, Ward proposed an 
I m p e r i a l Council, c o n t a i n i n g popularly-chosen delegates from a l l the 
Dominions, as w e l l as the various Dependencies ( i n c l u d i n g I n d i a ) . 
T h is, he hoped, would be a forerunner to an I m p e r i a l Parliament. 
However, Ward f a i l e d to present h i s case coherently, even confusing 
the terms he used on occasions, and l a i d himself open to c r i t i c i s m 
from those u n e n t h u s i a s t i c ^ i " a r a d i c a l scheme, such as Asquith and 
L a u r i e r . Thus the Conference only h i g h l i g h t e d , r a t h e r than reduced. 
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the d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion w i t h i n the 'White Empire', and f a i l e d to 
promote any sense of c o n s o l i d a t i o n . 
The extent of C u r t i s ' s i n f l u e n c e over Ward i s not known. 
C e r t a i n l y he sought to win him over to the proposals of the Round 
Table, and Ward's speech may have been based on h i s advice. Kerr had 
warned C u r t i s against o f f e r i n g an opinion of any ki n d , arguing that 
the time was i n a p p r o p r i a t e since n e i t h e r the B r i t i s h and Canadian 
governments, nor t h e i r populace, were ready f o r such a proposal. 
Ward's f a i l u r e caused serious upset to the Round Table's plans, and i t 
was to be a f u r t h e r four years before s u f f i c i e n t momentum was restored 
f o r C u r t i s to produce any more s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s . ( 3 6 ) 
As f o r Grey, he had l o s t i n t e r e s t i n what might happen at the 
Conference once h i s hopes about the Dominions O f f i c e had been dashed 
by F i e l d i n g ' s o b j e c t i o n . He was about to leave Canada a f t e r almost 
seven years i n o f f i c e , and was concentrating on the many d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f a c i n g B r i t a i n . Moreover, he knew there was no point i n press u r i s i n g 
L a u r i e r , who was i n the midst of a domestic p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s i n v o l v i n g 
r e c i p r o c a l t r a d i n g arrangements w i t h the United States. Grey di d not 
f r e t about La u r i e r ' s o b j e c t i o n to Ward's plan, regarding i t as j u s t 
another example of h i s longstanding o p p o s i t i o n to any scheme which 
might challenge Canadian autonomy; and aware as he was, l i k e Kerr, 
t h a t the time f o r I m p e r i a l Federation was not yet r i p e . ( 3 7 ) 
Conclusion 
Despite t h i s setback. Grey f e l t t hat he had achieved some 
success i n reducing Laurier's o p p o s i t i o n towards the notion of any 
a l t e r a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n and the 
Dominions, as i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t that Laurier had been persuaded 
to put the proposal f o r a Dominions O f f i c e before h i s Cabinet i n 1910. 
Recognising as he d i d t h a t , to most Canadians, the e x i s t i n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h B r i t a i n appeared to be p e r f e c t l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . Grey 
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d i d h i s utmost to convince Laurier of the b e n e f i t s that a system of 
I m p e r i a l Federation might o f f e r to Canada. He intervened i n domestic 
p o l i t i c s to a considerable extent, which might have had serious 
consequences i f L a u r i e r had not been such an amenable man. 
The p o s i t i o n of a Governor-General was, according to Cannadine, 
an ' e s s e n t i a l l y ornamental employment [ o p p o r t u n i t y ] ' , providing 'ideal 
jobs f o r second-rate statesmen and backwoods a r i s t o c r a t s ' . His duty 
was to be the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sovereign i n the Dominion, guardian of 
i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t s , and, before 1926, the prime means of communication 
between the B r i t i s h and Dominion governmentf. (38) Grey himself 
described being Governor-General as an exercise i n 'walking on the 
t i g h t r o p e of p l a t i t u d i n o u s g e n e r a l i t i e s ' . ( 3 9 ) Yet Grey was arguably 
one of the most i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t proconsuls of the whole period, and 
c e r t a i n l y a marked cont r a s t to h i s predecessor i n Canada (Lord Minto, 
h i s b r o t h e r - i n - l a w ) , who was said to have a ' t a c t f u l manner, and a 
shrewd sense of the powers and l i m i t a t i o n s of h i s o f f i c e ' . ( 4 0 ) Grey 
put d i r e c t pressure on Laurier to consider I m p e r i a l Federation -
p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic - to such an extent that he was 
'eventually to press h i s powers as Governor-General almost to the 
breaking p o i n t ' . ( 4 1 ) 
While Grey probably d i d have some success i n o f f s e t t i n g 
s l i g h t l y L a u r i e r ' s n a t u r a l suspicion about I m p e r i a l Federation, he 
deluded himself when he thought that he was a c t u a l l y managing to win 
L a u r i e r ' s support. As an e t e r n a l o p t i m i s t . Grey exaggerated the 
Canadian Prime M i n i s t e r ' s enthusiasm f o r the Empire: despite Laurier 
saying ' I do not pretend to be an i m p e r i a l i s t ' . Grey mistakenly 
believed that he needed only apply s u f f i c i e n t pressure to convince 
L a u r i e r . ( 4 2 ) He was, of course, u t t e r l y wrong, and i t i s not 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t those l i k e Hopwood and Crewe were d o u b t f u l of Grey's 
op i n i o n of L a u r i e r . 
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I n f a i r n e s s to Grey, i t has to be admitted that such 
over-confidence was a frequent misconception among f e d e r a t i o n i s t s , who 
f e l t the correctness of t h e i r creed was so s e l f - e v i d e n t that so long 
as they s t a t e d i t o f t e n enough they would eventually win over a l l 
except those who would never l i s t e n to reason. They a l l suffered from 
a common delusion that anyone who d i d not declare himself an avowed 
a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t must th e r e f o r e be a p o t e n t i a l convert. I t should 
also be added i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case that Laurier had a very t o l e r a n t 
and easy-going manner, always favouring compromise, and hence he 
probably f e l t the easiest way to cope w i t h Grey was to humour him.(43) 
O v e r a l l , Grey f a i l e d to convince the Canadian government of the 
merits of p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n w i t h i n the empire. His e f f o r t s of 
persuasion were e x t r a o r d i n a r y , nevertheless, and without p a r a l l e l . 
Whether he had any more success i n promoting some form of closer 
m i l i t a r y or economic co-operation i s the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY FEDERATION 
ECONOMIC FEDERATION 
Background 
The clamour f o r f r e e trade had gained the p o l i t i c a l ascendancy 
i n B r i t a i n from 1846, when Peel's government had repealed the Corn 
Laws, the argument being that both B r i t i s h trade and world trade would 
be best served i f there were no t a r i f f b a r r i e r s between countries. 
Although B r i t a i n stuck to t h i s d o c t r i n e f o r the next eighty years, 
other c o u n t r i e s s t a r t e d to erect b a r r i e r s i n order to protect t h e i r 
own burgeoning i n d u s t r i e s - such as Germany (1879), Russia (1881), 
France (1882) and the United States (1890). As a consequence, some 
B r i t i s h businessmen i n i n d u s t r i e s adversely a f f e c t e d formed themselves 
i n t o a F a i r Trade League i n 1881, aiming at r e t a l i a t i o n through the 
e r e c t i o n of t a r i f f b a r r i e r s i n B r i t a i n . 
As the B r i t i s h share of manufactured goods i n the world market 
continued to f a l l i n the 1880s, and B r i t i s h exports rose i n value much 
less than imports,(1) i t became evident that an easy s o l u t i o n was f o r 
B r i t a i n to concentrate instead on i t s c o l o n i a l markets, where 
favourable t r a d i n g arrangements might more r e a d i l y be established. 
Canada, which i n 1879 had created a t a r i f f w a l l against B r i t i s h as 
w e l l as f o r e i g n goods, was w i l l i n g to o f f e r d i s t i n c t trade advantages 
to B r i t a i n so long as the gesture was reciprocated. Thus Fair Traders 
argued t h e i r case not only from narrow p r o t e c t i o n i s t p r i n c i p l e s but 
also from the p o i n t of view of what might be more b e n e f i c i a l f o r the 
Empire. This gained i n c r e a s i n g favour once i t became apparent that 
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the a c q u i s i t i o n of new colonies i n A f r i c a would not, i n f a c t , prove 
overnight to be the necessary panacea f o r B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i v e economic 
d e c l i n e . 
With the exception of New South Wales, a l l the self-governing 
colonies were already committed to p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s , and the 
idea of e s t a b l i s h i n g a lower t a r i f f r a t e f o r goods from B r i t a i n would 
mean merely an adjustment of e x i s t i n g p o l i c i e s . The greater part of 
t h e i r trade was c a r r i e d on w i t h i n the Empire anyway. B r i t a i n , 
however, conducted 75% of i t s overseas trade w i t h non-Empire 
c o u n t r i e s . I n a d d i t i o n , the d o c t r i n e of Free Trade was so deeply 
embedded i n people's minds as the p o l i c y of f a i r n e s s and cheap food 
t h a t few dared challenge i t openly; and i t c e r t a i n l y helped B r i t a i n to 
be the c h i e f s u p p l i e r of shipping, insurance, investment and f i n a n c i a l 
services throughout the world at t h i s time. 
Another d i f f i c u l t y was that the self-governing colonies and 
B r i t a i n had opposing i n t e r e s t s at stake. The former arranged the 
Ottawa Conference i n 1894, f o r the purpose of discussing Imperial 
Preferences, whereby each would e s t a b l i s h t a r i f f s f o r a l l imported 
goods, but w i t h a s l i g h t l y lower t a r i f f f o r goods imported from w i t h i n 
the Empire i t s e l f . What advocates i n B r i t a i n p r e f e r r e d , however, was 
I m p e r i a l Free Trade - a system i n which there would be no t a r i f f 
b a r r i e r s of any k i n d between members of the Empire. The colonies 
found t h i s unacceptable, because the r e s u l t i n g loss of t a r i f f revenue 
would a f f e c t them, and also because they were each t r y i n g to protect ^ 
t h e i r own i n d u s t r i e s from the superior competition i n B r i t a i n . 
I n the l a t e nineteenth century the emotive attachment of most 
B r i t o n s to Free Trade was s t i l l f a r stronger than that to the Empire, 
and even the most ardent i m p e r i a l i s t s had d i v i d e d l o y a l t i e s . The 
I m p e r i a l Federation League, founded i n 1884, s k i l f u l l y avoided the 
issue of t a r i f f reform f o r i t s f i r s t few years. Once, however, the 
F a i r Traders began demanding the adoption of t a r i f f s , the issue had to 
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be discussed, and was one of the major reasons f o r the League's 
collapse. While Froude, f o r example, was i n favour of t a r i f f s , 
Rosebery was eq u a l l y emphatic that no f a i r or p r a c t i c a b l e i m p e r i a l 
t a r i f f could ever be est a b l i s h e d . ( 2 ) 
Pressure f o r an i m p e r i a l t a r i f f remained strong, e s p e c i a l l y 
once Chamberlain had a l l i e d himself to the cause. As Colonial 
Secretary he t r i e d hard at both the 1897 and 1902 Colonial Conferences 
to pursue schemes of p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n through an I m p e r i a l Council. 
Once he had concluded that such schemes were u n l i k e l y to meet w i t h 
success, he turned to t a r i f f reform, as an i n d i r e c t means of enhancing 
i m p e r i a l u n i t y . ( 3 ) 
The T a r i f f Reform movement 
I n the face of growing trade competition from f o r e i g n 
c o u n t r i e s . Chamberlain argued that B r i t a i n had a r i g h t to r e t a l i a t e 
w i t h t a r i f f s of i t s own. I n launching the T a r i f f Reform League i n the 
summer of 1903, he c a l l e d f o r duties of 5% on imported foods and 10% 
on manufactured goods, but w i t h no levy against c o l o n i a l imports. 
T a r i f f reform s p l i t the Unionist government, and caused the 
departure of f i v e members from the Cabinet over the next three years, 
i n c l u d i n g Chamberlain himself. For many Uni o n i s t s , and almost a l l 
L i b e r a l s , the attachment to Free Trade was as strong as ever, and i t 
seemed th a t Chamberlain was i n t e r e s t e d more i n protectionism than 
f\A i m p e r i a l u n i t y . Among L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s , f o r example, there was 
near unanimity on the issue. Asquith had v o c a l l y condemned 
Chamberlain's f i r s t c l a r i o n c a l l i n 1896, and Rosebery had maintained 
tha t i t would succeed only i n arousing world h o s t i l i t y . ( 4 ) 
For those Unionist supporters who were against f u l l 
p r o t e c t i o n i s m but were ardent i m p e r i a l i s t s , the p o s i t i o n was not easy. 
C e r t a i n l y Grey was i n t h i s category. On 20 October 1903, barely a 
month a f t e r Chamberlain had resigned from the government to launch his 
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t a r i f f campaign without the burden of o f f i c e . Grey found himself 
c h a i r i n g the annual conference of the North Riding L i b e r a l Unionist 
A s s o c i a t i o n i n Newcastle. Eight days beforehand he wrote to 
Chamberlain a l e t t e r e x p l a i n i n g t h a t , w h i l e he g r e a t l y admired h i s 
a c t i o n i n working f o r the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the Empire, he could not 
associate himself w i t h the advocacy of protectionism and r e t a l i a t i o n 
as an end i n i t s e l f . ( 5 ) 
At the meeting. Grey proposed a r e s o l u t i o n supporting 
Chamberlain, i n which he declared: ' I l i k e two good things. Empire and 
Free Trade, but i f I must put up w i t h (and my judgement t e l l s me I 
must) one of the two, give me the Empire'.(6) Yet Grey could not 
b r i n g himself to j o i n the T a r i f f Reform League, since he continued to 
deplore any group which was so avowedly p r o t e c t i o n i s t . ( 7 ) 
As long ago as 1885, Grey had h i g h l i g h t e d the importance of 
clos e r f i n a n c i a l and economic t i e s w i t h i n the Empire, and had pointed 
out t h a t i n the period 1878-1884 B r i t i s h exports to f o r e i g n countries 
had f a l l e n by 8.5% while those to the colonies had r i s e n by 14^.(8) 
Now, i n 1903, he acknowledged that I m p e r i a l Free Trade would make the 
Empire, l i k e the United States, s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . 
However, he recognised b e t t e r than Chamberlain that such a scheme was 
most u n l i k e l y to succeed i n the short term, since the self-governing 
colonies could not a f f o r d to lose the revenue they gained from t h e i r 
t a r i f f s . I n January of the f o l l o w i n g year, t h e r e f o r e , he c a l l e d 
instead f o r a system of i n t e r - i m p e r i a l p r e f e r e n t i a l t a r i f f s as a f i r s t 
step i n the d i r e c t i o n towards I m p e r i a l Free Trade, and also the 
e r e c t i o n of j u s t a low t a r i f f b a r r i e r i n B r i t a i n against a l l f o r e i g n 
imports. 
I n i t i a l l y Chamberlain's message seemed w e l l received i n the 
country, and h i s supporters won a l l three by-elections i n December 
1903 on the t a r i f f issue. Thereafter, however, he l o s t the 
i n i t i a t i v e , and the way th a t Asquith s k i l f u l l y h i g h l i g h t e d the 
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d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion between him and Balfour r e s u l t e d i n poor 
e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s throughout 1904. By concentrating on the l o c a l 
constituency organisations Chamberlain was g r a d u a l l y winning over the 
m a j o r i t y of U n i o n i s t s , but barely anyone outside the party. 
C e r t a i n l y Grey remained convinced that I m p e r i a l Preference, and 
not a mixture of I m p e r i a l Free Trade and protectionism, was the more 
appro p r i a t e answer. I n November 1905 he stated p r i v a t e l y that the 
adoption of an I m p e r i a l Preference would be the f i r s t step towards 
organic union of the Empire. He declared: 'The case f o r the 
Preference appears to me to be so strong. I become more and more 
convinced that the adoption by the United Kingdom of the P r e f e r e n t i a l 
p r i n c i p l e i s necessary to save the Empire'.(9) 
Up t o the time the Unionist government resigned i n December 
1905, Balfour had t r i e d not to l e t the issue of t a r i f f reform come to 
the f o r e , and sat on the fence i n order to maintain at l e a s t a 
semblance of u n i t y . His favoured s o l u t i o n was that i f the Unionist 
government were r e - e l e c t e d , a c o l o n i a l conference would be held to 
discuss the issue of I m p e r i a l Preference: and i f t h i s were accepted, a 
second e l e c t i o n would be held to allow the B r i t i s h e l e c t o r a t e a f i n a l 
say. The degree of support among Unionist M.P.s. f o r t a r i f f reform 
was so great by t h i s stage, however, that Balfour was obliged to 
include the issue i n the party manifesto. I n January 1906 the 
e l e c t o r a t e d e c i s i v e l y r e j e c t e d the idea, proving that Free Trade 
remained sacrosanct i n the popular imagination as the cause of food 
being cheap. 
Grey feared t h a t the r e t u r n of a L i b e r a l government w i t h such a 
l a r g e m a j o r i t y meant that some type of t a r i f f reform - which he now 
believed was 'the surest foundation of our f u t u r e organic union' 
would be abandoned.(10) He wrote to the new Under-Secretary of State 
at the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , Winston C h u r c h i l l (who had only r e c e n t l y 
defected from the Unionist to the L i b e r a l party over the t a r i f f reform 
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i s s u e ) , u r g i n g him to consider the question from a Canadian angle - or 
r a t h e r , the Canadian angle as Grey perceived i t : 
There i s a splendid f e e l i n g of l o y a l t y throughout the Dominion 
towards the country which buys t h e i r produce, but the people here 
have been nurtured on the gospel of s e l f - i n t e r e s t and i f we 
continue to t u r n the cold shoulder to the o f f e r e d hand, we must 
not be s u r p r i s e d i f Canadian a f f e c t i o n which i s now centred on us 
i s one day turned to our American neighbour who i s already 
adopting the ways of a wooer.(11) 
C h u r c h i l l and the L i b e r a l government remained unconvinced. At 
the C o l o n i a l Conference of 1907, a m a j o r i t y of the leaders of the 
Dominions, and e s p e c i a l l y Deakin of A u s t r a l i a and Jameson of the Cape, 
argued p u b l i c l y f o r an I m p e r i a l Preference. L a u r i e r expressed some 
i n t e r e s t i n the idea, but he subordinated i t to the absolute r i g h t of 
each Dominion, i n c l u d i n g the United Kingdom i t s e l f , to be e n t i r e l y 
responsible f o r i t s own t r a d i n g a f f a i r s , and so he would not intervene 
i n what he regarded as a B r i t i s h domestic matter. 
Grey, w h i l e d e l i g h t e d by the opinions expressed by Deakin and 
Jameson at the Conference, noted that Laurier was as resolved as ever 
to see the Dominions b u i l d up t h e i r own i n d u s t r i e s behind the 
necessary p r o t e c t i o n of t a r i f f b a r r i e r s . Yet he remained convinced 
th a t L a u r i e r remained committed to I m p e r i a l Preference. He i n s i s t e d 
to h i s f r i e n d s i n B r i t a i n that L a u r i e r had t r i e d to make the general 
commercial t a r i f f r a t e as favourable to B r i t a i n as h i s party would 
t o l e r a t e , since the Canadian Budget i n 1898 had f i x e d the t a r i f f f o r 
B r i t i s h imports at 25% below that f o r a l l other c o u n t r i e s , and that 
L a u r i e r deserved c r e d i t , not c r i t i c i s m , from the B r i t i s h Press f o r h i s 
e f f o r t s . ( 1 2 ) 
I n November 1908 Grey developed h i s thoughts a stage f u r t h e r . 
He believed t h a t once I m p e r i a l Free Trade was established the United 
States would wish to be included. A customs union between a l l the 
English-speaking peoples of the world was, he declared, 'the greatest 
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i d e a l yet put before men of B r i t i s h descent'.(13) While t h i s could 
only be a dream at present, and while Canada c e r t a i n l y would not 
contemplate a system of f r e e trade w i t h the United States u n t i l her 
own popula t i o n had grown enough to give her economy s u f f i c i e n t weight, 
nevertheless the l i k e l i h o o d of an Anglo-Saxon customs union was 
r a p i d l y approaching, he believed, 'and when i t does come the l i g h t of 
my i d e a l w i l l be on the Mountain Tops'.(14) Once t h i s had been 
achieved, the r e s u l t i n g economic bloc would be so powerful as to be 
able to hold a c o n t r o l l i n g i n f l u e n c e over a l l other i n d u s t r i a l and 
t r a d i n g n a t i o n s , thus guaranteeing world peace. The i n t r o d u c t i o n of 
an I m p e r i a l Preference would be a step i n the d i r e c t i o n towards the 
long term goal of Free Trade throughout the Empire, which was i t s e l f a 
precedent to I m p e r i a l Federation and Grey's dream of u l t i m a t e 
Anglo-Saxon c o n s o l i d a t i o n . ( 1 5 ) 
This message embodied so many of h i s keenest i n t e r e s t s : closer 
i m p e r i a l co-operation, yet without a high w a l l of p u n i t i v e t a r i f f s 
against a l l other nations; a union of the i n t e r e s t s of a l l the 
English-speaking peoples of the world, guided by B r i t a i n rather than 
the United States ( f o r i n any Anglo-American a s s o c i a t i o n , he intended 
t h a t i t be B r i t i s h views which predominated); and the use of t r a d i n g 
power to prevent m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t . B r i e f l y , i n 1910, Grey even 
suggested t h a t i f h i s scheme f o r the f e d e r a t i o n of the United Kingdom 
i t s e l f were enacted (a subject considered i n chapter s i x ) , the 
Dominions might enter w i t h each of England, Scotland, Wales and 
I r e l a n d i n t o some vast Federal customs union, which again the United 
States might e v e n t u a l l y j o i n . ( 1 6 ) 
Yet Grey preached t h i s message f o r only a short w h i l e . Within 
j u s t e i g h t months he had changed tack again, and believed instead that 
each Dominion should have the complete r i g h t to levy i t s own t a r i f f s 
as i t wished. A uniform t a r i f f was, he now thought, an unre a l i s a b l e 
goal at that time.(17) He had been made b r u t a l l y aware that most 
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Canadians and many i n the other Dominions found the whole notion of 
I m p e r i a l Preference both u n r e a l i s t i c and unacceptable. I t dawned on 
him t h a t pursuing t h i s idea would not only delay, but seri o u s l y 
d i s r u p t , any plans towards p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n of the Empire, h i s 
fear being t h a t the Dominions would f e e l aggrieved and antagonised. 
Above a l l e l s e , the u l t i m a t e cause, ( p o l i t i c a l ) I m p e r i a l Federation, 
must take precedence: i f plans f o r a Preference were going to be an 
obstacle, then they must be discarded. 
I t can only have been pressure from close associates i n Canada, 
and e s p e c i a l l y L a u r i e r , that caused Grey suddenly to a l t e r h i s hopes. 
His U n i o n i s t f r i e n d s at home ge n e r a l l y remained f u l l y committed to 
t a r i f f reform, even though i t had again proved e l e c t o r a l l y disastrous 
i n the 1910 e l e c t i o n s . Grey's own son had been soundly defeated on a 
Preference t i c k e t when he stood as Unionist candidate f o r Bradford i n 
the January e l e c t i o n . I n t h i s , h i s f i n a l period as Governor-General, 
Grey had come to bel i e v e that the economic and s t r a t e g i c f u t u r e of 
Canada w i t h i n the Empire would be so s i g n i f i c a n t that i t s views now 
must not be ignored. 
Without any f e e l i n g of inconsistency Grey declared instead that 
the i n t e r e s t of the Empire demanded the immediate adoption of a common 
p o l i c y of defence and of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , not a common t a r i f f p o l i c y . 
The c r e a t i o n of an I m p e r i a l Preference, although s t i l l a most 
d e s i r a b l e o b j e c t i v e , was not a sine qua non of I m p e r i a l Federation: 
I n t e r - i m p e r i a l Free Trade has always been to me the most 
a t t r a c t i v e deal, but we must as p r a c t i c a l men r e j e c t i t as 
impossible of present attainment.(18) 
By the end of 1910 Grey was saying that I m p e r i a l Federation, when i t 
came, would most l i k e l y evolve from a Dominions O f f i c e , which might 
have powers over defence p o l i c y and f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , but which must 
not i n t e r f e r e i n the r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l Dominions to impose t h e i r 
own l e v i e s or taxes. 
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A consequence of t h i s new a t t i t u d e was that Grey was t o t a l l y 
untroubled when, i n January 1911, the Canadian^signed a Reciprocity 
Agreement w i t h the United States. Unlike Milner, and indeed the 
L i b e r a l government as w e l l , he saw t h i s measure as no threat to 
i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t s . I n 1908 he had described the o f f e r of the United 
States to introduce a Preference w i t h Canada as tantamount to 
s u b s t i t u t i n g a p o l i c y of kisses a f t e r a lengthy p u r s u i t of a p o l i c y of 
k i c k s . ( 1 9 ) By 1911, however, he had known Laurier long enough to 
become f u l l y convinced of h i s commitment to the Empire, and recognised 
th a t no snub was intended. I n p a r t , t h i s r e f l e c t s the f a c t that Grey 
was sometimes remarkably pragmatic, and that on some issues he was 
r i g h t i n c l a i m i n g he had a b e t t e r a p p r e c i a t i o n of Dominion f e e l i n g 
than h i s contemporaries back i n B r i t a i n . I t i s also t r u e , though, 
th a t he saw t h i s as an e x c e l l e n t way of boosting r e l a t i o n s between the 
Empire and the United States, a step towards Anglo-Saxon 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n . The Canadian people saw the subject d i f f e r e n t l y , 
however, and f e l t t hat L a u r i e r was w i l f u l l y leading them i n t o the trap 
of American f i n a n c i a l annexation. 
I n changing h i s mind about the importance of Imperial 
Preference, Grey showed himself capable of keeping apace w i t h the 
l a t e s t developments i n i m p e r i a l t h i n k i n g . On the one hand, most 
Unio n i s t s never wavered i n t h e i r support f o r the idea, a l b e i t more f o r 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t than i m p e r i a l reasons, and i n 1913 both Bonar Law and 
Lansdowne i n s i s t e d that the party r e a f f i r m i t s support f o r t a r i f f 
reform (which i t duly d i d ) . On the other hand, a generation of new 
i m p e r i a l i s t s , and e s p e c i a l l y the younger members of the Round Table, 
q u i c k l y recognised the whole issue as a non-starter because the very 
idea of t a r i f f reform was so contentious that i t would d i s t r a c t p u b l i c 
a t t e n t i o n from the higher goal of I m p e r i a l Federation. 
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MILITARY FEDERATION 
Background 
Whereas the c a l l s f o r a customs union ebbed and flowed during 
the p eriod 1880-1917, the suggestion of a unit e d i m p e r i a l approach to 
defence p o l i c y was more longstanding. Even when the i n t e r e s t i n a 
customs union reached i t s peak, c a l l s f o r a j o i n t defence p o l i c y were 
never abandoned: and once Germany embarked on i t s programme of naval 
expansion i n 1898, the issue never l e f t the minds of those i n t e r e s t e d 
i n B r i t a i n ' s w e l f a r e . 
The t r a d i t i o n a l Treasury view was that as the colonies came to 
assume great e r autonomy, . they should also assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the cost of t h e i r own land defence; and that general i m p e r i a l 
expenses, such as the cost of the Royal Navy, should be borne by a l l 
those who b e n e f i t e d from i t . I t was t h i s opinion which had prompted 
the American Colonies to break away from the Empire i n 1776, when the 
B r i t i s h government demanded that they pay something towards the cost 
of t h e i r defence from France and Spain. From fear of r e p e t i t i o n of 
i m p e r i a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , the Treasury d i d not r e t a l i a t e even when most 
colonies l a t e r p o i n t e d l y refused to pay even the f u l l cost of t h e i r 
own defence, l e t alone donate towards the cost of the Royal Navy. I t 
was never able to recover the f u l l costs from the Cape Colony of i t s 
involvement i n the Border War i n the 1870s, and even colonies as small 
as Bermuda were able to refuse s u c c e s s f u l l y the Treasury requests f o r 
a m i l i t a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n . ( 2 0 ) 
During the 1880s there arose once more the fear of B r i t a i n 
being invaded from Europe. Salisbury advocated at the 1887 Colonial 
Conference some j o i n t defence venture, but t h i s met w i t h l i t t l e 
enthusiasm from the delegates. Subsequently A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand 
d i d agree to pay an annual subsidy of £126,000 f o r ten years towards 
the cost of an A u s t r a l a s i a n naval squadron, but a l l self-governing 
colonies remained r e l u c t a n t to c o n t r i b u t e to anything over which they 
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had no r e a l c o n t r o l . They remained unmoved by the f a c t that the Royal 
Navy was p r o t e c t i n g them as w e l l as B r i t a i n , or that the defence costs 
borne by the B r i t i s h taxpayer were twice as great as those of France 
or Germany at that time.(21) 
The Boer War of 1899-1902 prompted a mixed response from the 
Colonies. The Canadian government was f a r more r e l u c t a n t than those 
of A u s t r a l i a or New Zealand to o f f e r B r i t a i n any support, even though 
many Canadian people were e n t h u s i a s t i c , e s p e c i a l l y among the 
English-speaking community. I n the period 1865-1914 the average 
annual per c a p i t a cost of defence f o r the B r i t i s h people was £1.14, 
w h i l e f o r A u s t r a l i a n s i t was £0.12 and f o r Canadians j u s t £0.09. 
When, i n 1899, the Governor-General (Lord Minto) requested Canadian 
assistance towards the impending war e f f o r t i n South A f r i c a , Laurier 
r e p l i e d : 
The present case does not seem to be one, i n which England i f 
there i s war, ought to ask us, or even expect us to take p a r t , nor 
do I b e l i e v e t h a t i t would add to the s t r e n g t h of the i m p e r i a l 
sentiment to assent at t h i s j u n c t u r e that the colonies should 
assume the burden on m i l i t a r y expenditures.(22) 
Laur i e r maintained that i m p e r i a l l y - o r g a n i s e d schemes, whether 
m i l i t a r y or economic, were obsolete now that Canada had assumed 
responsible self-government. He believed n e i t h e r that there was any 
immediate m i l i t a r y t h r e a t to the B r i t i s h Empire as a whole which 
demanded a c o s t l y defence scheme, nor that Canada could a f f o r d to make 
any u s e f u l c o n t r i b u t i o n . He d i s l i k e d the idea of Canada being t o l d 
what to do by B r i t a i n , and being cajoled i n t o a defence pact, 
i n s i s t i n g instead t h a t ^she s h a l l reserve f o r h e r s e l f the r i g h t to 
judge whether or not there i s cause f o r her to act'.(23) U l t i m a t e l y , 
17,000 A u s t r a l i a n s , 8,500 Canadians and 8,000 New Zealanders agreed to 
f i g h t i n the Boer War f o r the B r i t i s h : but the Canadian troops were 
there because of the enthusiasm of Canadian p u b l i c opinion, not 
pressure from the B r i t i s h government.(24) 
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I n South A f r i c a , the d i f f i c u l t i e s which the B r i t i s h government 
faced i n d e f e a t i n g j u s t a few thousand Boers gave considerable cause 
f o r alarm. I t seemed u n f a i r that the self-governing colonies should 
be accepting the p r i v i l e g e s of Empire membership, such as t h e i r 
guaranteed p r o t e c t i o n by the Royal Navy, while not o f f e r i n g adequate 
assistance i n r e t u r n . I t appeared that they d i d not concur w i t h the 
famous maxim of Admiral Fisher, that ^the B r i t i s h Empire f l o a t s on the 
Royal Navy'.(25) A f t e r 1902 the governments of A u s t r a l i a , New 
Zealand, Cape Colony and Natal d i d a l l make small c o n t r i b u t i o n s , but 
L a u r i e r remained unrepentant. 
I n 1902 Balfour established the Committee of Imp e r i a l Defence 
as an advisory committee on a permanent basis, f l e x i b l e enough to c a l l 
to i t s meetings v i s i t i n g c o l o n i a l statesmen and service chiefs who 
could o f f e r t h e i r own opinions f r e e l y . This committee represented the 
f i r s t time t h a t the se l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies had been admitted to the 
inner sanctum of i m p e r i a l decision-making. However, at the eighty-odd 
meetings of the C.I.D., 1902-5, the defence of I n d i a dominated the 
agenda at more than f i f t y . ( 2 6 ) I n a d d i t i o n , c o l o n i a l statesmen tended 
to d i s t r u s t the Committee l e s t i t imposed commitments on them not to 
t h e i r l i k i n g . 
Even w i t h the C.I.D. i n operation, the problem remained of 
dec i d i n g what form of c o n t r i b u t i o n would a c t u a l l y be of any r e a l use. 
I n the 1890s a major naval s t r a t e g i s t . Admiral Mahan, had suggested 
tha t i t was more important to have a few b i g ships w i t h powerful guns 
than well-defended ports and l o t s of small gunboats. The subsequent 
adoption of t h i s s t r a t e g y by the B r i t i s h Admiralty seemed to suggest 
tha t i f the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies were to make a r e a l c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to i m p e r i a l defence they must each provide a large b a t t l e s h i p : yet few 
c o l o n i a l governments could a f f o r d to do t h i s and fewer s t i l l wanted to 
anyway. A land i n s t a l l a t i o n was obviously there to protect that 
p a r t i c u l a r country, whereas a Royal Navy ship would appear to most 
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taxpayers to be f o r the b e n e f i t of the B r i t i s h I s l e s rather than f o r 
themselves. 
Grey's c a l l for m i l i t a r y federation 
The question of i m p e r i a l defence had not r e a l l y troubled the 
L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s before the outbreak of the Boer War, but once 
c o n f l i c t erupted they soon r e l a t e d i t to the ^National E f f i c i e n c y ' 
argument. Haldane, as War Secretary a f t e r 1905, pushed f o r reforms i n 
the War O f f i c e and army, and s t r o n g l y supported Fisher's c a l l s f o r a 
naval build-up. I n comparison. Grey had o u t l i n e d as e a r l y as 1885 the 
need f o r a common c o n t r i b u t i o n from a l l self-governing colonies 
towards the cost of i m p e r i a l defence.(27) This view was motivated not 
only by Grey's i n t e r e s t i n B r i t a i n ' s s t r a t e g i c s e c u r i t y , but also by 
h i s b e l i e f t h a t B r i t a i n should remain s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to f u l f i l 
t h a t c i v i l i s i n g mission which had been entrusted to the Anglo-Saxon 
race, and which depended upon a powerful and e f f e c t i v e navy. 
Grey was among those i m p e r i a l i s t s who were adamant that the 
se l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies must accept t h e i r share of imper i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . I n 1892 he thought that they should each add to 
t h e i r t a r i f f s an a d d i t i o n a l 3Z duty on f o r e i g n imports and donate the 
e x t r a revenue to the B r i t i s h Treasury f o r the b e n e f i t of the Royal 
Navy. I n t h i s way, 'every part of the Empire c o n t r i b u t e s i t s quota to 
the maintenance of the f l e e t on which we depend f o r the maintenance of 
our Empire'.(28) Ten years l a t e r , he t o l d a meeting of the Royal 
C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e t h a t , as the self-governing colonies matured and 
developed, so the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them and B r i t a i n must adapt: i n 
the matter of i m p e r i a l defence, they should be given some d i r e c t 
i n f l u e n c e over i m p e r i a l p o l i c y , but they must also c o n t r i b u t e towards 
the cost of the f l e e t . ( 2 9 ) 
When Governor-General, Grey saw i t as h i s task to convince the 
Canadian people of the b e n e f i t s that accrued from an i m p e r i a l defence 
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s t r a t e g y based around a strong navy. He was not a f r a i d to speak and 
act openly about t h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l issue, even though i t deeply 
d i v i d e d Canadians between those i n favour of a strong i m p e r i a l 
commitment, those against, and those l i k e L aurier who were content 
w i t h the s t a t u s quo. Grey described Laurier to Crewe as by 
temperament a L i t t l e Englander, u n w i l l i n g to look beyond the shores of 
h i s own country and a f r a i d of Canada being dragged i n t o the vortex of 
European m i l i t a r i s m ; but not incapable of persuasion, 
nevertheless.(30) Grey wrote: 
Ve are a t the p a r t i n g of the ways and...unless the various 
p o r t i o n s of the B r i t i s h Empire p u l l together we may be destroyed 
i n d e t a i l , ( 3 1 ) 
I n 1909 Admiral Fisher revealed that w i t h i n four years Germany 
would be able to match B r i t a i n as to the number of the new Dreadnought 
b a t t l e s h i p s . Thus a perverse v i r i l i t y contest between two nations 
erupted, centred on numbers, which s t i r r e d the p a t r i o t i c sentiment of 
B r i t i s h people everywhere. Grey wrote g l e e f u l l y to Amery: ^ I am most 
g r a t e f u l to the Emperor W i l l i a m f o r the way he has poked up the 
B r i t i s h f i r e a l l over the world. Nothing i s more u s e f u l than a good 
scare.'(32) Grey was by i n c l i n a t i o n a man of peace, but he w e l l 
r e a l i s e d t h a t t h i s news would put pressure on Dominion governments 
everywhere to s t a r t h e l p i n g the mother country at l a s t . 
L a u r i e r was faced w i t h a r i s i n g demand from the great m a j o r i t y 
of English-speaking Canadians to o f f e r a generous gesture of support 
to B r i t a i n . He responded by proposing to b u i l d up the size of the 
Canadian navy, h i t h e r t o comprising j u s t one gunboat on the Great 
Lakes - a measure which he f e l t would s a t i s f y popular demand while yet 
s e r v i n g Canada's own n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s f i r s t and foremost. This 
o f f e r was, moreover, consistent w i t h the views expressed at the 
I m p e r i a l Defence Conference e a r l i e r that year, when the idea of an 
i m p e r i a l f l e e t as one u n i t was abandoned i n favour of separate 
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Dominion naval u n i t s . ( 3 3 ) Unfortunately f o r La u r i e r , h i s response 
s a t i s f i e d almost no one. The imperially-minded i n both Canada and 
B r i t a i n saw i t as a b e t r a y a l of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s and a p i t i f u l l y 
inadequate response, while the more nationalist-minded i n t e r p r e t e d i t 
as a sign of growing m i l i t a r i s t i c and i m p e r i a l i s t tendencies which 
they considered wholly un-Canadian. Both these groups, the 
Conservatives under Borden and the French-speaking N a t i o n a l i s t s under 
Bourassa, found i t convenient to u n i t e on t h i s issue against Laurier's 
government. 
Grey was one of the very few people supportive of Laurier's 
response, because he was so pleased that any response had been o f f e r e d 
at a l l . I t upset him t o see Canada d i v i d i n g i t s e l f on t h i s issue, 
r a t h e r than u n i t i n g around the need f o r a co-ordinated i m p e r i a l 
defence p o l i c y , and so he embarked on what Gordon describes as a 
' c o n f i d e n t i a l personal i n t e r v e n t i o n ' to persuade Conservatives not to 
a t t a c k L a u r i e r i n t h i s way.(34) This d i r e c t involvement i n domestic 
p o l i t i c s , most unusual f o r a non-partisan f i g u r e l i k e a Governor-
General but q u i t e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Grey, had l i t t l e e f f e c t . The 
Conservatives were not prepared to subordinate party i n t e r e s t s to 
i m p e r i a l i n t e r e s t s i f they had the chance to d i s c r e d i t Laurier. 
Grey was also unusual f o r maintaining even now that a stronger 
Canadian Navy would be more u s e f u l than the g i f t of a Dreadnought by 
Canada to B r i t a i n . He believed that the possession of a navy would 
boost Canadian n a t i o n a l sentiment and make Canadians more mindful of 
the f a r g r e a t e r r o l e played by the Royal Navy. As w i l l be explained 
i n the next chapter, Grey regarded c o l o n i a l n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment as 
p e r f e c t l y compatible w i t h e f f o r t s towards i m p e r i a l u n i t y . Hence he 
welcomed La u r i e r ' s response, and even t o l d him t h a t he would consider 
the g i f t of a Dreadnought or two from Canada 'a sop not a p o l i c y , a 
cheap and unworthy evasion of a N a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n ' . ( 3 5 ) 
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Whereas the merits of an i m p e r i a l customs union centred l a r g e l y 
around mutual s e l f - i n t e r e s t , those of a defence pact were based on 
sentiment as w e l l . Grey argued t h a t , i n r e t u r n f o r the p r i v i l e g e of 
being a ^dependent independency' w i t h guaranteed p r o t e c t i o n from the 
Royal Navy, Canada and the other Dominions should accept that they had 
a duty to help pay f o r that Navy, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y provide ships of 
t h e i r own. I t was a simple message which he preached constantly, a l l 
p a r t of h i s e f f o r t to educate Canadians i n t h e i r i m p e r i a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . He was never so provocative as to demand that they 
should make a c o n t r i b u t i o n immediately, but the i m p l i c a t i o n was 
obvious t h a t help very soon would be welcomed.(36) 
Grey even went to the lengths of encouraging Canadian 
i m p e r i a l i s t s to j o i n the new Navy Leagues being formed i n t h e i r 
country, which aimed to boost the popular demand f o r a stronger naval 
force i n a u n i t e d i m p e r i a l defence s t r a t e g y . This was the most 
s e n s i t i v e and p a r t i s a n issue i n which Grey involved himself while i n 
Canada, which l e d Goldwin Smith to describe Laurier's proposals f o r a 
Canadian navy as l a r g e l y the work of a ^mischief-making Governor-
General' . (37) Bourassa, moreover, implied that by y i e l d i n g to Grey's 
i n s i s t e n t i m p e r i a l i s t demands of the past s i x years Laurier had l o s t 
a l l sense of n a t i o n a l s p i r i t . L aurier doubtless found t h i s i r o n i c , 
since he had spent so much of h i s time i n f i g h t i n g o f f i n d o c t r i n a t i o n 
by Grey, and pursuing only those i m p e r i a l p o l i c i e s which he f e l t to be 
also i n the best i n t e r e s t s of Canada. 
Grey had long run the r i s k of u p s e t t i n g Canadian n a t i o n a l i s t 
s e n s i b i l i t i e s by h i s championing of imperialism, but generally his 
p o p u l a r i t y had saved him from a n a t i o n a l i s t backlash. On the issue of 
i m p e r i a l defence, however, he intervened too much. Howick warned the 
C o l o n i a l Secretary t h a t h i s f a t h e r r i s k e d t a r n i s h i n g h i s o f f i c i a l 
p o s i t i o n , as w e l l as h i s personal p r e s t i g e , by becoming embroiled i n a 
major domestic controversy. He wrote: 
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There i s no doubt that a s e c t i o n of the French Canadians ascribe 
the i n t e n s i t y of the Naval enthusiasm out west l a r g e l y to my 
f a t h e r . I do not t h i n k that that i s q u i t e a correct appreciation 
of the case. He has not created these enthusiasms. I t would be 
more t r u e to say that he has helped to remove the bushell [ s i c ] 
under which the l i g h t was h i d . But the point i s that whether 
r i g h t l y or wrongly they blame him as the author, and since 
November he has been conscious of the f a c t that many people are on 
the look out to t r i p him up.(38) 
L u c k i l y f o r Grey, i t s u i t e d the French n a t i o n a l i s t s and the 
Conservatives to concentrate t h e i r a t t a c k on Laurier himself, and he 
escaped any serious censure once a t t e n t i o n turned to the Reciprocity 
Agreement signed between Canada and the United States. I n March 1911 
a senior Canadian counsel at those R e c i p r o c i t y discussions, J.S. 
Ewart, took the o p p o r t u n i t y to a t t a c k Grey f o r promoting b l a t a n t l y 
p o l i t i c a l schemes by h i s enthusiasm f o r Canadian naval reform, and 
claimed t h a t h i s dearest wish was to bind Canada p o l i t i c a l l y and 
m i l i t a r i l y t o B r i t a i n . Henceforth Grey was much more d i s c r e e t , but he 
s t i l l took the o p p o r t u n i t y i n a f i n a l speech i n September 1911 to 
remind the Canadian people that the maintenance of t h e i r l i b e r t i e s and 
t h e i r p r o s p e r i t y depended e n t i r e l y on B r i t i s h supremacy of the seas -
a f a c t he claimed was so g e n e r a l l y admitted as not to be 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l . When he sat down a f t e r that speech, however, Laurier 
i n h i s response made no reference to the Governor-General's f i n a l 
i m p e r i a l r a l l y i n g c r y , thus i l l u s t r a t i n g that t h i s was a l l too c l e a r l y 
a c o n t r o v e r s i a l issue.(39) 
Conclusion 
I n i t s assessment of Grey's performance i n Canada, published 
upon h i s r e t u r n home. The Times remarked t h a t , despite h i s enthusiasm 
bordering on rashness, and h i s b l a t a n t banging of the i m p e r i a l i s t 
drum, he had r e t a i n e d h i s p o p u l a r i t y among most Canadians, 
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'notwithstanding that he has exercised a freedom of speech which was 
not attempted by h i s more cautious predecessors'.(40) The 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r Grey, of course, was that he saw i t as h i s duty to 
help Canada prepare f o r the war that was looming on the horizon. 
I n the matter of economic f e d e r a t i o n w i t h i n the Empire, Grey 
s t r u c k a markedly o r i g i n a l and f l e x i b l e l i n e . I n p a r t , t h i s was 
because he refused to l e t controversy about t a r i f f reform become a 
stumbling block f o r the u l t i m a t e goal, p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n ; and the 
f a c t t h a t he modified h i s c a l l s f o r I m p e r i a l Preference towards the 
end of 1910 i s a splendid i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s . I n large measure, 
however, Grey's t h i n k i n g was shaped by the f a c t that he had an 
unsurpassed a p p r e c i a t i o n of how the grandiose theories produced by h i s 
f r i e n d s i n London were g e n e r a l l y unacceptable i n the Dominions. 
Grey saw t h a t Canada simply could not a f f o r d to lose the income 
produced by the t a r i f f s against goods imported from B r i t a i n ; and hence 
I m p e r i a l Free Trade was not a reasonable goal i n the foreseeable 
f u t u r e . He sought instead to win over both h i s colleagues at home and 
also L a u r i e r i n Canada to a compromise s o l u t i o n of I m p e r i a l Preference 
- u n t i l he became aware t h a t , f o r the time being at l e a s t , even t h i s 
idea was unacceptable i n the Dominions. He thus showed a remarkable 
pragmatism i n the way he abandoned the proposal u n t i l closer t i e s of 
sentiment w i t h i n the Empire had been established to render economic 
f e d e r a t i o n more l i k e l y . 
I n a t t e m p t i n g to persuade L a u r i e r to make a p o s i t i v e 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the defence p o l i c y of the Empire, Grey again chose to 
i n v o l v e himself f a r more deeply i n contentious domestic issues than a 
Governor-General should have done. He convinced himself, and even 
La u r i e r too, t h a t the establishment by Canada of a navy could s a t i s f y 
both i m p e r i a l and Canadian n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s , without any 
r e s u l t i n g c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t . The f a c t that Grey exceeded h i s 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p rerogative i s undeniable: and A.J.P. Taylor even 
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suggests t h a t i t was f o r t u n a t e h i s term of o f f i c e ran out j u s t when 
the Conservatives took over i n Ottawa, or else they would have asked 
f o r h i s r e c a l l . ( 4 1 ) Nevertheless, Grey was prepared to take the r i s k , 
since anything which stimulated i m p e r i a l sentiment was, i n h i s 
o p i n i o n , to be encouraged. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPERIAL SENTIMENT 
I m p e r i a l Federation was more l i k e l y to be championed by 
p o l i t i c i a n s i n B r i t a i n and the Dominions i f the populace i n a l l of 
those co u n t r i e s f u l l y recognised i t s merits. That the boosting of 
i m p e r i a l sentiment everywhere was a pre-condition of Imper i a l 
Federation was a f a c t understood by most i m p e r i a l i s t s , but by none 
more so than Grey. I n h i s various c a p a c i t i e s - as a trustee of 
Rhodes's w i l l , as Governor-General of Canada, and as President of the 
Royal C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e - Grey devoted h i s considerable energies and 
t a l e n t s to promoting i m p e r i a l sentiment, e s p e c i a l l y among c i t i z e n s of 
the Dominions. He maintained that any resistance by them to Imper i a l 
Federation was simply the r e s u l t of ignorance about i t s possible 
b e n e f i t s , r a t h e r than a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m . 
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I n h i s e f f o r t s . Grey was unp a r a l l e l e d both f o r h i s energy and 
h i s c r e a t i v i t y . A charming p e r s o n a l i t y , and great i n t e g r i t y , won him 
many i n f l u e n t i a l f r i e n d s i n p o l i t i c s , j o u r n a l i s m and elsewhere, at 
home and abroad, who l i s t e n e d to h i s ideas w i t h respect and were not 
i n f r e q u e n t l y persuaded to lend him support, even though h i s large 
imagination and h i s single-mindedness sometimes caused him to pursue 
ideas which others might have r e j e c t e d as f a n c i f u l . 
Grey as 'teacher' of the Ceinadians 
The post of Canadian Governor-General was f o r Grey 'the crown 
of h i s c a r e e r . . . . I t was here f o r the f i r s t time that h i s imperialism 
had room to move'.(l) I t also presented him w i t h the opportunity to 
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awaken and nourish the s p i r i t of i m p e r i a l sentiment i n Canada, so that 
i t might become a leading advocate of I m p e r i a l Federation. A 
Governor-General was supposed to avoid party p o l i t i c a l issues: but 
that was easier said than done because i t was sometimes hard f o r 
anyone, and c e r t a i n l y an i m p e r i a l i s t l i k e Grey, to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
between i m p e r i a l questions and purely domestic ones.(2) 
As w i l l be seen. Grey stressed that i m p e r i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n was 
not to be feared, and strove to create i n Canada a sense of n a t i o n a l 
i d e n t i t y - something which he considered to be t o t a l l y compatible w i t h 
imperialism. He c o n f i d e n t l y p r e d i c t e d , as d i d many Canadians 
themselves, that t h e i r population would r i s e to more than eighty 
m i l l i o n by the end of the century, and t h a t as a r e s u l t Canada would 
become the senior partner i n the Empire.(3) I t was v i t a l , t herefore, 
t h a t Canada should f e e l u n i t e d i n i t s e l f , that i t should remain a 
c l o s e l y - k n i t member of the Empire, and that i t should even become 
w i l l i n g to take on an i n c r e a s i n g share of i m p e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
A l l t h a t was required. Grey f e l t , was education: and he was q u i t e 
prepared t o act as teacher. 
A s u b s t a n t i a l m i n o r i t y of Canadians, though, held the view that 
the next step f o r t h e i r country was f u l l independence, rather than 
i n c o r p o r a t i o n i n some great federated e n t e r p r i s e . Even many of those 
who accepted the maintenance of i m p e r i a l t i e s were keen to see the 
growth of Canadian na t i o n a l i s m , as a way of u n i t i n g the country by 
drawing together the d i f f e r e n t provinces, and also enabling Canada to 
e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f as a s i g n i f i c a n t power on the world stage. Colonial 
n a t i o n a l i s m i n a l l the Dominions had been growing since at l e a s t the 
1880s, but nowhere more so than i n Canada. 
Carleton Hayes has described the New Imperialism of the l a t e 
V i c t o r i a n era as but a n a t i o n a l i s t urge, a psychological r e a c t i o n 
s p r i n g i n g from an ardent desire to maintain or recover p r e s t i g e . ( 4 ) 
I n much the same s p i r i t , Seeley spoke of i m p e r i a l u n i t y as 'some sor t 
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of pan-Anglicanism' and compared the movement f o r closer union to the 
s t r u g g l e f o r n a t i o n a l u n i t y i n I t a l y and Germany.(5) Thus Grey, and 
those l i k e him who were Anglo-Saxon race i m p e r i a l i s t s , were 
n a t i o n a l i s t s i n another guise, aiming to preserve the Anglo-Saxon 
race's i d e a l s of progress and c i v i l i s a t i o n by means of consolidation 
across the world. He was not prepared to l e t what he c a l l e d 
parochialism i n c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s , adhered to by the Roman Catholics 
i n I r e l a n d , the French speakers i n Canada or the Boers i n South 
A f r i c a , thwart the cause of I m p e r i a l Federation. 
Grey d i d not see I m p e r i a l Federation and what he meant by 
c o l o n i a l n a t i o n a l i s m as necessarily incompatible. At a speech i n 
December 1907, he declared that the danger which threatened the Empire 
was the s p i r i t of parochialism. Where t h i s s p i r i t was not 
subordinated to n a t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s , p r o v i n c i a l 
impoverishment and pa r o c h i a l stagnation would ensue. History had 
taught mankind, he proclaimed, t h a t n a t i o n a l greatness, once achieved, 
q u i c k l y disappeared where l o c a l and i n d i v i d u a l selfishness made co-
opera t i v e union f o r n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s impossible.(6) For Grey, 
c o l o n i a l n a t i o n a l i s m was acceptable on the c o n d i t i o n that the im p e r i a l 
l i n k w i t h B r i t a i n was never questioned. 
While parochialism was dangerous. Grey saw the development of 
n a t i o n a l p r i d e as a necessary p r e l i m i n a r y to closer i m p e r i a l u n i t y . 
He wrote t o La u r i e r i n 1909: 
As a r u l e of course na t i o n a l i s m i s a step towards imperialism, and 
i t i s the r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s t r u t h which has made me, as a race 
i m p e r i a l i s t , do everything i n my power to promote Canadian 
n a t i o n a l i s m . ( 7 ) 
At f i r s t t h i s o p i n i o n might seem somewhat b a f f l i n g , but i t becomes 
more understandable when considering h i s subsequent advice to Laurier 
on how to deal w i t h the n e w l y - s e t t l e d western provinces i n Canada, 
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which f e l t no l o y a l t y e i t h e r to the r e s t of Canada or the Empire as a 
whole: 
The best and surest way t o s t i m u l a t e a passion f o r Canadian 
na t i o n a l i s m i s through Imperialism. The r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
splendid d e s t i n y a w a i t i n g Canada as an i n t e g r a l part of the 
B r i t i s h Empire, w i l l keep the West of the Dominion l o y a l to the 
East, and prevent i t from developing c e n t r i f u g a l tendencies 
towards the [United] States.(8) 
Grey was worried t h a t people s e t t l i n g i n the West, o f t e n formerly from 
the United States, f e l t l i t t l e l o y a l t y to Montreal or Ottawa. F i r s t 
and foremost they must develop a sense of pride i n t h e i r n a t i on. He 
sought to promote t h i s by suggesting that Canada might one day be the 
most powerful Dominion i n the Empire.(9) Once they could i d e n t i f y 
w i t h t h e i r country, he believed, they would then be able to i d e n t i f y 
w i t h the g r e a t e r union to which they also belonged - the B r i t i s h 
Empire. 
Grey's most v i s i b l e attempt to boost i m p e r i a l f e e l i n g through 
strong n a t i o n a l i s m came w i t h the Quebec Tercentenary Celebrations i n 
1908, which he transformed from a p r o v i n c i a l i n t o an im p e r i a l 
c e l e b r a t i o n . While he could not persuade the King to come over f o r 
the occasion, he d i d secure the presence of the Prince of Wales. Grey 
sought at the same time to purchase the Plains of Abraham, the 
b a t t l e f i e l d where the B r i t i s h had defeated the French i n 1759, and 
urged the governments of each sel f - g o v e r n i n g colony to c o n t r i b u t e 
$100,000 towards the purchase cost. I n a l e t t e r to the Governor of 
the Cape, Lord Selborne, Grey explained h i s ideas: 
By the c o n t r i b u t i o n of the r e l a t i v e l y small sum of $100,000 South 
A f r i c a may, so to speak, run up her f l a g and keep i t f l y i n g above 
the Plains of Abraham f o r a l l time - a cheap and p r e t t y l i t t l e b i t 
of I m p e r i a l Federation sentiment e n t a i l i n g no r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s or 
o b l i g a t i o n s , but supplying a permanent symbol of that I m p e r i a l 
u n i t y on the maintenance of which the p r o s p e r i t y of every part of 
the Empire depends.(10) 
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Grey lobbied e x t e n s i v e l y to s t i r up support f o r the 
Celebrations, and endeavoured to a t t r a c t representatives from 
throughout the Empire to attend. Yet h i s scheme f a i l e d to capture the 
imagination of the self - g o v e r n i n g colonies or B r i t a i n : although each 
Dominion sent a re p r e s e n t a t i v e , only New Zealand made a f i n a n c i a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n . Grey's Canadian extravaganza f a i l e d to equal Curzon's 
Durbar of 1902, i l l u s t r a t i n g how f o r most B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s t s the 
'White Empire' lacked the mystique of the Orient. 
For Grey, the Tercentenary Celebrations were nevertheless a 
q u a l i f i e d success. What he f a i l e d to recognise was that the 
enthusiasm of many Canadians f o r these f e s t i v i t i e s d i d not necessarily 
mean they were also keen on closer i m p e r i a l u n i t y . The opinion of 
MacKenzie King, at t h i s stage an up-and-coming Canadian p o l i t i c i a n , 
provides a s t r i k i n g contrast to that of Grey. Although a close f r i e n d 
of the Governor-General, King d i s t r u s t e d a l l i m p e r i a l i s t s l i k e him f o r 
being ' i n danger of breaking down the very s t r u c t u r e they were t r y i n g 
to create' through i n s e n s i t i v i t y to Dominion f e e l i n g s . The Quebec 
Celebrations were, he f e l t , not a Canadian event but simply a party 
l a i d on f o r a c h i l d by i t s mother. Furthermore, he could not see how 
South A f r i c a ' s love f o r Empire would be increased by asking Botha and 
the Boers to help celebrate an occasion marking the defeat of another 
race by the B r i t i s h . ( 1 1 ) 
Grey was not alone i n b e l i e v i n g that c o l o n i a l nationalism and 
imp e r i a l i s m were compatible, however: F.S. O l i v e r pointed out that 
Scotland i s u n i t e d w i t h England and yet remains 'a proud and s e l f -
r e l i a n t nation....The meaning of Empire to a f r e e people i s not a 
s t u n t i n g and overshadowing growth, but a proud and w i l l i n g 
s ubordination'.(12) Yet O l i v e r and Grey were equally wrong i n t h i s 
s u p p o s i t i o n , and f a i l e d to understand that the growth of c o l o n i a l 
n a t i o n a l i s m could not be equated w i t h any loss of autonomy i n a 
f e d e r a l p o l i t i c a l union. When Governor-General, Grey always spoke of 
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himself as a Canadian, but i n assessing Canadian i n t e r e s t s through 
English eyes he represented only a m i n o r i t y opinion i n Canada. 
Likewise he was mistaken when he made suggestions about r a c i a l fusion 
and a s s i m i l a t i o n between the French and the English Canadians (and, 
indeed, between Boers and English-speaking South A f r i c a n s ) , since such 
f u s i o n was so u n l i k e l y to happen - and , indeed, has not happened. 
Grey was not a r a c i s t i n the sense that he believed there are 
b i o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s between races, although i n a l e t t e r to Rhodes 
he d i d recommend th a t Scandinavians be encouraged to s e t t l e i n 
Rhodesia because Uhey cross s p l e n d i d l y w i t h the English'.(13) 
However, recognising what he believed to be the marked c u l t u r a l and 
moral s u p e r i o r i t y of the Anglo-Saxon race, he urged that the f l o o d of 
immigrants from Asia to Canada, occurring i n the ea r l y 1900s, be 
stemmed. He wrote: 
I t i s obvious t h a t Canada cannot allow [ B r i t i s h Columbia] to 
become a yellow province, any more than Japan can allow any part 
of the ^land of the r i s e n sun' to become white.(14) 
Keeping each colour to i t s own sphere of influence would, he argued, 
be advisable i n the i n t e r e s t s of both peace and Anglo-Saxon 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n . ( 1 5 ) 
Neither was Grey p a r t i c u l a r l y keen about the prospect of 
massive m i g r a t i o n i n t o Canada from the United States. He was appalled 
by the l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l and j u d i c i a l c o r r u p t i o n south of the border, 
which he believed arose from the f l o o d of immigrants there from 
southern Europe, and feared that such c o r r u p t i n g influences might seep 
i n t o Canada too. He was happy to welcome immigrants to boost the t i n y 
p o p u l a t i o n of Canada ( s t i l l only 5,300,000 i n 1900), but only i f they 
were the r i g h t s o r t - from Northern Europe, rather than what he 
considered to be c u l t u r a l l y and morally degenerate Southern 
Europeans.(16) Racial p u r i t y i n t h i s sense was e s s e n t i a l to the cause 
of Anglo-Saxon c o n s o l i d a t i o n . He wished to preserve the r e l a t i v e 
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r a c i a l p u r i t y of Canada, by urging Anglo-French f u s i o n and p r o t e c t i n g 
i t from the s o r d i d influences of modern American l i f e , as w e l l as from 
A s i a t i c m i g r a t i o n . 
Grey never considered the p o s i t i o n of the Canadian Indians i n 
the grand v i s i o n of h i s 'White Empire'. Neither d i d he address the 
question of how the m i l l i o n s of Southern Europeans and Hispanics who 
had already s e t t l e d i n the United States would respond to h i s dream of 
Anglo-American a s s o c i a t i o n . Probably he j u s t assumed t h a t , given 
time, they would share the same f a t e as the Boers and the French 
Canadians, i n adopting the c u l t u r e and m o r a l i t y of the 'superior' 
Anglo-Saxon race. This was a fundamental defect i n the l o g i c of a l l 
such race i m p e r i a l i s t s : perhaps they considered such matters a minor 
inconvenience, which could be l e f t to a l a t e r generation to r e c t i f y . 
When i n Canada, Grey attached tremendous importance to the 
improvement of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between the United States on the 
one hand and Canada and the Empire on the other. O f f i c i a l l y Canada's 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y was determined e n t i r e l y by the C o l o n i a l and Foreign 
O f f i c e s i n London, but the manner i n which the 1903 Alaskan Boundary 
Dispute was s e t t l e d had prompted so many c r i e s i n Canada of English 
pro-American bias that henceforth W h i t e h a l l i n t e r f e r e d less i n such 
matters. Nevertheless, Grey could not r e s i s t i n t e r v e n i n g , and between 
1904 and 1911 the i n f l u e n c e of the Governor-General upon Canadian 
e x t e r n a l p o l i c y reached i t s zenith.(17) He developed a rapport w i t h 
Root, the U.S. Secretary of State from J u l y 1905, and together they 
worked hard to improve r e l a t i o n s between the U.S.A. and B r i t a i n as 
w e l l as Canada, s u c c e s s f u l l y d i s p e l l i n g the tension of the 1903 
dispute. When James Bryce, an o l d f r i e n d of Grey, became Ambassador 
to Washington i n 1907, r e l a t i o n s improved s t i l l f u r t h e r . ( 1 8 ) As 
H.A.L. Fisher wrote of Grey and Bryce: 'To each the f r i e n d s h i p of the 
United States and the B r i t i s h Empire seemed one of the most desirable 
ends to be pursued'.(19) 
98 
Grey c a j o l e d L a u r i e r i n t o being more c o n c i l i a t o r y to 
Washington, which helped lead to the s e t t l i n g of numerous longstanding 
disputes - such as f i s h i n g and s e a l i n g r i g h t s and the boundary waters 
di s p u t e . He also s t r u c k up a personal f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Theodore 
Roosevelt (United States President 1901-8), who seemed to share his 
i n t e r e s t i n closer r e l a t i o n s . Roosevelt wrote to him i n 1905 of his 
d e s i r e to 'strengthen the t i e s between not merely the United States 
and Canada but a l l p o r t i o n s of the English-speaking world'.(20) Grey 
began d e s c r i b i n g him as the i n h e r i t o r of Rhodes's v i s i o n : but i t i s 
inconceivable that Roosevelt had anything l i k e an Anglo-Saxon world 
f e d e r a t i o n i n mind when he u t t e r e d such p l a t i t u d e s to Grey. 
I n March 1906, before a d i s t i n g u i s h e d audience of f i v e hundred 
guests at the Waldorf A s t o r i a i n New York, Grey made a keynote speech 
as the senior r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the B r i t i s h Empire on the American 
c o n t i n e n t . I n a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d gesture. Grey announced 
t h a t , as a symbol of the growing f r i e n d s h i p between t h e i r two 
c o u n t r i e s , he would r e t u r n to the United States a p o r t r a i t of Benjamin 
F r a n k l i n which the 1st E a r l Grey had looted i n 1777 i n the War of 
Independence. To thunderous applause, he continued: 
To those of us who believe that i n the coming s o l i d a r i t y and 
u n i f i c a t i o n of the Anglo-Saxon race l i e s the f u t u r e peace and hope 
of the world, the signs of the times are most encouraging. 
Anglo-Saxon c i v i l i s a t i o n , he continued, o f f e r e d the hope of f u t u r e 
peace and the r e a l i s a t i o n of the highest i d e a l s a t t a i n a b l e on 
earth.(21) 
The Times, which upon h i s death was to describe Grey as 
' e x c e p t i o n a l l y sympathetic w i t h the United States', said that t h i s 
speech gave i n v a l u a b l e help to the cause of Anglo-American f r i e n d s h i p , 
and was very w e l l received i n the United States.(22) There was 
dissension, however, among the s u b s t a n t i a l m i n o r i t y of Americans who 
were not of Anglo-Saxon o r i g i n . The Gaelic American newspaper argued 
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i n an a r t i c l e l a b e l l e d 'Toadies and Sycophants slobber over Earl Grey' 
tha t Grey's t a l k of a common ancestry f a l s i f i e d h i s t o r y by ignoring 
the presence of so many Americans of C e l t i c and Gaelic o r i g i n , people 
from Scotland and I r e l a n d r a t h e r than h i s beloved England.(23) This 
was a p e r t i n e n t observation, h i g h l i g h t i n g an inaccuracy i n the 
t h i n k i n g of a l l i m p e r i a l i s t s a t t h i s time, and one which Grey never 
bothered to c o r r e c t . The a r t i c l e expressed the fears of a small but 
s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n of the American population, who were absolutely 
opposed to the strengthening of l i n k s w i t h the Empire which they had 
l e f t behind. 
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , Grey's mind never s e t t l e d on t h i s subject 
long enough f o r him to suggest any s p e c i f i c plans about how the United 
States and the Empire might be brought closer together. He talked 
vaguely about j o i n t t r a d i n g or defence arrangements, and praised the 
m e r i t s of the Rhodes Scholarships. Grey never admitted to himself the 
f a c t t h a t the United States had not the s l i g h t e s t i n t e n t i o n of 
surrendering any power of decision-making to the B r i t i s h Empire, or 
becoming embroiled i n world a f f a i r s ; and that h i s v i s i o n was, 
t h e r e f o r e , pure fantasy. His hopes were raised w i t h the outbreak of 
war i n 1914, since he believed t h i s would prove c o r r e c t the maxim of 
Goldwin Smith, t h a t ' i n e n t e r p r i s e and p e r i l Anglo-Saxon w i l l be the 
t r u e s t of comrades to Anglo-Saxon'.(24) The f a c t that the United 
States d i d not enter the war u n t i l 1917 provoked i n him a f e e l i n g of 
b e t r a y a l , but s t i l l he believed that eventual c o n s o l i d a t i o n was q u i t e 
p o s s ible. He wrote to Bryce: 
The coming i n of America has l i f t e d a great weight o f f my heart. 
I cabled to Roosevelt and to Choate and the e x c e l l e n t Page saying 
how g r e a t l y we a l l r e j o i c e d at the f a c t that now and f o r ever 
henceforward the English-speaking nations would walk hand i n hand 
as j o i n t p r o t e c t o r s of the r i g h t s of mankind.(25) 
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Encouraging migration to the Empire 
Both as a way of boosting i m p e r i a l sentiment and f u r t h e r i n g the 
c i v i l i s i n g mission of the Anglo-Saxon people. Grey was s t r o n g l y i n 
favour of B r i t i s h men and t h e i r f a m i l i e s emigrating from t h e i r 
homeland to the s e l f - g o v e r n i n g colonies and Rhodesia. This would have 
the added advantage of h e l p i n g to reduce the perceived overcrowding i n 
B r i t a i n ' s c i t i e s , which he thought was leading to s o c i a l unrest and 
d i s c o n t e n t . Thus Grey advocated that emigration be a c t i v e l y 
encouraged by the B r i t i s h government, f o r the b e n e f i t of B r i t a i n and 
the Empire a l i k e . 
As a B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Company d i r e c t o r from 1889 to 1904, 
Grey was deeply involved i n the attempt by Rhodes to repeat i n the 
c h a r t e r t e r r i t o r i e s of Matabeleland and Mashonaland the process 
i n i t i a t e d i n South A f r i c a two centuries e a r l i e r - t u r n i n g a black 
man's land white. Mass emigration to the region was v i t a l i f t h i s 
goal were to be achieved and i t s economic p o t e n t i a l r e a l i s e d , as w e l l 
as to o f f s e t the i n f l u e n c e of the Boers and thus e s t a b l i s h the region 
as an i n t e g r a l part of the B r i t i s h Empire. The opinion of the native 
A f r i c a n s was i r r e l e v a n t , since they were ignorant savages who must not 
be allowed to thwart the march of progress. 
I t was emigration to Rhodesia and Canada which most i n t e r e s t e d 
Grey, b e l i e v i n g as he d i d that the presence of more new blood from the 
mother country could not f a i l to boost i m p e r i a l sentiment there. 'We 
have, as K i p l i n g says, to keep on pumping i n white men', he t o l d one 
f r i e n d . ( 2 6 ) He resented the f a c t t h a t , between 1821 and 1900, more 
than 6,800,000 people had migrated from the B r i t i s h I s l e s to the 
United States, r a t h e r than to the Empire. I f only a l l United Kingdom 
emigrants i n the nineteenth century had s e t t l e d i n the Empire, rather 
than the United States, he believed, the r e s u l t a n t manpower size and 
g r e a t e r economic p r o d u c t i v i t y would have been such that 'Germany would 
never have dared t o challenge the B r i t i s h Empire'.(27) Grey appeared 
101 
t o ignore the f a c t t h a t i f these people - many of whom were I r i s h and 
not h i s beloved Anglo-Saxons - had not chosen to s e t t l e across the 
A t l a n t i c , then the United States would have been s t i l l more i n the 
hands of those I t a l i a n s and Hispanics f o r whom he had such contempt. 
Size was a l l - i m p o r t a n t i n t h i s matter. The Empire had at that 
time a white population of s i x t y m i l l i o n , while i n the United States 
the f i g u r e was one hundred m i l l i o n , and i n Russia almost twice as many 
again. Grey's fear was that the Anglo-Saxon population of the Empire 
would d i m i n i s h p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y to these other two powers (not to 
mention the yellow p e r i l s of Japan and China), thus reducing B r i t a i n 
to the rank of a second-class power. The l o g i c of t h i s argument i s 
b a f f l i n g , since i t takes no account of the q u a l i t y of a nation's 
manpower, and disregards the f a c t that many thousands of Indian troops 
were at tha t moment f i g h t i n g w i t h d i s t i n c t i o n f o r the Empire. 
Moreover, i t i s t o t a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s suggestion of closer 
Anglo-American a s s o c i a t i o n . Grey r a r e l y l e t l o g i c impede h i s 
arguments, however. 
From the moment that he had become Governor-General, Grey had 
been anxious to encourage immigration ( o f the r i g h t s o r t ) to Canada, 
and suggested p r i v a t e l y that the B r i t i s h government should advance 
money to the Salva t i o n Army to enable them to place the worthy poor 
and t h e i r f a m i l i e s t n c a r e f u l l y selected areas i n the Dominions.(28) 
He was f u r t h e r i n s p i r e d when he met Rider Haggard, a B r i t i s h n o v e l i s t 
who was compiling a rep o r t f o r the Salvation Army on the s t a t e of 
t h e i r emigration schemes i n the United States.(29) Grey enthused over 
these schemes, but the Co l o n i a l O f f i c e regarded them as f a i l u r e s 
f i n a n c i a l l y . For the moment, t h e r e f o r e . Grey concentrated more on 
encouraging land settlement i n Rhodesia, and i n 1906 urged the B r i t i s h 
South A f r i c a Company to grant s u i t a b l e land there to the Salvation 
Army, together w i t h a loan of £50,000.(30) 
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With the outbreak of war i n 1914, Grey's i n t e r e s t i n emigration 
took on a new urgency. By now he had developed a t e r r i b l e fear of the 
c i v i l unrest i n B r i t a i n i n the past few years, i n c l u d i n g massive and 
u n r u l y s t r i k e s i n Wales and L i v e r p o o l , and believed that problems 
would only worsen once the war ended. I n December, theref o r e , he 
arranged a meeting between the Royal C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e and the 
S a l v a t i o n Army, to discuss how emigration might be a s u i t a b l e means of 
a l l e v i a t i n g immediate post-war d i f f i c u l t i e s . He wrote: 
I t i s obvious t h a t at the end of the war we s h a l l have large 
numbers of e x - s o l d i e r s out of employment, and unless p r o v i s i o n i s 
made to meet t h e i r requirements they may c o n s t i t u t e a s o c i a l and 
p o l i t i c a l menace....Here i s the o p p o r t u n i t y to strengthen the 
Empire by s e t t l i n g the unoccupied lands of the Empire, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y A u s t r a l i a . ( 3 1 ) 
Grey wrote t h i s to Kerr, probably i n the hope of i n t e r e s t i n g 
the Round Table i n the cause of emigration, but help was not 
forthcoming. Thereafter he concentrated h i s e f f o r t s on the Royal 
C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e , of which he had been President f o r the past two 
years. An e l d e r l y A u s t r a l i a n , Samuel Copley, had i n November 1914 
o f f e r e d 100,000 acres of land and £50,000 of working c a p i t a l f o r the 
b e n e f i t of ex-servicemen selected by the R.C.I., at a nominal annual 
rent of £10,000.(32) Grey saw t h i s as j u s t the beginning of great 
things and, i n 1915, established and chaired an 'After the War' 
Committee ( l a t e r renamed the Land Settlement Committee) to pursue t h i s 
cause. Other members included Haggard and Evelyn Wrench.(33) 
The Royal C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e ' s enthusiasm f o r emigration was 
not shared by the government. I n June 1915 n e i t h e r Asquith nor Bonar 
Law ( t h e l a t t e r i n h i s capacity as C o l o n i a l Secretary) would see a 
deputation from the Committee, although a f t e r personal pressure from 
Grey Bonar Law and Selborne (by then the President of the Board of 
A g r i c u l t u r e ) d i d e v e n t u a l l y arrange to see one.(34) I n large measure 
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t h i s a n t i p a t h y was because the government had f a r more important 
things to consider. 
During the course of 1915 Grey resigned the chair of the 
committee on account of h i s f a i l i n g h e a l t h , but supported the proposal 
of h i s successor. Lord Sydenham, to send out Haggard to explore the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r land settlement i n a l l the Dominions.(35) The 
B r i t i s h government declined to approve the idea, aware as i t was that 
some Dominions, and A u s t r a l i a i n p a r t i c u l a r , would be most unhappy. 
The prospect of B r i t o n s of low class and w i t h few p r a c t i c a l s k i l l s 
s e t t l i n g on t h e i r land and pl a c i n g an e x t r a burden on t h e i r l i m i t e d 
resources f i l l e d many A u s t r a l i a n s w i t h a sense of horr o r , not 
increased i m p e r i a l sentiment.(36) 
Haggard's t r i p r e s u l t e d i n an account d e c l a r i n g that various 
promises had been made by d i f f e r e n t s t a t e governments i n 
A u s t r a l i a . ( 3 7 ) Spurred on by the B r i t i s h South A f r i c a Company's o f f e r 
of 500,000 acres of land i n Rhodesia f o r post-war settlement, the 
Committee pursued i t s o b j e c t i v e s w i t h renewed vigour, although by t h i s 
time Grey's involvement had l a r g e l y ceased.(38) One year l a t e r , i n 
A p r i l 1917, the B r i t i s h government at l a s t set up i t s own Empire 
Settlement Committee, w i t h Haggard as a member, thus superseding that 
of the Royal C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e . Yet i t f a i l e d to give more than 
minimal encouragement to a s p i r i n g emigrants once the war ended, and 
declined to take up the various o f f e r s of land.(39) 
I t should be noted that the number of Br i t o n s who emigrated to 
the Empire i n 1919 was 115,369, whereas i n 1913 the f i g u r e had been 
285,046.(40) Thus Grey's great hopes were not r e a l i s e d : they provoked 
enthusiasm from n e i t h e r the B r i t i s h and Dominion governments, nor the 
B r i t i s h people as a whole. Nevertheless the p r o j e c t i s worth r e l a t i n g 
because i t t y p i f i e d the b e l i e f of those l i k e Grey that the concerns of 
i m p e r i a l u n i t y and the s t a t e of B r i t i s h s o c i e t y were cl o s e l y 
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i n t e r l i n k e d , and that the Empire could be used as a way of s o l v i n g 
B r i t a i n ' s domestic i l l s . 
Grey's M^agnum Opus': Dominion House 
A f u r t h e r and yet more ambitious example of Grey's commitment 
to the importance of boosting i m p e r i a l sentiment was his Dominion 
House p r o j e c t , to which he devoted most of h i s time a f t e r r e t u r n i n g 
home from Canada i n 1911. He envisaged one vast b u i l d i n g i n the 
centre of London i n which the representatives of each of the Dominions 
might work alongside one another - a great ph y s i c a l symbol of I m p e r i a l 
Federation, matched i n splendour and s i g n i f i c a n c e only by St. Paul's 
Cathedral and the Palace of Westminster. Grey considered t h i s the 
most ambitious scheme of h i s l i f e . ' I t i s to be my magnum opus', he 
t o l d one f r i e n d . ( 4 1 ) 
The idea f i r s t occurred to him i n 1907, when he suggested to 
La u r i e r t h a t i f , as they both hoped, a separate Dominions Department 
i n W h i t e h a l l were es t a b l i s h e d , 'the pressure f o r b r i n g i n g under the 
same roof a l l the London o f f i c e s of the Dominion High Commissioners 
and Agents General w i l l I hope become i r r e s i s t i b l e ' . ( 4 2 ) I n February 
1913 t h i s dream was launched when Grey obtained from London County 
Council an o p t i o n on a 2.5 acre s i t e at Aldwych i n the Strand, and he 
es t a b l i s h e d a company (Dominion House Limited) to promote the scheme. 
The s i t e was b i g enough f o r not only the London o f f i c e s of a l l the 
Dominions, so enhancing a d m i n i s t r a t i v e cohesion and u n i t y between 
them, but also a large e x h i b i t i o n h a l l where the produce of each 
Dominion would be displayed, thus boosting i n t e r - i m p e r i a l commerce. 
This proposal would c o n s t i t u t e a v i s i b l e l i n k between the centre of 
the Empire and the Dominions. 
I n J u l y Grey hosted a luncheon at the Savoy to advertise the 
scheme, at which a l l the leading newspaper e d i t o r s were present. 
Thereafter he won an enormous amount of favourable coverage i n the 
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EARL GREY'S PROPOSED DOMINION HOUSE 
The P h y s i c a l Symbol of I m p e r i a l F e d e r a t i o n 
B r i t i s h press.(43) He was less successful elsewhere, however. The 
King declined to patronise the scheme, presumably on the advice of the 
government - which never o f f e r e d the s l i g h t e s t h i n t of support or 
sympathy f o r what i t considered a c o s t l y and impracticable scheme. 
Likewise, no Dominion government accepted Grey's plea f o r help. He 
d i d persuade numerous Canadian i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and p o l i t i c i a n s to 
advocate the scheme to Prime M i n i s t e r Borden (who had succeeded 
L a u r i e r i n September 1911), and wrote numerous personal messages to 
him reminding him of the b e n e f i t s of I m p e r i a l Federation which would 
r e s u l t from a Dominion House - but i n v a i n . 
The Dominion governments had no wish to work alongside each 
other i n one b u i l d i n g , since they were u s u a l l y competing f i e r c e l y 
against one another f o r t r a d i n g c o n t r a c t s . Moreover, they considered 
the cost of the scheme - estimated at £3,000,000 - too excessive f o r 
them to c o n t r i b u t e towards. Neither were other B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s t s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d , and as e a r l y as 1912 Rosebery had warned Grey 
tha t a b u i l d i n g by i t s e l f would do nothing to consolidate the 
Empire.(44) Although he secured the support of Jameson, others l i k e 
M i lner and St.Loe Strachey ( e d i t o r of The Spectator) preferred a 
d i f f e r e n t suggestion f o r an i m p e r i a l business and s o c i a l centre, free 
from any p o l i t i c a l overtones.(45) 
Despite t h i s l a c k of support. Grey was anxious that the scheme 
be kept a l i v e u n t i l the time of the next I m p e r i a l Conference, when i t 
might be relaunched as an I m p e r i a l War Memorial venture.(46) At that 
conference, however, held i n 1917, the scheme was r e j e c t e d f o r the 
foreseeable f u t u r e . This was indeed a b i t t e r blow to a man by then on 
h i s deathbed, who had spent £5,000 of h i s own money promoting the 
scheme and devoted most of h i s f a i l i n g energies to i n s p i r i n g i n the 
Dominion governments r e a l enthusiasm f o r I m p e r i a l Federation which 
transcended mere f i n a n c i a l and parochial considerations.(47) 
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I n May 1913 Lewis Harcourt, the only government min i s t e r who 
had expressed any support f o r the scheme, had w r i t t e n to Grey: 'You 
always have grandiose ideas and by your enthusiasm very o f t e n b r i n g 
them o f f ' . ( 4 8 ) I n t h i s case, however. Grey was swept away by his 
imagination, and f a i l e d to r e a l i s e that Dominion governments viewed 
h i s proposal w i t h nothing less than h o r r o r , since i t seemed to be 
advocating c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and suppressing the r i g h t of independent 
a c t i o n which they had long been e s t a b l i s h i n g f o r themselves. Borden 
had warned Grey i n 1913 that a Dominion House would not meet w i t h the 
necessary co-operation between the i n d i v i d u a l provinces of Canada 
(each separate t r a d i n g r i v a l s ) l e t alone the separate Dominions.(49) 
Harry B r i t t a i n , a pioneer of the I m p e r i a l Press Conference of 
1909, l a t e r commented of Grey's Dominion House p r o j e c t : ' I t was a 
grand idea, but was I fe a r , somewhat before i t s time; maybe that time 
w i l l never a r r i v e ! ' ( 5 0 ) This was an appropriate epitaph f o r Grey's 
most ambitious p r o j e c t . 
Boosting Imperial Sentiment in p r a c t i c a l ways 
Even w h i l e Grey committed h i s energies to being 
Governor-General and then to h i s Dominion House p r o j e c t , he spared 
time to promote any venture which caught h i s imagination, such as the 
scouting movement, the I m p e r i a l Press Conference, and/Royal Colonial 
I n s t i t u t e . The scouts were established by Baden Powell i n B r i t a i n i n 
1908 - d u r i n g the era of 'National E f f i c i e n c y ' - as a n o n - m i l i t a r i s t i c 
and n o n - r a c i a l body, i l l u s t r a t i v e of i t s founder's b e l i e f i n the 'need 
f o r s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l u n i t y against danger both e x t e r n a l and 
subversive'.(51) I t spread to the Dominions i n 1910-11, as a way of 
b r i n g i n g the youth of the Empire together and encouraging them to 
t h i n k i m p e r i a l l y r a t h e r than p a r o c h i a l l y . From the outset Grey 
expressed h i s support, and i n December 1910 spoke at the Scouts' 
Ontario P r o v i n c i a l Council: 
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My i n t e r e s t i n the Boy Scouts arises from my love of Canada and my 
s o l i c i t u d e f o r her well-being. England has planted the seeds of 
her great d e s t i n y w i t h the Dominion. My doubt i s whether the 
people w i l l be able to reap i t . That w i l l depend on the education 
you g i v e your c h i l d r e n . I am not convinced that your schools are 
t u r n i n g out boys f i t t e d when they become men to be the reapers of 
t h i s splendid destiny.(52) 
Grey's i n t e r e s t i n i n t e r - i m p e r i a l communications also developed 
when he was i n Canada. He was appalled by the slowness and expense of 
news transmission between B r i t a i n and the Dominions, and by the f a c t 
t h a t passenger ships g e n e r a l l y headed s t r a i g h t f o r the United States 
r a t h e r than Canada. I n a l e t t e r to Harcourt i n February 1906 he urged 
the new L i b e r a l government to subsidise passenger steamers, and thus 
help to promote the connection between the heart and the periphery of 
the Empire, as w e l l as to lower i n t e r - i m p e r i a l postal rates and 
increase mail service subsidies.(53) He considered i t extraordinary 
t h a t , although Quebec was closer to London than to Vancouver, i n t e r -
i m p e r i a l communications remained so poor. While the union of Germany, 
I t a l y and the United States had each benefited so much from 
improvements i n communications, there had been no s i m i l a r improvements 
i n the Empire.(54) The f a c t that the Empire was s p l i t up by water 
r a t h e r than land was no excuse, he f e l t , since the new system of 
telegraph cables had been developed. Indeed, he pressed p a r t i c u l a r l y 
hard f o r a s p e c i a l i m p e r i a l cable network,(55) while at the same time 
g i v i n g much encouragement to the I m p e r i a l Press Conference arranged by 
B r i t / a i n i n 1909, which led to reduced cable charges.(56) 
With regard to the Royal C o l o n i a l I n s t i t u t e , f i n a l l y , i t was 
not i n Grey's nature, any more than i t was h i s i n t e n t i o n , to consider 
h i s presidency as merely an h o n o r i f i c p o s i t i o n . The I n s t i t u t e became 
much more a c t i v e under h i s guidance, and between 1912 and 1915 doubled 
i t s membership to 10,000. I n seeking to define i t s o b j e c t i v e . Grey 
t o l d Asquith t h a t ' i t has only one object and that i s to b r i n g about 
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c l o s e r cohesion between the component parts of the Empire and the 
Motherland'.(57) I n 1914 Grey hoped to boost the membership 
considerably i n the United States as another way of promoting Anglo-
Saxon c o n s o l i d a t i o n ; and upon the outbreak of the F i r s t World War he 
even thought i t might seek to urge Americans to volunteer f o r service 
i n the B r i t i s h Army - an idea s w i f t l y scotched by the B r i t i s h Foreign 
O f f i c e . ( 5 8 ) 
Grey much enjoyed h i s work w i t h the I n s t i t u t e , 'the non-
p o l i t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l character of whose a c t i v i t i e s e s p e c i a l l y 
appealed to him'.(59) I t focused only on the 'white' part of the 
Empire, moreover, and had long promoted i m p e r i a l union while not 
e m b r o i l i n g i t s e l f i n the debate about what form t h i s might take.(60) 
I n p a r t i c u l a r . Grey found that i t o f f e r e d him a very us e f u l and 
prominent p l a t f o r m during the war to promote h i s various ideas, such 
as c o n s c r i p t i o n i n B r i t a i n (which he c a l l e d f o r i n August 1915), and 
of course emigration schemes.(61) The Royal Colo n i a l I n s t i t u t e ' s 
o b j e c t i v e s were, f o r Grey, the per f e c t embodiment of what he himself 
had long advocated: the promotion of i m p e r i a l sentiment. As he 
declared i n 1915: 
I t i s obvious that the u n i t y and the maintenance of the B r i t i s h 
Empire depend on the existence i n a l l i t s parts of a r e a l and 
l i v i n g sense of i m p e r i a l consciousness. The R.C.I, e x i s t s to 
f o s t e r and promote t h i s sense of I m p e r i a l consciousness and 
t h e r e f o r e should be supported to the best of h i s or her a b i l i t y , 
by everyone who has the well-being of the B r i t i s h Empire at 
heart.(62) 
Conclusion 
No i m p e r i a l i s t was more a c t i v e than Grey i n t r y i n g to s t i r up 
i m p e r i a l sentiment as a way of making I m p e r i a l Federation a more 
popular and more r e a l i s a b l e goal. He refused to accept that the 
growth of Dominion n a t i o n a l i s m made the eventual acceptance of some 
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s o r t of p o l i t i c a l union any more u n l i k e l y , and maintained that 
education was a l l that was needed to b r i n g the English-speaking 
peoples of the world together. The f a i l u r e of h i s Dominion House 
p r o j e c t , l i k e the u l t i m a t e f a i l u r e of I m p e r i a l Federation i t s e l f , was 
to prove Grey thoroughly mistaken. Despite h i s undoubted success i n 
boosting i m p e r i a l sentiment among many Canadians, there remained a 
fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between a f e e l i n g of stronger sentiment and a 
p o s i t i v e d e s i r e f o r d e f i n i t e u n i f i c a t i o n of any s o r t . That Grey 
refused, or perhaps even f a i l e d , to recognise t h i s f a c t i s undeniable, 
but nevertheless i t does not de t r a c t t o t a l l y from the message which he 
sought to preach. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EARL GREY AND UNITED KINGDOM FEDERATION 
Background 
During the years 1886-1914, while debate developed over the 
f u t u r e of the Empire and what shape any form of closer i m p e r i a l union 
might take, B r i t i s h domestic p o l i t i c s were dominated by the question 
of I r i s h Home Rule. From one point of view, Home Rule, i f conceded, 
would be f a t a l to I m p e r i a l Federation, because i t was the a n t i t h e s i s 
of the c o n s o l i d a t i o n which f e d e r a t i o n i s t s sought to promote. Yet, 
from another p o s i t i o n , i t seemed that the problems of both I r e l a n d and 
the Empire could a c t u a l l y be s e t t l e d by f e d e r a t i o n . Indeed, I r e l a n d 
might be the f i r s t step, the i d e a l o p p o r t u n i t y , to advance the 
i m p e r i a l cause by a p r a c t i c a l demonstration of federalism. The c a l l s 
f o r United Kingdom f e d e r a t i o n must be studied because f i r s t l y , as J.E. 
Kendle suggests, i t i s not always possible to separate the arguments 
f o r c loser i m p e r i a l u n i t y from the proposals f o r B r i t i s h 
d e v o l u t i o n . ( 1 ) Secondly, these proposals help i n prov i d i n g a be t t e r 
understanding of how the word 'federalism' was defined by i t s 
advocates, and how w e l l the idea was gene r a l l y received. 
C a l l s f o r I r i s h Home Rule were i n vogue p r i m a r i l y i n the 1830s, 
the period 1880-95, and again from 1910 to 1914.(2) At most Home Rule 
meant e s t a b l i s h i n g an executive i n Dublin, responsible f o r e s s e n t i a l l y 
l o c a l matters, w h i l e the Westminster Parliament continued to d i c t a t e 
trade, defence and f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; at the very l e a s t , i t meant some 
degree of l o c a l autonomy. The I r i s h problem p e r s i s t e n t l y , recurred i n 
B r i t i s h domestic p o l i t i c s throughout the nineteenth century, and once 
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Gladstone revealed h i s conversion to Home Rule i n 1885 the issue 
remained at the f o r e f r o n t of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . 
I n proposing h i s Home Rule B i l l , i n A p r i l 1886, Gladstone used 
the example of countries l i k e Hungary to show that ^a vigorous sense 
of n a t i o n a l i t y i s compatible w i t h the e f f e c t i v e organic union tempered 
by autonomy', and declared that the a l t e r n a t i v e to Home Rule was 
s o c i a l chaos i n I r e l a n d and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n B r i t a i n . ( 3 ) 
B a l f o u r and other U n i o n i s t s , however, dismissed the very notion that 
there was any such t h i n g as I r i s h n a t i o n a l i t y . 
A longstanding opponent of the B i l l was Chamberlain. He had 
been committed since 1879 to some reform of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
arrangements between B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d , p a r t l y because he had a 
genuine d e s i r e to see the I r i s h problem resolved, but also because he 
was convinced t h a t the Westminster Parliament was now so overworked 
th a t major reform was necessary. One way to a l l e v i a t e t h i s problem 
would be to devolve c e r t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to a lower l e v e l of 
government. I n May 1885 he had unsuccessfully proposed to the Cabinet 
a c e n t r a l board i n I r e l a n d , which would have c e r t a i n l i m i t e d 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l e g i s l a t i v e functions i n areas such as education 
and p u b l i c works p o l i c y . 
By December 1885 Chamberlain ^had come grudgingly to the 
conclusion t h a t the only way of g i v i n g "bona f i d e Home Rule" would be 
the adoption of the American C o n s t i t u t i o n ' . ( 4 ) By t h i s time he meant 
'Home Rule A l l Round' - envisaging the adoption of a fe d e r a l system of 
government throughout the B r i t i s h I s l e s . There would be National 
Councils i n England, Scotland and Wales, and perhaps two i n I r e l a n d 
( i n c l u d i n g a separate one f o r U l s t e r ) , each s t i l l i r r e v o c a b l y bound to 
the United Kingdom through r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the Westminster 
Parliament. This was a r a d i c a l proposal. I n t r u t h , i t i s f a i r to 
suggest that h i s o v e r r i d i n g aim was to block Gladstone's scheme, which 
he believed was fundamentally misconceived i n that i t would only 
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encourage I r i s h moves towards f u l l independence. Chamberlain's 
i n t e r e s t i n federalism was never wholehearted, and subsequently he 
p r i v a t e l y h i g h l i g h t e d i t s i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y . ( 5 ) 
Home Rule s p l i t the L i b e r a l p a r t y , and Chamberlain and 
Har t i n g t o n broke away w i t h about f o r t y others, i n c l u d i n g Selborne and 
Grey, to form the L i b e r a l Unionists. I n co n t r a s t , Rosebery remained 
alongside Gladstone. He believed that Home Rule was r e g r e t t a b l e but 
necessary, as he considered i t both i n e v i t a b l e and the only 
a l t e r n a t i v e to separation. Moreover, he believed, 'when that i s 
accomplished I m p e r i a l Federation w i l l cease to be a dream'.(6) I n 
much the same s p i r i t , he and h i s f e l l o w L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t s -
Haldane, Asquith and Edward Grey - voted f o r Home Rule i n 1893, at the 
time when the B i l l was revived. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that many of those 
who were on opposing sides i n the L i b e r a l p a r t y on the Home Rule issue 
were l a t e r t o u n i t e i n the c a l l s f o r United Kingdom f e d e r a t i o n . 
Grey's Opposition to Home Rule 
Grey's b e l i e f i n the c u l t u r a l s u p e r i o r i t y of the Anglo-Saxon 
race was a major m o t i v a t i o n behind h i s c o n v i c t i o n that I r e l a n d must 
remain w i t h i n the Union. He believed that Gaelic people were 
e d u c a t i o n a l l y backward, and that therefore progress of any type i n 
I r e l a n d - whether p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l or economic - was stunted. The 
view th a t the I r i s h were, f o r whatever reason, u n f i t to govern 
themselves was held a lso by others - i n c l u d i n g Goldwin Smith.(7) 
Furthermore, Grey was h o s t i l e towards the infl u e n c e of the Roman 
Cat h o l i c Church which, i n I r e l a n d as much as i n Canada, he believed 
advocated ultramontane l o y a l t i e s , o v e r r i d i n g any to the B r i t i s h 
Empire.(8) 
Secondly, Grey considered i t q u i t e unacceptable that the United 
Kingdom should d i s i n t e g r a t e w h i l e attempts were being made to 
consolidate the Empire. A f t e r a l l , any form of I r i s h separation would 
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show t h a t the B r i t i s h succumbed to i n t i m i d a t i o n and violence - which 
would send most unfortunate s i g n a l s to any i n the Empire who aspired 
to separation, such as various of the French Canadians or the South 
A f r i c a n Boers. I n a d d i t i o n , Grey reasoned that an independent I r e l a n d 
would c o n s t i t u t e a grave s t r a t e g i c weakness f o r England, l e s t i t 
f a i l e d to r a l l y to England's defence i n the event of danger. 
This b e l i e f i n the v i t a l importance of the Union led Grey to 
oppose Gladstone's Home Rule B i l l i n 1886, and to stand as a L i b e r a l 
U n i o n i s t candidate at the ensuing e l e c t i o n . Thus he broke from many 
of h i s f e l l o w L i b e r a l s , whom he considered to be pandering to the 
I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t lobby i n Parliament. They were, he f e l t , p u t t i n g 
mere pa r t y p o s i t i o n above what he considered to be the greater need -
I m p e r i a l Federation. 
Throughout the 1890s, while Grey's mind concentrated on B r i t i s h 
expansion i n Southern A f r i c a , he thought l i t t l e of I r e l a n d . When i n 
Canada, however, he began to appreciate that most Canadians 
i n t e r p r e t e d the I r i s h problems very d i f f e r e n t l y ^ ^ him, and instead 
saw only an oppressed people being ignored by the B r i t i s h Parliament -
a l l i n s t a r k c o n t r a s t to the s i t u a t i o n i n South A f r i c a and Canada, 
where the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s claimed to at t a c h much importance to 
r a c i a l harmony and the p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r i t y i n t e r e s t s (except, of 
course, i n respect of franchise r i g h t s f o r the A f r i c a n n a t i v e s ) . Grey 
believed t h a t t h i s Canadian i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , whether or not misguided, 
d i d nothing to strengthen t i e s of l o y a l t y w i t h i n the Empire. 
Grey was aware also that to the Canadians i t appeared f a r c i c a l 
f o r the Westminster Parliament, g u i d i n g the a f f a i r s of a great Empire, 
to be so e a s i l y l i a b l e to i t s proceedings being disrupted by j u s t 
e i g h t y I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t M.P.s., and also how much business was 
devoted s o l e l y to I r i s h a f f a i r s . As he wrote i n 1910: 
A Canadian who r e a l i s e s the important place which the Dominion 
w i l l occupy some day i n the Empire, also r e a l i s e s that the House 
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of Commons of the United Kingdom i s . . . i n the hand of t r a i t o r s . He 
asks, why do not your people i n England put t h e i r house i n 
order ?(9) 
I r e l a n d had been one of the few poi n t s over which Rhodes and 
Grey disagreed. Rhodes c r i t i c i s e d him f o r h i s t o t a l opposition to the 
1886 Home Rule B i l l , an occasion when he himself had of f e r e d £5,000 
s e c r e t l y to the L i b e r a l Party i n approval of the idea. Rhodes's 
reasoning was tha t Home Rule i n every part of the Empire was a 
forerunner to 'Imper i a l Home Rule': i f l o c a l problems could be solved 
e f f e c t i v e l y a t l o c a l l e v e l , the p a t t e r n could then be repeated on an 
i m p e r i a l scale i n an I m p e r i a l Parliament. Moreover,Rhodes was 
convinced by the worthiness of federalism as an appropriate p o l i t i c a l 
system f o r the United Kingdom. Upon Rhodes's death. Grey r e c o l l e c t e d : 
He saw that the f e d e r a t i o n of Canada had been agreeably 
arranged...that the time f o r A u s t r a l i a n f e d e r a t i o n was now at 
hand; t h a t a peaceful (as he thought) f e d e r a t i o n of South A f r i c a 
was i n e v i t a b l e ; t h a t w i t h c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n our second 
chamber, so i t might evolve as an i m p e r i a l senate....(10) 
I n i t i a l l y Grey was unconvinced, perhaps because he was more s c e p t i c a l 
than Rhodes about the competence of the I r i s h i n managing t h e i r own 
a f f a i r s . A f t e r a l l , he had sat i n the House of Commons at the time 
when the I r i s h M.P.s. had been at t h e i r most d i s r u p t i v e . 
Nevertheless, the seed of Rhodes's enthusiasm had been sown i n h i s 
mind, and i t began to grow once he was posted to Canada i n 1904, and 
could study a f e d e r a l system at f i r s t hand. This, together w i t h the 
impact of O l i v e r ' s Alexander Hamilton, was enough to win over Grey 
f u l l y to the merits of a f e d e r a l system of government. 
Over the next few years, the p o s s i b i l i t y of applying federalism 
to the United Kingdom fermented i n Grey's mind. He had become 
convinced of i t s merits by 1907, and was one of the e a r l i e s t of the 
p r i n c i p a l advocates of a f e d e r a l s o l u t i o n . His basic proposal was f o r 
separate p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s f o r I r e l a n d , Scotland, Wales, 
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Northern England and Southern England, overseen by a feder a l 
Parliament i n London. Each p r o v i n c i a l u n i t would be represented i n 
the o v e r a l l Parliament i n pr o p o r t i o n to i t s size of population, 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to be chosen by p r o p o r t i o n a l representation. 'When 
the I r i s h are thus reduced i n the Federal Parliament of the U.K. to 
t h e i r proper p r o p o r t i o n s , we can begin to t a l k of Imperial 
Federation'.(11) 
Grey d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n h i s mind between 'na t i o n a l Home Rule', as 
Gladstone had envisaged f o r I r e l a n d , and h i s own c a l l f o r 'federal 
Home Rule'. Whereas the former would have given the I r i s h almost 
complete independence i n domestic matters, not l e a s t over customs 
d u t i e s , the l a t t e r would r e l i n q u i s h only c e r t a i n powers, and the 
c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y - the Federal Parliament - would have p l e n t i f u l 
r e s i d u a l powers. He claimed that ' n a t i o n a l Home Rule' would have 
r e s u l t e d i n I r e l a n d being t r e a t e d as a separate country, when i n 
r e a l i t y i t w a s / i n t e g r a l part of the United Kingdom. To i l l u s t r a t e 
t h i s p o i n t , he s a i d , Gladstone had proposed that the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between B r i t a i n and I r e l a n d should be l i k e that between Canada and 
B r i t a i n . I n c o n t r a s t , under h i s proposal the r e l a t i o n s h i p would be 
akin to that between the Canadian provinces and the Canadian f e d e r a l 
government i n Ottawa. Thus whereas Gladstone's measure promoted 
sepa r a t i o n , Grey's promoted u n i t y . 
Federalism i s the most modern and the most progressive form of 
government. I t combines the advantages of l o c a l autonomy w i t h 
those of n a t i o n a l u n i t y . I t provides f o r self-government i n a l l 
l o c a l matters and f o r u n i t y i n a l l matters of n a t i o n a l concern. 
I t gives l i b e r t y to the i n d i v i d u a l federated states and strength 
and s o l i d a r i t y to the f e d e r a t i o n as a whole.... Federalism creates 
l i b e r t y and u n i t y combined, while nationalism creates l i b e r t y and 
disunion.(12) 
Grey believed i n 1886 and 1893 that i f Home Rule were enacted, 
the I r i s h e l e c t o r a t e would undoubtedly support measures by a Dublin 
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parliament to co n f i s c a t e the lands of the English or Protestant 
l a n d l o r d s . He considered t h i s reprehensible, not only because i t 
would jeopardise v i t a l a g r i c u l t u r a l improvements which had been 
i n i t i a t e d i n some such estates, but also because he feared i t might be 
an unfortunate precedent f o r r a d i c a l s and s o c i a l i s t s to repeat i n 
England. By 1909, however, h i s fears had subsided. Now, as a 
consequence of successive Land Acts, some 300,000 I r i s h tenants had 
themselves become landowners, and Grey convinced himself that t h i s 
f a c t alone would make the I r i s h s u f f i c i e n t l y responsible to merit 
t h e i r now being given some, though s t i l l not t o t a l , c o n t r o l over t h e i r 
own domestic a f f a i r s . ( 1 3 ) 
I n a d d i t i o n , the more Grey studied the idea, the more he 
concluded t h a t f ederalism would solve B r i t i s h parliamentary problems: 
the d i s r u p t i v e presence of I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t M.P.s. at Westminster; 
reform of the House of Lords; and an overloaded and overworked House 
of Commons. On the f i r s t p o i n t , he considered the eighty-odd I r i s h 
N a t i o n a l i s t s i n Parliament to be the 'greatest danger now threatening 
the Empire'. Given the r e l a t i v e populations of I r e l a n d and England, 
I r e l a n d was gr o s s l y over-represented i n Parliament, a s i t u a t i o n he 
regarded as i n t o l e r a b l e since the I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t M.P.s. were 
g e n e r a l l y h o s t i l e to everything English ( i n c l u d i n g the Empire) and 
were always on the a l e r t to seize an oppo r t u n i t y of 'stabbing the | 
Empire to the heart'.(14) 
Secondly, under Grey's proposals there would be no place f o r 
the e x i s t i n g House of Lords i n the new Federal Parliament. Although a 
staunch b e l i e v e r i n the h e r e d i t a r y p r i n c i p l e , he was shocked by the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the parliamentary wrangles over the f u t u r e of the 
Upper Chamber. He considered these to be de t r i m e n t a l to B r i t a i n at a 
time when u n i t y was ever more necessary i n view of the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
f a c i n g B r i t a i n and i t s Empire. Under a f e d e r a l system the House of 
Lords would be replaced by an e l e c t i v e Senate.(15) F i n a l l y , Grey 
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shared Chamberlain's view that the House of Commons was grossly 
overworked, and that i t s membership was too large to allow 
c o n s t r u c t i v e debate: a Federal Parliament, on the other hand, would 
deal w i t h f a r less business and could have a much smaller and hence 
more i n t i m a t e membership. 
I n p r i n c i p l e , the idea of a f e d e r a l system i s the 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n o f c e n t r a l c o n t r o l and l o c a l self-government, but an 
e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e i s that the smaller u n i t s should have some c o n t r o l 
over the government of the c e n t r a l u n i t . However, i n Grey's plan t h i s 
key f e a t u r e was missing. What he c a l l e d federalism, 'Federal Home 
Rule', or 'Home Rule A l l Round', was i n r e a l i t y l i t t l e more than a 
scheme of d e v o l u t i o n , since he always maintained that the Federal 
parliament should continue to have t o t a l power i n c e r t a i n areas - such 
as defence, f o r e i g n p o l i c y and i m p e r i a l p o l i c y (although these would 
u l t i m a t e l y be shared w i t h the Dominion governments once Impe r i a l 
Federation was e s t a b l i s h e d ) . Using the word 'federalism' i n t h i s 
context was thus a misnomer common amongst a l l those who came to 
promote causes s i m i l a r to Grey's i n the period 1909-21, but i t was a 
convenient l a b e l which embraced the m u l t i p l i c i t y of schemes which were 
suggested. 
Grey's i n t e r e s t i n federalism became of p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t i n 
1909, the year when the L i b e r a l government's Budget was rejected by 
the House of Lords. Grey's f i r s t convert to federalism was a v i s i t o r 
to Canada i n December 1909, L i o n e l C u r t i s . I t was Grey who also 
persuaded C u r t i s , and through him the Round Table, that 'before the 
road i s cleared f o r the f e d e r a t i o n of the Empire we have to put the 
U.K. s t r a i g h t . The time i s approaching, i f i t i s not already here, 
f o r g e t t i n g t h i s work done'.(16) The extent of Grey's influence on 
the Round Table i n t h i s respect was profound. Although avowedly an 
i m p e r i a l i s t o r g a n i s a t i o n , i t came to devote a considerable amount of 
time to the I r i s h issue, and i n 1910 produced a 'Green Memorandum' on 
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i m p e r i a l a f f a i r s which endorsed Grey's point that U.K. fed e r a t i o n was 
a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r I m p e r i a l Federation.(17) I n the period up to 1914, 
the Round Table was to provide key i n s p i r a t i o n to the whole 
f e d e r a t i o n i s t movement. 
I n A p r i l 1910, the L i b e r a l government introduced the Parliament 
B i l l , w i t h the aim of reforming the House of Lords. The Round Table 
now made a concerted e f f o r t to win over Balfour. O l i v e r urged him 
p r i v a t e l y , and i n a s e r i e s of seven l e t t e r s i n The Times, w r i t t e n 
under the pseudonym ' P a c i f i c u s ' , t r i e d to i n f l u e n c e wider Unionist 
o p i n i o n . The Times i t s e l f had become e n t h u s i a s t i c about federalism 
because i t s p r o p r i e t o r Lord N o r t h c l i f f e was now a supporter. Grey had 
f i r s t met N o r t h c l i f f e i n 1908, when both had expressed support f o r an 
i m p e r i a l cable s e r v i c e . Thereafter, Grey received favourable coverage 
i n N o r t h c l i f f e ' s newspapers, and i n September 1910 the Daily Mail 
proposed that he should be appointed a Knight of the Garter.(18) Grey 
had p r e d i c t e d that N o r t h c l i f f e would use ' a l l h i s energies i n the 
d i r e c t i o n of b u t t r e s s i n g up the B r i t i s h Empire',(19) and N o r t h c l i f f e 
indeed a t t r i b u t e d h i s own i n t e r e s t i n federalism to Grey: 
I am sure you have seen that the seed you scattered i n London l a s t 
J u l y has borne f r u i t . C e r t a i n l y you c r y s t a l l i s e d i n my mind, 
whatever th a t may be worth, the Federal I d e a . . . . I t i s curious that 
many people who thought you v i s i o n a r y i n J u l y , have come round to 
your p o i n t o f view i n November.(20) 
Another recent convert to federalism was Waldorf Astor, the new 
p r o p r i e t o r of The Observer. Astor convinced h i s e d i t o r , J.L. Garvin, 
of the merits of a f e d e r a l s o l u t i o n , and Garvin then j o i n e d Oliver's 
attempt to win over Balfour by w r i t i n g an a r t i c l e which drew heavily 
on Grey's ideas. Yet t h e i r e f f o r t s were i n vain.(21) Balfour, i n 
r e p l y , h i g h l i g h t e d s u c c i n c t l y several of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n such a 
scheme: 
I s i t not an i l l u s i o n to suppose (as I gather Al b e r t Grey 
supposes) th a t a Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n i n Great B r i t a i n would be a 
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step towards u l t i m a t e l y f e d e r a l i s i n g the Empire? Might i t not, 
from many poi n t s of view, increase the d i f f i c u l t i e s of that 
task?....Is i t not a f a c t that federalism, as e x h i b i t e d i n the 
USA, Canada, A u s t r a l i a and the Cape, i s a stage i n the process 
from separation towards u n i f i c a t i o n ; while federalism i n the 
United Kingdom would be a step from u n i f i c a t i o n towards 
separation [ ? ] ( 2 2 ) 
C e r t a i n l y Balfour's second point seemed unanswerable, and h i g h l i g h t e d 
the i r o n y of advocates such as Grey using the Canadian c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
e s p e c i a l l y , as a model f o r the United Kingdom. Balfour was 
unimpressed by the vagueness of the t a l k about federalism, and 
h i g h l i g h t e d the mass of unanswered dilemmas - such as the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a power-clash between an I m p e r i a l Parliament and an English 
Parliament. He knew, too, that most Unionists were t o t a l l y h o s t i l e to 
f e d e r a l i s m , b e l i e v i n g i t to be merely Home Rule i n another guise. I n 
despair Grey wrote t h a t , despite the support of men as i n f l u e n t i a l as 
Garvin, N o r t h c l i f f e and O l i v e r , any r e a l step forward had been 
thwarted.(23) 
Throughout 1910, Grey made personal approaches to various 
l e a d i n g f i g u r e s , i n c l u d i n g p o l i t i c i a n s of both p a r t i e s . He wrote to 
Lansdowne, Edward Grey, Balfour, and even to the King, urging that the 
moderates of the two p a r t i e s should agree to appoint a Royal 
Commission to consider how best to f e d e r a l i s e the United Kingdom.(24) 
I n a subsequent l e t t e r to Milner he added h i s hopes that he would be 
r e t u r n i n g home from Canada, at the end of 1910, to a s s i s t i n a new 
f e d e r a l i s t p a r t y l e d by Rosebery, Cromer and Milner.(25) 
Grey thus endeavoured once more to a t t r a c t the e l u s i v e Rosebery 
back i n to the p o l i t i c a l f r a y . This c a l l f o r a new party should not 
be taken too s e r i o u s l y . Grey had s i m i l a r plans i n the 1880s, when he 
dreamed of the Whigs breaking away under Goschen to form a new party 
of moderation. His proposal now was more a r e f l e c t i o n of h i s contempt 
f o r the two e x i s t i n g p a r t i e s than a serious p r o p o s i t i o n . I t was 
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always to Rosebery that Grey looked f o r leadership of any such group, 
sending him a steady flow of l e t t e r s e x h o r t i n g him to j o i n w i t h Edward 
Grey i n t a k i n g up the banner of a f i r m l y moderate and i m p e r i a l i s t 
p a r t y . Grey seemed to be f o r g e t f u l of Rosebery's despair of p o l i t i c s 
by t h i s stage. He also c l e a r l y overrated Milner's feelingc i n so f a r 
as Milner ever supported federalism, i t was only because he could see 
no r e a l a l t e r n a t i v e except the status quo. He was never an 
e n t h u s i a s t , and i n November 1910 declared that federalism 
c l e a r l y a f f o r d s no jumping-off ground f o r I m p e r i a l 
Federation....No doubt any change i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the 
United Kingdom...must have important consequences f o r the Empire 
as a whole. But they w i l l be i n d i r e c t consequences.(26) 
I n h i s l e t t e r s Grey apologised f o r endeavouring to intervene i n 
domestic p o l i t i c s w h i l e 3,000 miles away, but suggested that distance 
might enable him to see the s i t u a t i o n somewhat more c l e a r l y than could 
many at home. However, the f a c t that he was t r y i n g to involve 
Rosebery i n h i s plans suggests r a t h e r that i t was Grey himself who 
could not see p r o p e r l y . No major Unionist or L i b e r a l I m p e r i a l i s t 
heeded Grey's lone c l a r i o n c a l l from Ottawa. Howick warned that he 
was causing annoyance by imposing what was f e l t by some to be a red 
h e r r i n g on the scene at a time when the Unionists were t r y i n g to 
concentrate on the c r i s i s f a c i n g the House of Lords. But Grey 
remained unabashed, remarking i n r e p l y how awful i t would be i f i t 
were Asquith instead of Balfour who won e l e c t o r a l acclaim by using 
f e d e r a l i s m to solve the I r i s h problem. I n May 1910 he had sought to 
a n t i c i p a t e what the popular r e a c t i o n to Balfour o p t i n g f o r federalism 
before the next e l e c t i o n might be: 
Consternation at f i r s t and execrations, but out of the storm the 
voice of reason w i l l make i t s e l f [ h e a r d ] . Slowly and by degrees 
people w i l l begin to r e a l i s e that f e d e r a t i o n of the U.K. i s the 
p o l i c y required by the i n t e r e s t s of 1. I r e l a n d 2. Gt B r i t a i n 3. 
The Empire.(27) 
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One source of encouragement f o r Grey was the Canadian Prime 
M i n i s t e r , who, w h i l e not a supporter of I m p e r i a l Federation, appeared 
to support h i s views about I r e l a n d . Laurier wrote: 'A new Parliament 
has to be evolved, l e a v i n g l o c a l questions to l o c a l l e g i s l a t u r e s , and 
above a t r u l y i m p e r i a l body. What an opening there i s at t h i s moment 
i n England, f o r someone w i t h imagination and courage'.(28) Grey 
i n t e r p r e t e d L a u r i e r ' s views as r e f l e c t i n g the opinion of a l l members 
of the Outer Empire, u n i v e r s a l l y demanding change i n B r i t a i n . 
During the course of 1910 various members of the Round Table 
had begun to dispute the Grey/Curtis view that United Kingdom 
f e d e r a t i o n was a c o n d i t i o n precedent to I m p e r i a l Federation. O l i v e r , 
Brand and Kerr became more cautious, Kerr p o i n t i n g out that the word 
'federalism' was not s t r i c t l y c o r r e c t since i t was not proposed that 
there be any r e s t r i c t i o n s on the a u t h o r i t y of the c e n t r a l Federal 
Parliament.(29) By September 1910 C u r t i s too was more guarded than 
before, once he had begun to r e a l i s e the enormity of the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems that a new system of federalism would create, 
such as the question of checks and balances and the place of the 
j u d i c i a r y . Amery, meanwhile, advocated one l o c a l parliament f o r the 
United Kingdom as a whole, g i v i n g i t Dominion s t a t u s , and subordinate 
alongside a l l other Dominions to an o v e r a l l I m p e r i a l Parliament. 
Grey too decided to modify h i s plans, not so much because of 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved as because they were not a t t r a c t i n g any 
enthusiasm. By October 1910 he had concluded that f e d e r a l Home Rule 
was not, i n f a c t , a c o n d i t i o n precedent to I m p e r i a l Federation, 
although s t i l l very much de s i r a b l e i n i t s e l f : 
One does not n e c e s s a r i l y depend on the other, but one advantage 
tha t would r e s u l t from the a g i t a t i o n f o r the f e d e r a t i o n of the 
United Kingdom would be the stimulus i t would give to the idea of 
I m p e r i a l Federation. The a g i t a t i o n f o r the f e d e r a t i o n of the 
United Kingdom would educate people a l l round the Empire i n the 
v i r t u e s of the Federal P r i n c i p l e . ( 3 0 ) 
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At t h i s time Grey was determined to cle a r any obstacles to Imperial 
Federation, which he believed was an imminent p o s s i b i l i t y . Anxious as 
he was to see the l a r g e r scheme enacted, he d i d not wish to see i t 
delayed by d i f f i c u l t i e s about U.K. f e d e r a t i o n : he therefore found i t 
expedient to argue that the two schemes d i d not depend on each other. 
Grey thus s h i f t e d h i s emphasis during the course of 1910, and chose to 
concentrate on the v i r t u e s of f e d e r a t i o n f o r s o l v i n g the I r i s h problem 
i n i t s e l f , r a t h e r than on i t s advantages f o r the Empire as a whole. 
While many p o l i t i c i a n s might be persuaded to favour a fe d e r a l s o l u t i o n 
f o r the United Kingdom i n the immediate f u t u r e , they might be slower 
to see how i t would accord w i t h I m p e r i a l Federation. Not everyone saw 
things q u i t e so c l e a r l y as he d i d , he acknowledged. 
As the prospect of a Home Rule B i l l grew nearer, once the 
Parliament Act received r o y a l assent ( i n August 1911), Grey c l e a r l y 
wished he had not been obliged to stay on an e x t r a year as Governor-
General, f e e l i n g that h i s presence i n London might yet have done much 
to persuade h i s Unionist colleagues to lessen t h e i r opposition to 
Federalism. He was more prepared now, however, to contemplate the 
L i b e r a l s adopting the scheme, and suggested to Harcourt: 'My 
impression i s t h a t there i s among the Unionist ranks a s u f f i c i e n t 
support f o r tha t p r i n c i p l e to enable your Government to boldly 
champion i t ' . ( 3 1 ) He was wrong i n f a c t , because Balfour would not 
change h i s mind, but t h i s d i d not deter him from urging the Unionist 
leadership not to r e s i s t proposals f o r reform so abso l u t e l y that they 
would lose the support of people such as himself: some change was 
e s s e n t i a l , and the best o p t i o n was federalism.(32) 
The passing of the Parliament Act i n August only increased 
Grey's keenness f o r h i s cause, since the reduction of the veto power 
of the House of Lords to two years now removed any e f f e c t i v e obstacle 
to the passing of a Home Rule B i l l by the L i b e r a l government. 
Describing the newly weakened House of Lords as 'a despicable 
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Parliamentary Eunuch, a castrated and emasculated Assembly, destined 
a f t e r f u r t h e r degradations and m u t i l a t i o n s to be f l u n g i n disgust upon 
the d u n g h i l l ' , ( 3 3 ) he urged a new w r i t t e n c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r B r i t a i n , 
w i t h an e l e c t i v e Senate and a supreme court, as part of a fede r a l 
s o l u t i o n f o r the United Kingdom. 'However much we d i s l i k e i t ' , he 
t o l d Howick, 'we have to recognise that the era of a r i s t o c r a t i c 
government of the Empire i s over - and that our duty i s to take such 
steps as w i l l make the new era of the Democratic [Government] of the 
Empire as safe as possible'.(34) I n a l e t t e r to the King's secretary, 
Bigge, he added a blunt and sobering p o s t s c r i p t , most 
u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y despondent, which i s h e l p f u l i n t r y i n g to 
understand why he was so anxious f o r a s o l u t i o n to the c r i s i s he 
believed would r e s u l t from Home Rule being enacted: 
I am so miserable at the prospects of the times, and at the 
absence of men i n the H of C w i t h an adequate appreciation of the 
dangers i n f r o n t of us, that f o r the f i r s t time i n my l i f e I am 
i n c l i n e d to be p e s s i m i s t i c as to the f u t u r e of my country. I hope 
t h i s unwonted f e e l i n g i s only a sign of my growing age, but alas I 
don't t h i n k so.(35) 
Grey back i n England 
Grey returned home from Canada i n November 1911, at the same 
time t h a t he received a note from Rudyard K i p l i n g , d e c l a r i n g : ' I t h i n k 
you have taught the Dominion to f i n d her soul. Now w i l l you please 
help England to recover hers. She i s s e l l i n g i t f o r 9d. and a Welsh 
r a b b i t ' ( 3 6 ) - a reference to Lloyd George and the 1911 Budget. Grey 
decided t o in v o l v e himself wholeheartedly i n the I r i s h controversy, 
perhaps aware th a t he had nothing to lose, since he sympathised w i t h 
n e i t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a rty much, and so had l i t t l e chance of being 
o f f e r e d another major p u b l i c o f f i c e . His hopes of succeeding Selborne 
i n South A f r i c a had been dashed i n the previous year when Herbert 
Gladstone was appointed instead.(37) 
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The L i b e r a l Committee on I r e l a n d presented i t s report i n 
December to the Cabinet, where a m a j o r i t y decided that there was 
l i t t l e support i n the p a r t y or the country f o r such a r a d i c a l reform 
as 'Home Rule A l l Round'. Consequently, the Home Rule B i l l which was 
launched i n A p r i l 1912 was e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r to the 1893 proposal. 
The B i l l c a l l e d f o r a dual-chamber parliament i n Dublin, and the 
presence of 42 I r i s h M.P.s. at Westminster - which would continue to 
have supreme a u t h o r i t y i n areas such as defence and f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y . 
A l l keen f e d e r a l i s t s condemned i t as a r e j e c t i o n of what they were 
espousing. 
Throughout 1912 and 1913, as the Home Rule B i l l passed slowly 
through Parliament, encountering much opposi t i o n from both I r i s h and 
B r i t i s h U n i o n i s t s , federalism remained the subject of intense 
discussion i n both p a r t i e s . I t was e s s e n t i a l l y t h i s resistance to the 
B i l l which kept federalism a l i v e at t h i s time. Notwithstanding 
Asquith's l a c k of i n t e r e s t , C h u r c h i l l advocated some form of 'Home 
Rule A l l Round', having been won over by C u r t i s . Like many, C h u r c h i l l 
was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y f e a r f u l of the prospect of c i v i l disorder i n 
U l s t e r , and was prepared to consider anything which might prevent 
t h i s . 
I n the House of Lords debate on the Second Reading of the Home 
Rule B i l l i n January 1913, Grey was among the most vocal opponents. 
I r e l a n d , he maintained, had progressed f a r enough since 1886 to 
q u a l i f y i t s e l f f o r s t a t u s akin to a Canadian province, but not a 
Canada. A f e d e r a l s o l u t i o n would keep I r e l a n d u n i t e d and would draw 
i t c l o s e r to B r i t a i n , so strengthening the Empire. He c a l l e d f o r 
I r e l a n d to be d i v i d e d i n t o two provinces ( i n c l u d i n g one f o r U l s t e r ) , 
each having considerable c o n t r o l over i t s own domestic a f f a i r s . The 
Home Rule B i l l would, he asserted, never be accepted by U l s t e r , as i t 
overrode Protestant f e e l i n g ; he also found the stubborn resistance to 
change of any k i n d , as advocated by Lansdowne and Walter Long, equally 
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unacceptable. For him federalism was the only r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e -
and i f Canada, A u s t r a l i a and South A f r i c a could each federate 
s u c c e s s f u l l y , then why not also the United Kingdom? As a way of 
achieving t h i s , he advocated a conference of both p a r t i e s , which 
should seek to create the c o n s t i t u t i o n 'most l i k e l y to ensure the 
permanent w e l l - b e i n g of the United Kingdom, of the Empire, and of the 
whole of the English-speaking people'.(38) 
Grey, however, was expressing a m i n o r i t y opinion. Selborne 
sai d t h a t he was i n favour of I m p e r i a l Federation, but not U.K. 
f e d e r a t i o n , and sought to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between the u n i t a r y 
system i n South A f r i c a (where the c e n t r a l government was strong, and 
only a few powers were expressly devolved) and the f e d e r a l system i n 
Canada which Grey was proposing, where the smaller u n i t s had 
considerable autonomy. Even among the f e d e r a l i s t s themselves b i g 
d i f f e r e n c e s arose - Grey wanting the e n t i r e Home Rule B i l l r e j e c t e d , 
f o r example, whereas Dunraven f e l t i t could be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
amended.(39) 
Grey's c a l l f o r a conference was shared by several others, 
notably the King and Loreburn (Lord Chancellor), a l b e i t f o r d i f f e r e n t 
purposes. I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t s and most Unionists feared a t r a p , and 
both Asquith and Bonar Law (who had succeeded Balfour i n November 
1911) were d o u b t f u l . Nevertheless, they bowed to r o y a l persuasion and 
met p r i v a t e l y on three occasions i n l a t e 1913. Acting upon Grey's 
advice, O l i v e r sought to put renewed pressure on the Unionist 
leadership to be p o s i t i v e about federalism, and the r e s u l t was a 
pamphlet c a l l e d The A l t e r n a t i v e s to C i v i l War. Grey obviously 
r e a l i s e d t h a t he himself was not best q u a l i f i e d to be the persuader: 
O l i v e r had developed h i s ideas f a r more thoroughly than had Grey as to 
what the a c t u a l mechanics of a f e d e r a l system might be, and was not 
pre-occupied l i k e Grey was w i t h h i s Dominion House p r o j e c t . O l i v e r 
f a i l e d to persuade Bonar Law, but d i d manage to win over Selborne, 
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Austen Chamberlain and, notably, even Walter Long that federalism was 
a b e t t e r p r o p o s i t i o n than mere stubbornness. 
The t a l k s achieved nothing. Even O l i v e r l o s t heart, and became 
convinced that the leaders' a t t i t u d e s could not be changed. Bonar Law 
would not abandon Carson, and Asquith would not do anything which 
might jeopardise h i s government's I r i s h N a t i o n a l i s t support. A 
f u r t h e r attempt at a settlement, at Buckingham Palace i n July 1914, 
also f a i l e d . The United Kingdom appeared to be set on course f o r 
c i v i l war i n U l s t e r . 
As e a r l y as 1893 Grey had predicted that U l s t e r would rebel 
r a t h e r than accept Home Rule, and i n 1913 he now repeated t h i s 
prophecy i n a l e t t e r to The Times: confess my sympathies are heart 
and soul w i t h the Ulstermen i n t h e i r resistance to the B i l l , and I 
w i l l u n h e s i t a t i n g l y support them i n t h e i r endeavour to prevent i t from 
becoming law'.(40) Later he even openly approved of Ulste r ' s r i g h t to 
defend i t s e l f by force of arms i f necessary.(41) I f t h i s were the 
only way such a r e v o l u t i o n a r y measure could be r e s i s t e d . Grey was 
prepared to sanction armed resistance - a stance openly advocated by 
Bonar Law dur i n g h i s momentous speech at Blenheim i n June 1913 - on 
the grounds that Asquith's r a d i c a l government would not heed the 
warnings of the Opposition. Advocating such a response put Grey 
f i r m l y alongside the h a r d l i n e U n i o n i s t s , although he d i d not go so f a r 
as Milner and Bonar Law i n a s s o c i a t i n g w i t h the U l s t e r Defence League, 
a body formed i n 1908 to su s t a i n o p p o s i t i o n to Home Rule by any means. 
I n August 1914, a f t e r the two-year veto of the House of Lords 
had lapsed, the Home Rule B i l l f i n a l l y reached the s t a t u t e book. The 
th r e a t of major disorder i n I r e l a n d was averted only by the outbreak 
of war i n Continental Europe, when a l l p a r t i e s agreed to the 
implementation of the new Act being deferred, and a t t e n t i o n was 
switched from domestic issues to the war e f f o r t . 
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I n the wake of the Easter Rising i n 1916, Grey once again 
merged I r i s h w i t h i m p e r i a l considerations i n an e f f o r t to o f f e r a 
p r a c t i c a l long-term s o l u t i o n f o r that troubled land. Because he 
doubted the a b i l i t y of any government, whether L i b e r a l , Unionist or 
C o a l i t i o n , to solve adequately the I r i s h problem once the European war 
ended, he urged t h a t I r e l a n d be governed by emergency po l i c e and 
m i l i t a r y r e g u l a t i o n u n t i l such time as the next I m p e r i a l Conference, 
due to he held i n 1917, had 
an o p p o r t u n i t y of considering what s o r t of Home Rule w i l l meet i n 
the f u l l e s t possible way the l e g i t i m a t e a s p i r a t i o n s of the I r i s h 
people at the same time that i t provides f o r the f u l l safeguarding 
of our i m p e r i a l s e c u r i t y , the f i n d i n g of the I m p e r i a l Conference 
to be binding on the Unionist Party.(42) 
Grey no longer t r u s t e d B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s to s e t t l e the I r i s h 
problem s e n s i b l y , and f e l t that only overseas Dominion leaders could 
be r e l i e d upon to reach a proper s o l u t i o n . He believed that no 
se l f - g o v e r n i n g Dominion would ever have considered g r a n t i n g to any 
part of t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s the powers conferred by the Home Rule Act 
upon the people of I r e l a n d , and that they would b r i n g to the problem a 
f a r more r a t i o n a l approach than B r i t i s h p o l i t i c i a n s alone could o f f e r . 
Once more he urged that the Unionists should take up federalism, and 
o f f e r e d to help as much as h i s f a i l i n g h e a l t h might permit. I t might 
seem inconceivable t h a t any B r i t i s h government would have been 
prepared to give the Dominions a say i n the f a t e of the United 
Kingdom, and t h a t Grey was t a l k i n g nonsense. Yet t h i s idea was also 
considered s e r i o u s l y by Lloyd George and Selborne i n the f o l l o w i n g 
year - although i t i s d o u b t f u l that they were contemplating that the 
government should be bound by a m a j o r i t y decision.(43) Whether the 
dominions would have wished to become embroiled i n the problems of 
I r e l a n d i s another matter. 
Before I r e l a n d rose once more to the f o r e of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , 
Grey had died. The cause f o r which he had s t r i v e n l i v e d on, though. 
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Lloyd George as Prime M i n i s t e r d i d r e - a f f i r m h i s i n t e r e s t i n 
federalism, and a government committee on I r i s h a f f a i r s recommended 
tha t any Home Rule B i l l should be part of a l a r g e r measure of 
federali s m . The m a j o r i t y of the Cabinet, however, f e l t i t 
unreasonable to rush i n t o anything so far-reaching as H^ome Rule A l l 
Round' while the war was s t i l l r aging, and while the whole concept was 
s t i l l remarkably vague. Once the war ended, the government decided 
th a t the I r i s h problem must be solved before United Kingdom federation 
could even be f o r m a l l y discussed: and by d i v o r c i n g these two issues, 
a l l enthusiasm f o r d e v o l u t i o n faded - r e f l e c t i n g the f a c t that most of 
those who supported federalism d i d so p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h I r e l a n d i n 
mind. C e r t a i n l y the Government of I r e l a n d Act (1920) and the 
r e s u l t a n t I r i s h Free State were not consistent w i t h the f e d e r a l i d e a l . 
Conclusion 
I n 1918 some s o r t of United Kingdom devolution seemed a r e a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y : indeed, i t never had so much prominence again u n t i l the 
1970s. At f i r s t s i g h t , t h i s appears to be an achievement f o r the 
advocates of ^ Home Rule A l l Round', and i t may be tempting to suggest 
t h a t United Kingdom f e d e r a t i o n would have provided a considerable 
impetus towards I m p e r i a l Federation. I n r e a l i t y , though, i n t e r e s t i n 
feder a l i s m centred very l a r g e l y on i t s a t t r a c t i o n as a s o l u t i o n to the 
I r i s h problem. Few wanted fa r - r e a c h i n g , systematic reform i n the rest 
of the United Kingdom, and fewer s t i l l r e a l l y understood f u l l y the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of federalism. 
Furthermore, a f t e r the extension of the franchise i n 1918, and 
the new emphasis on i n d u s t r i a l , labour and economic issues, the 
government found i t s e l f f u l l y pre-occupied. The promises of n a t i o n a l 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , and the problems of coping w i t h the aftermath of war, 
meant th a t any secondary issues such as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l reform were 
pushed to the wayside. 
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I n the new age of democracy, i t seemed appropriate that one 
should seek to persuade not j u s t the leaders: the led must be 
persuaded too. Although the p r o - f e d e r a l i s t reports i n the press were 
considerable, the concept would not gain p o p u l a r i t y unless a main 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , or one charismatic p o l i t i c i a n , adopted i t . No such 
p o l i t i c i a n d i d come forward, and those l i k e Lloyd George were aware 
tha t - as Chamberlain had discovered - championing a c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
issue, w h i l e perhaps winning him a few votes i n the Reform Club, would 
not be l i k e l y to prompt a chorus of thanks from a g r a t e f u l nation. 
This r e a l i t y d i d not accord w i t h Grey's v i s i o n . 
'Home Rule A l l Round' demanded the reform of the e n t i r e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and f i n a n c i a l s t r u c t u r e i n B r i t a i n , and 
l o y a l t i e s focused i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n . Despite t h i s . Grey and 
h i s f e l l o w enthusiasts f a i l e d to make any s u b s t a n t i a l comment on the 
enormity of the r a m i f i c a t i o n s of change. The vagueness w i t h which men 
l i k e Grey spoke of federalism was alarming. Even a l l o w i n g f o r the 
f a c t that Grey doubtless expected others to o f f e r the substance to the 
idea, most f e d e r a t i o n i s t s f a i l e d to o u t l i n e any comprehensive v i s i o n 
of the l i k e l y consequences of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of federalism. Perhaps 
t h i s was because they had l i t t l e idea themselves. Indeed, perhaps a 
s i m i l a r argument could be l e v e l l e d against that even higher f l i g h t of 
ide a l i s m . I m p e r i a l Federation. 
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CONCLUSION 
I m p e r i a l Federation has been described as 'a compound of 
idea l i s m and p o l i t i c a l opportunism, of s t r a t e g i c concern and economic 
a n x i e t y ' . ( 1 ) For E a r l Grey, idealism was the o v e r r i d i n g motive. 
Everything he believed i n seemed to show that I m p e r i a l Federation made 
p e r f e c t sense, and he took upon himself the task of promoting i t w i t h 
a l l h i s considerable ardour and enthusiasm. Yet he f a i l e d , and 
I m p e r i a l Federation came to nothing. This concluding chapter seeks to 
a s c e r t a i n the reason f o r t h i s . 
I n 1863 Goldwin Smith had dismissed the idea of a 'Greater 
B r i t a i n ' as a fantasy, and urged instead an infor m a l association 
between B r i t a i n and i t s self-governing colonies. Later, i n 1905, 
Richard Jebb expressed the view that f e d e r a t i o n had been rendered 
obsolete by the growth of a sense of nationalism i n countries such as 
A u s t r a l i a and Canada.(2) Why should countries which had been 
e s t a b l i s h i n g f o r themselves an i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y over the past f i f t y 
years, and been slowly e x t r i c a t i n g themselves from the g r i p of formal 
c o n t r o l by the B r i t i s h government, now v o l u n t a r i l y surrender t h e i r 
autonomy and be submerged i n a 'Greater B r i t a i n ' ? 
I t i s contended here that i t i s not enough to say that Imperial 
Federation f a i l e d j u s t because i t lacked popular support i n the 
Dominions. Kendle says that 'no major c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes can be 
imposed on a r e l u c t a n t democracy'.(3) But i s that not exactly what i s 
happening to B r i t a i n i n 1991, as i t s l i d e s inexorably towards a 
f e d e r a l Europe, which w i l l e n t a i l a considerable erosion of B r i t i s h 
sovereignty? The e l e c t o r a t e were consulted j u s t once on t h i s issue, 
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i n 1975, when they were asked whether they wanted to be i n a common 
economic market, not whether they were prepared to surrender p o l i t i c a l 
and l e g a l powers as w e l l . The vast m a j o r i t y of B r i t i s h people have 
l i t t l e understanding, and even less enthusiasm, f o r the prospect, and 
yet the whole episode i s presented to them as i f i t were i n e v i t a b l e . 
The p a r a l l e l s w i t h I m p e r i a l Federation are obvious. I t can be 
argued that when p u b l i c opinion i s s t r o n g l y i n favour of something, 
then p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l g e n e r a l l y concur, but that when p u b l i c opinion 
i s a p a t h e t i c , or even s l i g h t l y negative, p o l i t i c i a n s may nevertheless 
choose to disregard i t i f they f e e l i t expedient to do so. Thus, i n 
the 1990s p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l lead us towards a f e d e r a l Europe because 
they f e e l B r i t a i n ' s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t w i l l be best served i n that way, 
notw i t h s t a n d i n g p u b l i c f e e l i n g . I n 1918 Lloyd George could have 
introduced U.K. f e d e r a t i o n i f he had wished, because he would probably 
have had enough support i n the House of Commons, and the apathy of the 
e l e c t o r a t e would not have been an immediate obstacle. 
Thus Grey was c l e a r l y c o r r e c t i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t , i f he and 
others could s t i r up enough enthusiasm f o r I m p e r i a l Federation among 
the populace i n B r i t a i n and the Dominions, t h e i r cause might yet be 
won, and p o l i t i c i a n s would bow to t h e i r demands f o r consolidation of 
the Empire. So Grey was wise i n seeking to promote a f e e l i n g of 
i m p e r i a l sentiment i n every way imaginable. I f he won over enough of 
the l e d , then t h e i r leaders would surely f o l l o w . 
The problem was that the populace were not i n t e r e s t e d . 
Undoubtedly Grey d i d succeed i n making many Canadians more aware of 
the Empire, and i n provoking among those who were already i m p e r i a l i s t s 
a gre a t e r enthusiasm. Yet, as H a l l e t t suggests, because these people 
spoke o f the Empire i n the same glowing terms that Grey himself used, 
he mistakenly believed that they had the same goals.(4) Like a l l 
i m p e r i a l f e d e r a t i o n i s t s , he tended to mistake the l i p - s e r v i c e paid to 
h i s slogans as agreement w i t h h i s aims. (5) There was a vast 
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d i f f e r e n c e between being an i m p e r i a l i s t and a f e d e r a t i o n i s t , a f a c t of 
which Grey u s u a l l y seemed o b l i v i o u s . 
While a f e e l i n g of c o l o n i a l n ationalism could not by i t s e l f 
have prevented I m p e r i a l Federation from reaching f r u i t i o n , i t did 
c e r t a i n l y mean tha t Grey and h i s compatriots were unable to use public 
pressure to win over the p o l i t i c i a n s . Grey was not wrong i n arguing 
th a t n a t i o n a l i s m and imperialism need not be incompatible; but he 
extended the idea beyond the bounds of common sense by saying that 
n a t i o n a l i s m could f l o u r i s h alongside I m p e r i a l Federation. What he was 
envisaging, even i f he d i d not express i t i n t h i s way, was a 'Greater 
B r i t a i n ' - which was i t s e l f j u s t an extension of B r i t i s h nationalism. 
This had l i t t l e appeal to most Canadians, A u s t r a l i a n s , or others. 
Grey seemed genuinely unaware of t h i s dichotomy. He claimed that he 
could see things l i k e a Canadian, but he was wrong: he saw things as a 
B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s t . Imperialism was a p e c u l i a r l y B r i t i s h phenomenon, 
emanating from the need to harness the Empire to b e n e f i t B r i t a i n , as 
w e l l as to use i t so as to promote the Anglo-Saxon notion of 
c i v i l i s a t i o n across the world. This had no more appeal to the keenest 
Canadian i m p e r i a l i s t s than i t d i d the A f r i k a n e r s i n the Transvaal, the 
Roman Catholics i n Southern I r e l a n d , or the overwhelming m a j o r i t y of 
c i t i z e n s i n the United States. 
Grey and h i s colleagues also f a i l e d to r e a l i s e that I m p e r i a l 
Federation aroused l i t t l e i n t e r e s t at home. The I m p e r i a l Federation 
League received support because i t appealed to p a t r i o t i c f e e l i n g more 
than because i t urged p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n . Like Canadians and the 
c i t i z e n s of other Dominions, most B r i t o n s were p e r f e c t l y content w i t h 
the e x i s t i n g i m p e r i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and saw no need f o r any change. 
Nor d i d the whole idea of the 'White Empire' ever s t i r up much 
emotion, whether among the populace or the leaders of opinion: the 
vast emptiness of the A u s t r a l i a n outback or the Canadian p r a i r i e s 
somehow f a i l e d to capture the imagination i n the same way as the 
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mystique of I n d i a . I n t h i s respect, the domestic p o l i t i c i a n s were 
much clo s e r to the pulse of popular f e e l i n g than Grey ever was. He 
never had any r e a l conception of p u b l i c opinion, and too e a s i l y 
mistook the deference of p o l i t e audiences or h i s f r i e n d s f o r support. 
This i s , a l a s , a common f a u l t among i d e a l i s t s . As one commentator has 
suggested: 
I m p e r i a l Federation was convincingly denied from at lea s t h a l f a 
dozen standpoints; yet those who believed i n i t continued to 
discuss i t as i f i t required no argument and needed only to be 
st a t e d to be received w i t h unanimous approval.(6) 
Lord Milner d i f f e r e d considerably from Grey i n t h i s respect, 
acknowledging i n 1902 that he was ^out of touch w i t h the predominant 
sentiment of my countrymen, the trend of opinion which u l t i m a t e l y 
determines p o l i c y ' . ( 7 ) But Milner had long loathed democracy, 
mai n t a i n i n g t h a t the e l e c t o r a t e was too ignorant to know what was best 
f o r the Empire or themselves. So Milner's a t t i t u d e supports the 
argument advanced here - f o r he believed that popular f e e l i n g should 
simply be bypassed. That i s why he and the Round Table d i r e c t e d t h e i r 
e f f o r t s e x c l u s i v e l y to winning over the p o l i t i c i a n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n 
B r i t a i n , on the assumption that i f these leaders became s u f f i c i e n t l y 
convinced of the expediency of I m p e r i a l Federation, then they would 
adopt i t regardless of p u b l i c opinion. So I m p e r i a l Federation would 
be successful i f the p o l i t i c i a n s chose to recommend i t . Sadly f o r 
Milner and Grey, they d i d not. 
As has been shown i n chapter four, the Dominions wished to 
promote the i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r own burgeoning economies, and i t was 
q u i t e impossible f o r them i n the period a f t e r 1900 to abolish t a r i f f s 
f o r B r i t i s h imports without l o s i n g considerable income. I m p e r i a l Free 
Trade would enable B r i t i s h goods to f l o o d t h e i r domestic markets. I t 
d i d not make sense f o r any country except B r i t a i n , whereas i m p e r i a l 
preference, which d i d make sense f o r many, could e a s i l y be established 
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i n f o r m a l l y and without the need f o r a corresponding p o l i t i c a l 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n . Yet a major hurdle to any system of preference was the 
obsession of the B r i t i s h people w i t h the d o c t r i n e of Free Trade, and -
as the Unionists discovered i n 1906 - no amount of i m p e r i a l i s t i c 
drum-beating could a l t e r t h a t . I t was to take a world war and an 
economic slump before that hallowed p r i n c i p l e was f i n a l l y buried, and 
an i m p e r i a l preference established i n 1932. 
C a l l s f o r m i l i t a r y f e d e r a t i o n were also doomed. The aspect of 
defence where co-operation was most widely advocated was naval p o l i c y , 
and yet here again there was considerable d i f f e r e n c e of opinion. 
B r i t a i n wanted a l a r g e number of b i g ships i n one i m p e r i a l navy, 
whereas the Dominions each had very d i f f e r e n t p r i o r i t i e s . New 
Zealand, f o r example, welcomed the p r o t e c t i o n afforded by a powerful 
Royal Navy, and was prepared to pay f o r the p r i v i l e g e , but Canada -
which d i d not f e e l a t t a c k against i t by sea was a l i k e l y prospect -
had l i t t l e i n t e r e s t . Moreover, as shown i n chapter four, the demand 
of the B r i t i s h Admiralty that the Dominions each c o n t r i b u t e a 
Dreadnought to the f l e e t f e l l on deaf ears, since the various 
governments believed t h i s would not b e n e f i t themselves, and that 
probably they would not a c t u a l l y see t h e i r ship anywhere near t h e i r 
shores. 
Economic f e d e r a t i o n was r e j e c t e d at the 1902 and 1907 Colonial 
Conferences, and by the general e l e c t i o n r e s u l t i n B r i t a i n i n 1906, 
w h i l e m i l i t a r y f e d e r a t i o n - and p a r t i c u l a r l y the prospect of a j o i n t 
naval s t r a t e g y - was k i l l e d o f f at the I m p e r i a l Defence Conference i n 
1909. Yet at l e a s t these were discussed by the p o l i t i c i a n s . 
P o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n of the Empire, by comparison, was f o r most never 
any more than a fantasy. While the idea of co-operation i n strategy 
might sound a good idea i n theory, i t would mean nothing i n p r a c t i c e 
unless a l l the Dominions acted j o i n t l y . Yet many f e l t that the 
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Dominions already acted c l o s e l y enough w i t h B r i t a i n , c onsulting 
W h i t e h a l l on issues r e l a t i n g to f o r e i g n p o l i c y , and s i m i l a r matters. 
I m p e r i a l Federation amounted to f a r more than j u s t co-
ope r a t i o n . I t would have involved a wholesale sharing of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as w e l l as powers. Any c e n t r a l body - whether a 
c o u n c i l or an I m p e r i a l Parliament - would i n e v i t a b l y be based i n 
B r i t a i n , and would be dominated by B r i t i s h concerns. I f 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n any assembly was a l l o c a t e d according to the 
popu l a t i o n of each country, then B r i t i s h delegates would e a s i l y 
outnumber a l l the others together. Moreover, Canada would no more 
wish i t s i n t e r e s t s to be discussed and voted upon by the Australians 
than by the B r i t i s h , and v i c e versa. I t was these p r a c t i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , more than popular s e n s i b i l i t i e s , which rendered 
p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n impossible. 
For Grey and h i s f e l l o w i m p e r i a l i s t s , the outbreak of the F i r s t 
World War renewed i n them f a l s e hopes about what might be achieved by 
the Dominions being compelled to work so c l o s e l y together. His 
kinsman, the Foreign Secretary S i r Edward Grey, r e c a l l e d l a t e r : 
I t was the v i s i o n of the people of B r i t a i n and of the Dominions 
combined i n one high resolve and e f f o r t that i n s p i r e d him and 
r a i s e d h i s own s p i r i t s to a height of enthusiasm and 
confidence.(8) 
At f i r s t glance the extent of the co-operation was considerable: more 
than 2,500,000 c o l o n i a l s fought alongside the B r i t i s h , and A u s t r a l i a 
and Canada each l o s t almost 60,000 servicemen i n the war. Moreover, 
lea d i n g i m p e r i a l i s t s obtained p o s i t i o n s of power. Curzon j o i n e d the 
government i n May 1915, and Milner i n December 1916. Astor, C u r t i s 
and Kerr served i n Lloyd George's personal s e c r e t a r i a t , and Amery i n 
the Cabinet e q u i v a l e n t . Largely at Milner's behest, the Dominion 
Premiers were i n v i t e d to London i n 1917 f o r an I m p e r i a l Conference, 
and to j o i n the War Cabinet. This was as near to an I m p e r i a l Council 
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as there ever was. C e r t a i n l y Grey was d e l i g h t e d , and i n conversation 
w i t h Begbie remarked: 
We must have, w i t h f u l l l o c a l autonomy f o r a l l the p a r t s , an 
I m p e r i a l Senate at the heart of the Empire l e g i s l a t i n g f o r the 
welfare of the whole Commonwealth. I cannot understand how men 
shut t h e i r eyes to the wisdom of the idea.(9) 
So Grey was c o n t i n u i n g to urge that n e i t h e r conferences nor a council 
were adequate. Only an I m p e r i a l Parliament would s u f f i c e i n a system 
of p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n ; but he saw the I m p e r i a l War Cabinet as a 
splendid forerunner. However, the 1917 Conference d i d nothing to 
s t i m u l a t e i m p e r i a l u n i t y , and discussion about the Empire's 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p was deferred to a post-war conference -
which i n f a c t was never summoned.(10) I f he had l i v e d beyond 1917, 
Grey would have been b i t t e r l y disappointed. 
As was shown i n chapter s i x , once the problem of I r e l a n d was 
solved, the impetus f o r United Kingdom f e d e r a t i o n faded. I n much the 
same way, once the 1914-18 war ended, the need f o r i m p e r i a l 
c o n s o l i d a t i o n d i d not appear to be so urgent. The c a l l s f o r m i l i t a r y 
co-operation lapsed, and most countries were pre-occupied w i t h 
reducing the s i z e of t h e i r armies as r a p i d l y as possible. Moreover, 
i n t e r - i m p e r i a l trade had grown r a p i d l y of i t s own accord, without any 
d i r e c t c o n t r o l or the encouragement of t a r i f f reform, and was to 
continue r i s i n g over the next twenty years. 
The war also rendered obsolete the prospect of p o l i t i c a l 
f e d e r a t i o n . At a time when B r i t a i n and the other v i c t o r s were 
p o n t i f i c a t i n g about the r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r the 
new s t a t e s i n Eastern Europe, i t seemed f a r c i c a l that the Dominions 
should now be expected to submerge t h e i r own nascent i d e n t i t i e s i n t o a 
'Greater B r i t a i n ' . Local n a t i o n a l i s t f e e l i n g rose up everywhere - i n 
I r e l a n d and I n d i a e s p e c i a l l y , and among the A f r i k a n e r s and Canadian 
French. The f a i l u r e of B r i t a i n to maintain i t s c o n t r o l of I r e l a n d , 
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j u s t t h i r t y miles from i t s c o a s t l i n e , and despite the s t a t i o n i n g of 
30,000 troops there, underlined B r i t a i n ' s weakening g r i p on i t s 
possessions, and seemed to render f u t i l e the c a l l s f o r closer i m p e r i a l 
u n i t y . 
The Empire was not represented as a s i n g l e u n i t at the 
V e r s a i l l e s peace t a l k s : instead, there were representatives from both 
B r i t a i n and each of the Dominions - a minor p o i n t , but s i g n i f i c a n t . 
I n 1922 Canada and South A f r i c a p o i n t e d l y refused to support B r i t i s h 
p o l i c y defending the Dardanelles against Turkey, and i n 1923 Canada 
concluded a t r e a t y w i t h the United States without reference to 
B r i t a i n . The Dominions f e l t that they had 'come of age', and that 
they no longer needed to seek mother's permission before going out to 
play. 
I n B r i t a i n i t s e l f , even the e f f o r t s of two f e d e r a t i o n i s t 
C o l o n i a l Secretaries - Milner (1919-21) and l a t e r Amery (1924-29) -
were f r u i t l e s s . The endeavours of the d o c t r i n a i r e Amery to e s t a b l i s h 
i m p e r i a l preference and to promote i m p e r i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n were 
thwarted by h i s more cautious Cabinet colleagues, as was h i s desire to 
e s t a b l i s h a new Dominion i n East A f r i c a . C l e a r l y Amery, Milner and 
t h e i r l i k e , although now occupying senior p o s i t i o n s i n government, 
were out of touch w i t h how the Empire was developing. 
The r e a l i t y was t h a t , as Goldwin Smith had long maintained, the 
'Consolidate or D i s i n t e g r a t e ' scenario was wrong. There was a 
p e r f e c t l y acceptable middle course - a calm e v o l u t i o n from semi-formal 
to i n f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and i t s Dominions, from 
associate to par t n e r s h i p s t a t u s . This new r e l a t i o n s h i p formed the 
basis of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth, established at the 1926 Im p e r i a l 
Conference, and defined as: 
autonomous communities w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Empire, equal i n s t a t u s , 
i n no way subordinate one to another i n any aspect of t h e i r 
domestic or e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s , though u n i t e d by a common allegiance 
to the crown, and f r e e l y associated as members of the B r i t i s h 
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Commonwealth of Nations.(11) 
This idea of a commonwealth was fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from 
what Grey had envisaged. Although he always talked of equal 
p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h i n the 'White Empire', he always saw B r i t a i n as the 
mother and the Dominions as the daughters: he looked forward to the 
day when the daughters were mature enough to help take decisions and 
bear many of the burdens of the whole f a m i l y , but u l t i m a t e l y the 
agenda would continue to be set by the mother. 
I n t h i s respect Grey made the fundamental e r r o r of assuming 
that the i n t e r e s t s of the Dominions would always be i d e n t i c a l w i t h 
those of B r i t a i n . Moreover, Grey can never have ser i o u s l y 
contemplated a s i t u a t i o n where B r i t a i n might f i n d i t s e l f outvoted or 
outmanoeuvred by the Dominions i n an Im p e r i a l Parliament. The primary 
purpose of i m p e r i a l preference was to prote c t the B r i t i s h economy, and 
the main r o l e of the Royal Navy was to pr o t e c t B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s at 
home and abroad. There was not the s l i g h t e s t chance that Grey or any 
other f e d e r a t i o n i s t s s e r i o u s l y imagined B r i t a i n ' s wishes being 
subordinated to anyone else's. 
At t h i s time the 'White Empire' could s t i l l be considered as a 
'f a m i l y ' . Grey was co r r e c t i n i d e n t i f y i n g that i t shared a common 
c u l t u r e and language, which i s more than the European Community can 
boast. Yet I m p e r i a l Federation d i d not make sense. The daughters, 
q u i t e understandably, each had d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s and a s p i r a t i o n s , 
and wanted to be allowed to make t h e i r own decisions. Grey and the 
other f e d e r a t i o n i s t s simply f a i l e d to r e a l i s e t h i s , which was a 
fundamental e r r o r . P o l i t i c i a n s , as suggested e a r l i e r , are guided 
p r i m a r i l y by expediency: and the vast m a j o r i t y of them recognised 
c l e a r l y that d i s i n t e g r a t i o n was not the only a l t e r n a t i v e to Imper i a l 
Federation. 
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Grey commented to Begbie i n 1917: 
Here I l i e on my death-bed - l o o k i n g clear i n t o the Promised Land. 
I'm not allowed to enter i t , but there i t i s before my eyes. 
A f t e r the War the people of t h i s country w i l l enter i t , and those 
who laughed at me f o r a dreamer w i l l see that I wasn't so wrong 
a f t e r a l l . But there's s t i l l work to do f o r those who didn't 
laugh, hard work, and w i t h much opposi t i o n i n t h e i r way; a l l the 
same, i t i s work r i g h t up against the goal. My dreams have come 
true.(1 2 ) 
Sadly, Grey's eyes were deceiving him. I f h i s c r i t i c s were too 
s h o r t - s i g h t e d to appreciate Grey's i d e a l i s t i c v i s i o n of an Anglo-Saxon 
f e d e r a t i o n ensuring world peace and progress throughout the world, 
towards which I m p e r i a l Federation was a v i t a l p r e l i m i n a r y step, then 
i t i s e q u a l l y tru e that Grey s u f f e r e d from long-sightedness, i n being 
unable to see the sheer i m p o s s i b i l i t y of what he preached. He f a i l e d 
to r e a l i s e t h a t f e d e r a t i o n e n t a i l e d a degree of subordination which 
none of the Dominions would countenance. Nor d i d he seem aware of the 
f a c t t h a t the e x i s t i n g power-base of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and of 
the B r i t i s h government i t s e l f , would be r a d i c a l l y a l t e r e d by any such 
fundamental change as I m p e r i a l Federation. I t i s l i t t l e wonder that 
no mainstream p o l i t i c i a n except Chamberlain ever embraced the idea. 
The vast m a j o r i t y d i d not see I m p e r i a l Federation as e i t h e r expedient 
or s e n s i b l e , and hence, i n the absence of a popular demand f o r i t , the 
whole idea was a n o n - s t a r t e r . As Ronald Hyam says; 
The whole dream of an organic i m p e r i a l i n t e g r a t i o n was 
u n r e a l i s t i c , misplaced, narrow and out of touch w i t h the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l p o l i t i c a l and economic development of B r i t a i n and the 
Empire.(13) 
E a r l Grey's passion f o r I m p e r i a l Federation was motivated by 
the highest, and most noble, idealism. This led him to see beyond the 
s o r d i d r e a l i t y of p o l i t i c s to the horizon, to indulge i n l i f e not as 
i t was but as i t might be. He was probably one of the most h i g h l y 
p r i n c i p l e d men of h i s generation, and h i s whole approach to I m p e r i a l 
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Federation i s imbued w i t h a v i s i o n a r y zeal which i s both compelling 
and deserving of study. I r o n i c a l l y , i t was because he was so 
i d e a l i s t i c that he was simply unable to recognise the world as i t 
r e a l l y was. 
I n h i s o b i t u a r y i n The Times i n August 1917, t h i s statement was 
made about Grey's Dominion House p r o j e c t : 
I t was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of h i s defects as w e l l as of his strength. 
I t was imaginative and i n s p i r i n g i n i t s conception, b u t . . . i t s 
p r a c t i c a l usefulness was less conspicuous than i t s sentimental 
appeal.(14) 
This, s u r e l y , i s an apt d e s c r i p t i o n of Grey's involvement w i t h 
I m p e r i a l Federation, as w e l l as of the idea i t s e l f . I t i s also an 
a p p r o p r i a t e , and by no means dishonourable or unworthy, epitaph of the 
p e r s o n a l i t y of the 4th E a r l Grey, 'Paladin of Empire'. 
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to i t s authorship and date. 
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